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Abstract
The USAF/Rockwell International B-lB strategic bomber's
protracted development period stretches over seven
Administrations. The bomber was conceived in the early
60s, it suffered cancellation at the hands of President
Carter in 1977, and it was resurrected in 1981 by
President Reagan. With a projected service life of 30
years, the B-lB bridges the gap between the retiring B-52s
and the next generation advanced technology stealth
bomber.
Like many of the "Big Technology" projects, the B-lB's
development was continuously shaped both by emerging new
technologies and political processes. This study examines
various facets of these processes and technologies, and
provides an historical perspective on them. The
development of this bomber was largely influenced by four
factors: vast uncertainties associated with the
constantly changing nature of enemy threats, technical
challenges to counteract these threats, Congressional
micromanagement through appropriations and through
oversight of General Accounting Office, and the imposition
of a strict cost and initial operating capability
schedule. The Congressional mandate of initial operating
capability by 1987 was backed by presidential assurances
of $20.5 billion (in 1981 dollars) for acquisition.
In spite of these limitations, the designers and builders
of the B-1B bomber were successful in developing a
flexible strategy, and produced a variety of technical
choices. In the end, the Air Force found itself managing a
program in which development, production and basing of the
aircraft were concurrent. From the outset, the Air Force
accepted the significant risk entailed in such a
concurrent program, and indeed, it did have to compromise
later by announcing a delay in the initial operating
capability of the bomber. The development of the defensive
avionics system was at the center of scrutiny which
resulted as a consequence of this delay.
The aircraft's development plans were influenced by two
fatal crashes, one in 1984, and the other in 1987. In FY
1986, the funding was cut by $1 billion (in 1981 dollars).
This sum was to be recovered from acquisition improvement
programs such as productivity enhancement and multiyear
procurement. Even so, $30.33 billion (in then-year
dollars) have been spent for acquiring 100 B-lBs. At the
time of this writing, the Strategic Air Command has 72
operational B-1B bombers in its various wings. The mission
readiness goal of 30% of the fleet is expected to be met
in the early 90s.
Multi-role capability of the B-1B bomber includes the
cruise missile standoff mission. Inclusion of this
capability made it heavy relative to its initial design.
In addition, the fixed geometry inlet limited the B-1B's
capability to a flight Mach number of 1.3. A new engine
development and variable geometry inlet were not pursued
because of the additional cost and schedule delays. The
defensive avionics system development was designed in the
early 80s to maintain the B-1B's penetration capability
into enemy air defenses well into the mid-90s. The long
term projection of the degree of enemy threat was
necessarily uncertain and hence conservative. This element
of conservatism determined the system's specifications.
The system's concurrent development, production and
integration was faced with many unforeseen problems. In
early 1987, the Air Force sought additional funding to
handle these problems, but the future of this funding is
still uncertain.
The acquisition of a multiyear, multibillion dollar
technically complex weapons system such as the B-lB, might
have been more efficient if there had been: stability in
its mission requirements; stability in its political and
fiscal support; a high degree of government-industry
accountability; constant communication between its
designers and its operational command; complete field
testing of its prototype hardware under simulated
conditions before its design was released for production;
and responsible coverage of the issues and problems of the
program by the popular press.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCT ION
"We don't build bombers to go to war. We build them
to keep from going to war. May it never fly in anger."
This message from Secretary of Air Force Verne Orr
(Canan, 1984, pp 53) was pronounced at the roll-out of
United States Air Force's (USAF) new variable sweep wing
B-lB bomber (see Figure 1-1 on page 22) on September 4,
1984, at Rockwell International Corporation's assembly
plant in Palmdale, California. The first production B-1B
was delivered to Strategic Air Command (SAC) at Dyass Air
Force Base in Texas on 29 June, 1985, some 32 years after
the first B-52 bomber was delivered (Berry, 1985). The
B-lB bomber is expected to be in the service for well into
the twenty first century as a viable air-breathing leg of
United States' (US') triad strategy of defense against
Russian attack. At the time of this writing, there are 72
of the B-1B bombers in SAC's inventory.
On October 2, 1981, President Reagan announced his
intention to build 100 of the multi-role long range combat
aircraft (LRCA), the B-1B bombers, as a part of his
-22-
Figure 1-1: The B-lB Bomber
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strategic forces modernization program (Robinson, 1981a).
The acquisition price was quoted to be $27 billion in
then-year funds. But, when President Carter announced on
June 30, 1977, that he had decided to discontinue plans
for the B-1 bomber in favor of air launched cruise
missiles (ALCM), he effectively killed a strategic bomber
program which was some eleven years in the making
(Weinraub, 1977). The B-1 bomber was fully supported by
both President Ford and President Nixon. The feasibility
studies of a new manned strategic aircraft (AMSA) began in
1965 during President Johnson's administration. It is this
AMSA which eventually became the B-1B bomber.
During both President Kennedy's and President
Johnson's administration, Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara was a staunch opponent of any replacement for the
ailing B-52s and supersonic B-58 bombers. Throughout, he
was an ardent supporter of missile defense but reluctantly
supported the predecessor of the B-1, i.e., the supersonic
Mach 3 B-70 chemical bomber. He vigilantly fought with the
Congress to kill that program but with little success. The
B-70 bomber was conceived in 1953 during President
Eisenhower's time under the code name of weapon system
WS-110. It is with this background and the first delivery
of the B-52 bomber to SAC in September 1955, the program
history of the B-1B bomber begins. The present study
-24-
encompasses a period of some 32 years which stretches over
seven presidencies.
The fundamental purpose of this study is to acquire
and present knowledge about the technological and
political processes which shaped the development of a
major weapons system acquisition, the B-1B bomber, which
is being acquired by the USAF. The compilation and the
intensive analysis of history of this nearly completed
acquisition (due date in April of 1988) in no way intends
to criticise past development procedures associated with
the project; neither does it pretend to advocate one kind
of research-and-development (R&D) management strategy as
opposed to another (Marschak, Glenmann and Summers, 1967).
The B-1B bomber program has been highly visible since
early 1987. In a large defense acquisition program such as
this, in addition to technical uncertainties, often there
are shifting perceptions of the enemy's capabilities which
complicate technical development. Also, there are many
other strategic uncertainties. These strategic
uncertainties have their roots in political processes.
These processes encompass the strategic defense policies
of the ongoing administration on one hand and perceptions
and preferences of the Armed Services and of the Congress
(both the House and Senate) to realize the goals of such
-25-
policies on the other hand. The public and the
contractor's interest also play a significant role through
the process of lobbying making procurement a nightmare at
times. The secondary purpose of this study is to learn
more about the crafting of strategy by the North-American
Rockwell Corporation (the prime contractor for the B-1B
bomber) under these political uncertainties (Mintzberg,
1987).
Throughout this study, details of the technologies of
the airframe, engines, avionics, bomber payloads and other
systems associated with the B-l bomber (both the B-1A and
B-1B versions) are discussed together with the political
processes which shaped their evolution. To understand the
capabilities and present criticism of the performance
characteristics of the bomber (Evans, 1987c), the reverse
engineering approach was attempted. However, due to the
lack of necessary data, this approach was not pursued. The
views presented in this study are the views of the
outsiders, i.e., these views were described in: various
news papers, magazines and journal articles, publications
of private research institutions and studies of
Congressional and governmental institutions. People who
were directly involved in day-to-day management of the
program (e.g. employees of the North-American Rockwell
Corporation or of its subcontractors, Department of
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Defense officials, officials of the USAF etc.) were quoted
or referred to only in purely technical literature. These
people responded to author's request for literature on the
program through their office of Public Relations and to
that extent, their opinions are referred to at appropriate
places within this study.
The remaining portion of this chapter describes the
organization of the thesis document. Chapter 2 summarizes
background development which played a significant role in
the feasibility study of AMSA which eventually became the
B-1B bomber. This chapter primarily focuses on a period
covering some 25 years (1940-1965) in the history of the
program. A brief history of bombers is presented in the
beginning. In addition, this chapter discusses major
events such as: the first delivery of the B-52 bomber to
SAC, development of the supersonic bomber B-58;
Congressional debate on the need to modernize SAC in
response to Russian air power gain and to seek future
replacement to B-52s and B-58s; the birth and growth of
the Mach 3 chemical bomber B-70 (WS-110) and its
reconnaissance derivative RB-70. In addition, this chapter
also discusses: the first delivery of refueling tanker
KC-135 to SAC (upgraded versions of these tankers are
still being used to refuel the B-lBs); the development of
nuclear powered aircraft; and the saga of shooting down of
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the U-2 aircraft and its repercussions on the development
of the B-70 bomber. The House and Administration's fight
for the funding of the follow-on manned bomber is also
described. It is this fight which brought about the
Constitutional debate over "the Congress's right to raise
the armies". Discussion on the increasing role of missiles
in national defense is also included here. In addition,
this chapter discusses the birth of a new designation
scheme for defense aircraft which gave the B-1 bomber the
name it bears. A brief discussion of the study of a low
altitude penetrator bomber, and other fore-runner aircraft
to AMSA which set a stage for the funding of the ASMA
program, is presented next. This chapter concludes with a
summary of the development of variable sweep wing.
Chapter 3 covers the period of some five years in
B-lB's history. In particular, the time frame of 1965 to
1970 is included. During this period, the major events
that influenced the birth of the B-1 bomber were the crash
of the B-70 bomber; the proposal to introduce the variable
sweep wing FB-111 as an intermediate bomber; and further
studies and technical developments under AMSA program. The
stage set by these events led the Air Force to send
request for proposal to acquire the B-1 bomber. Two
leading candidates for the bomber design were considered
at that time. The related Congressional politics of the
time is also briefly discussed.
-28-
Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the birth and
growth of the B-1 (designated as the B-1A bomber from
hence on) bomber. This chapter presents a study of some
seven years from 1970 to 1976. It summarizes the B-1A
program reorganization, technological development,
recommendations of the Bisplinghoff committee report and
the Congressional debate on cost effective cruise missile
launcher aircraft alternatives. During Carter's
Presidency, a large public debate surfaced which
criticized continued funding for the B-1A bomber. This
debate is also discussed. Information on program delays,
the first roll-out of the bomber and the national debate
on the production decision of the B-1A bomber are also
included in this chapter.
In Chapter 5, which covers the time period of
1976-1977, I have included a discussion of all the events
which led to the cancellation of the B-1A program in favor
of ALCM. National debate on the bomber issue and its
alternative programs, and a description of the prescribed
limited development of the B-1A bomber are also discussed
here.
Chapter 6 presents the study of the next three and a
half years (1977-1980) in the history of the bomber. This
chapter discusses the repercussions of the B-1A bomber
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cancellations and the Congressional debates that followed.
The studies describing the B-1A alternatives such as the
cruise missiles, and the new modified multi-role B-1A
bomber, are also summarized. It is this study on the
multi-role bomber which provided a strong argument in
favor of resurrection of the manned bomber program. This
chapter concludes with the discussion of the on-going
flight testing of the B-1A prototypes.
The period of 1980-1981 is studied in Chapter 7. The
results of the bomber penetration evaluation study of the
B-1A bomber equipped with both the defensive and offensive
avionics systems are presented here. In addition, this
chapter discusses the Congressional debate which mandated
a 1987 initial operational capability deadline for the new
bomber. Moreover, results of governmental studies on
alternative bomber programs (including FB-111H bomber and
the stealth bomber) are presented together with the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board's recommendations for the
long-range combat aircraft (LRCA). At the end, President
Reagan's Strategic Forces Modernization Plan announcement
is included. Under this plan, the manned bomber program
was given new life and the modified B-1A bomber (called
the B-lB bomber) was given production status.
The next chapter covers the period of 1981 through
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1986. During this period, the B-1B bomber acquisition
proceeded without interruption and hence, the yearly
progress of the bomber program is presented. This chapter
contains a description of further technological
developments and details of the production program and
management controls of the B-1B bomber. Manufacturing
technologies and the problems associated with the
production of the bomber, the multiyear production
contract debate and the delivery of the bomber to SAC are
discussed in this chapter. This chapter also summarizes
the results of the program micromanagement efforts by
Congress. These efforts led to numerous Congressional
studies criticizing the cost, schedule, delivery and
logistics of the bomber's absorption into SAC. The crash
of the B-1B bomber and the development of its emerging
competitor aircraft, the stealth bomber, are also
discussed. This chapter also discusses the future
possibilities of continuing the B-1B bomber production
line beyond the 100 aircraft purchased as per now. Program
delays resulting from fuel leak problems and from new
defensive avionics integration, are summarized at the end
of this chapter. These delays, the additional funding
needed to cure them, and further flight testing necessary
to mature the aircraft, set the stage for the high
visibility of the program in early 1987.
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In Chapter 9, I have discussed the the B-1B bomber
program in 1987. Special attention is given to the
problems faced by the bomber, the public outcry of the
mismanagement of the program, the Air Force's reply to
that, and two major Congressional studies which examined
the program status and readiness of the bomber to support
SAC. In addition, a brief discussion of the B-1B
appropriations debate, continued flight testing and the
second fatal crash is provided. A summary of the current
status of the program is included at the end.
Chapter 10 summarizes the program history of the B-1B
bomber. It also discusses the understanding and knowledge
acquired of the technological and political processes
which shaped the development and procurement of this major
weapon system by the USAF. In addition, this chapter
provides my opinions on the B-lB's acqusition process, and
my recommendations on ways of improving efficiency of
overall acquisition system.
Two appendices are also included. Appendix A provides
the information on the predicted aerodynamic performance
of the B-lB bomber. Such information can form bases for a
reverse engineering study to evaluate the performance of
the B-1B bomber. As mentioned earlier, this approach was
not pursued. In Appendix B, the opportunity costs of the
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B-1B program are discussed. This includes studies of: (a)
employment and energy impacts of the B-1B procurement and
(b) the value of the B-lBs that lies in the difference
between the benefits obtained by procuring the bombers and
those benefits that could have been obtained by building
equivalent defense systems using the same resources.
At the end, this thesis document includes a
bibliography of references used and my short biography.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND (1940 - 1965)
The inception of the idea of an advanced manned
strategic aircraft (AMSA) grew out of a complex set of
political and technological developments. It is this AMSA
which became the B-lB of today. Before the AMSA, many
other bombers were developed. These bombers played a
significant role in the technology of the AMSA. A brief
history of these bombers and other related aircraft is
provided in this chapter.
2.1 A Brief History of Bombers
Figure 2-1 on page 34 illustrates a vast range of the
operational aircraft over a period of 1900 to 1960 ("SAC
Gains Powerful Deterrent in B-58", (1960)). The bomber era
seem to have begun by the early Twenties. We shall focus
our attention on the period beginning in the 1940s.
The strategic bombardment of Germany in World War II
by the USAF was carried out largely with B-17s, B-24s and
B-50s (York, 1970). These were the subsonic propeller-
driven aircraft. The bombardment of Japan, including the
fire-bombing of Tokyo and other major cities and the
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delivery of the two atomic bombs, was carried out with
B-29s, another type of subsonic propeller-driven aircraft.
These were specially designed for the Pacific regions
where a much larger range was needed than for the European
regions. Aircraft continued after World War II until 1960
to be the sole means of delivery of US' strategic weapons.
And even today, a large bulk of total megatonnage in US
nuclear stockpile is still programmed to be delivered by
aircraft.
After World War II the B-36 bomber, an extremely
long-range propeller-driven aircraft, was introduced into
to the force to give the US a home-based intercontinental
strategic bombardment capabilities. All of these
propeller-driven aircraft were eventually replaced by the
B-47 and B-52 bombers.
2.2 The B-47 and B-52 Bombers
The first American medium jet bomber, the Boeing
B-47, was introduced into the Air Force's inventory in the
late Forties. It did not have either the desired range or
the desired payload-carrying capacity, and hence, the B-52
was designed to specifically meet these capabilities. The
B-52 was essentially a much larger version of the B-47 and
was called the Stratofortess heavy bomber. The USAF's
basic requirement for the B-52 dates back to early 1946,
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with Boeing starting preliminary design studies later that
year. It was announced in September 1947 that two
prototypes of the XB-52 (where the X stands for "
experimental" and the B stands for the "bomber") had been
ordered, and they first flew in early 1952. Eight models
were subsequently produced ("Keeping the Boeing B-52
Operational Until the End of the Century", 1978). The
production roll-out of B-52A was in March 1954
("Production B-52A Rolls Off Line", 1954). In September of
1955, the 93rd Bombardment Wing of SAC at the Castle Air
Force Base in California received its first operational
B-52 Stratofortess ("A Behemoth Joins the Air Force",
1955).
Boeing did manage to get orders to modernize the B-52
weapon system providing a total of 742 of the B-52 B, C,
D, E, F and G model mix to the USAF by 26 October 1962. A
complete history of the B-52 weapon system and its present
status is provided in a Boeing Company's document (Boeing
Corporation, 1984). A summary of the B-52 models is
provided in Table 2-I on page 37. Table 2-II on page 38
provides technical data for the B-52G and B-52H models
(Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1986-87, pp. 378-379).
Currently, the Air Force plans to retire the last 98
B-52Gs (with cruise missile carrying capability) beginning
in the early 1990 as the advanced technology stealth
-37-
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B-52 mrodels
The US Air Force's basic requirement for the
8-52 dates back to early in 1946, with Boeing
starting preliminary design studies later that
year. It was announced in September 1947
that two prototypes, designated XB-52, had
been ordered, and the first flew in early 1952.
Eight models were subsequently produced.
8-52A: Three pre-production aircraft were
' produced under this designation, with a
revised cockpit layout compared with the
prototypes. They were similarto the first series
version. the 8-528. and have now been with-
drawn from operational service.
8-528: Weighing over 180 tonnes. the 8-528
was capable of nuclear and conventional
bombing and photo reconnaissance. Fifty were
built and these are no longer in operational
service.
B-52C: Featuring increased weight (over 204
tonnes), 35 of this model were built, but are
now withdrawn from operational use.
8-520/E/F: A total of 170 B-52Ds were
produced. embodying a number of improve-
ments over the C-model, including aerial
refuelling capability. These are still opera-
tional. The B-52E and F were similar. except
"that the latter had uprated J57 engines; 100
· and 89 of each were built respectively. These
- two versions are no longer in the operational
- inventory. ;.,-- 
-52G: This model was extensively rede-
.signed, featuring a slightly shorter fuselage '
· ,:and cut-down vertical tail. It has uprated J57"
-. ,aEnginesandrevised defensive armament, with .1
y* '1nrlllrl'e*eat - Aed ; e raal 
.a fuselage to the forward crew compartment.
: Still operational, it will receive the new Offten- .
·sive Avionics System and cruise missile launch j
racks. A total of 193 were built. 1
8-52H: Although externally similar to the G- 
:'model,thisversion hasdifferent engines (TF33 '
·turbofans), giving much greater range. as well
as new tail armament. Production amounted to i
.102 units and, like the G, the 8-52H has been 4
·progressively updated; both models can carry
SRAM (Short-Range Attack Missiles). have
advanced Phase VI ECM and EOS (Electro- ,
optical Viewing Systems) equipment. The -
8-52H will remain operational until the end of
the century, alongside the G.
,/'
~~~·~ ~ · rt·.--·;;lr- · -~· l
Table 2-I: The B-52 Bomber Models
_· Y __-- __
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The following details apply to the B-52G and B-52H:
Pow PLANT (B-S2G): Eight 61.2 kN (13,750 lb st) J57-P-
43WB turbojet engines. Fuel capacity 174,130 litres
(46,000 US gallons) internally, plus two 2.650 litre (700
US gallon) underwing drop tanks.
POWR PLANT (B-52H): Eight 75-6 kN (17,000 lb st) Pratt &
Whitney TF33-P-3 turbofan engines. Fuel capacity as totr
B-52G.
AccwooDAnon (B-52G/H): Crew of six (pilot and co-
pilot, side by side on flight deck, navigator, radar
navigator, ECM operator and gunner).
AatAmI,'T (B-52G): Four 050 in machine-gus in tail
turret, remotely operated by AGS- 15 fire control system,
remote radar control, or closed circuit TV. Up to 20
Boeing AGM-69 SRAM short-range attack missiles
eight on rotary launcher in internal weapons bay, and six
under each wing. plus nuclear free-fall bombs; ability to
carry AGM-86 cruise missiles being introduced progres-
sively on large proportion of fleet.
Awleinr (B-52H): As B-52G, except for single 20 mm
Vulcan multi-barrel cannon in tail turret instead of four
machine-guns.
DwENs, XTRNAL
Wing span 56-39 m (185 ft 0 in)
Wing ara. gross 371-6 ml (4,000 sq t)
Length overall 49-05 m (160 ft 10-9 in)
Height overall 12-40 m (40 ft in)
Wheel track (c/I ofshock struts) 2-51 m (8 ft 3 in)
Wheelbase 1548 m (0 t 3 in)
DImhcNON, tN=rUNAL:
Weapons bay volume 29-53 ml (1,043 cu ft)
Max T-O weight more than 221.350 kg (488,000 lb)
PEMIIANCE
Max level speed at high altitude
Mach 0.90 (516 knots; 957 km/h; 595 mph)
Cruising speed at high altitude
Mach 0-77 (442 knots: 819 km/h; 509 mph)
Penetration speed at low altitude Mach 0-53 to 0.55
(352-365 knots; 652-676 km/h; 405-420 mph)
Service ceiling 16,765 m (55,000 ft)
T- run: G 3,050 m (10,000 ft)
H 2,900 m (9,500 ft)
Range with max fuel, without in-flight refuelling:
G more than 6,513 nm (12,070 km; 7,500 miles)
H more than 8,685 m (16,093 km; 10,000 miles)
Table 2-II: Technical Data for B-52G and B-52H Bombers
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bombers are developed (United States Congress, 1986). And
it is the search for the replacement to these B-52s right
from their first delivery to SAC in 1955, which constitute
program history of the B-1B bomber.
2.3 The B-57, B-58 and B-66B Bombers and KC-135 Tankers
The B-57 Canberra, a light bomber, did remain in
SAC's inventory from the mid fifties to the mid sixties
and was primarily used for reconnaissance and later was
assigned duties in South Vietnam. It was a high subsonic
medium range US version of the British Canberra bomber.
The other bomber which became operational in the late
fifties and obsolete in the late sixties was Convair's
B-58 bomber. It was named the Hustler. The Hustler was a
delta-wing design, aimed at operating at the supersonic
speed of 1000 miles per hour (mph). The development of the
Hustler was announced by the Pentagon in December 1952 and
it was scheduled for test flights in 1957 (Holz, 1954;
"B-58 Program", 1954). Its speed capability was a result
of two major technical breakthroughs. They were the
development of the area rule fuselage and the development
and use of sandwich material for bomber skin (Lewis,
1957). One hundred and six B-58s were ordered ("USAF
Cancels Work on Convair B-58B", 1959). The B-58A did win
SAC's Radar Bombing Event in late 1960 and set the speed
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and the longest supersonic flight records in early 1961
and 1964 ("B-58 Wins SAC's Radar Bombing Event", 1960;
Reed, 1961; and Smith, 1964). Two of the USAF/General
Dynamics B-58s crashed at the Paris Air Show in 1961 and
1965 (Brownlow, 1961; "B-58 Crashes at Le Bourget", 1965).
The inventory of these planes never became very large and
consequently they never played a major role in US
strategic delivery plans.
Three other aircraft are worth mentioning at this
stage. One is the B-66B bomber, a low range bomber, which
was retired from active inventory in the early sixties
("The Air Force Bomber", 1964). The second plane is the
long endurance /range nuclear powered aircraft (Aircraft
Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) Program), which was put on the
back burner in 1958 ("Soviets Flight Testing Nuclear
Bomber", 1958). The third aircraft is the Boeing KC-135
Stratotanker which became operational in July 1957
("KC-135 Goes into Operational Use", 1957). This tanker
transport version was developed from Boeing's commercial
707 prototype aircraft as a standard aerial tanker for the
USAF. Approximately 732 of KC-135s were produced. About
650 remain operational today. These KC-135s refueled the
long supersonic flights of the B-58s. The updated versions
of this aircraft, KC-135Rs and KC-135Es, are in service
today with Air Refueling Wings of the USAF and are being
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used to refuel the B-1B bombers in flight (Jane's All the
World's Aircraft, 1986-87, pp. 379-390).
2.4 The Supersonic B-70 Bomber
The B-1 story probably starts in 1955 (Holder, 1986).
In the aftermath of the Russian Jet Power display of
Badger, Bison and IR-38 bombers in a May Day parade (Hotz,
1955) and the follow-on testimony of General Curtis
E. LeMay before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee
(Johnson, 1956), there lies the roots of the B-1 family
tree. Gen. LeMay called for the US to address her efforts
and her scientific and production capabilities to the
development and production of the manned bomber
"follow-on" or successor to the B-52/KC-135 combination at
the earliest possible date. He warned the Committee that,
"If proper steps are not taken, then strategic air
superiority will shift from the United States to Russia
within the next four years under the Eisenhower
Administration's present defense program". These two
events pushed further the chemically-powered strategic
bombardment reconnaissance weapon system WS 110 A/L and
gave it national prominence. This system was first
conceived in 1953 as a Mach 3 long-range heavy bomber
("RS-70 Background", 1962) and was under low key
development from its inception. Initial requirements,
General Operating Requirements (GOR) 82, of 22 March, 1955
-42-
(Holder, 1986, pp. 1-3), and subsequent increased funding
to providing contracts to both Boeing and North American
Aviation to conduct preliminary studies. What would
eventually eventually evolve from GOR 82 would be the
giant supersonic Mach 3 delta-wing B-70 bomber.
Development work (mostly done at NACA laboratories)
on the various kinds of components and design ideas
necessary for long-range supersonic flight had reached a
point where it became clear to everyone concerned that a
Mach 3 aircraft of intercontinental range could really be
built. As a result, a request for proposal (RFP) was
issued to both Boeing and North American Aviation to
engage in a competitive design study for the airplane.
Meanwhile, the huge program to develop intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had been started and had been
given the highest national priority. They soon come to
dominate the technological scene in the US and they
absorbed the bulk of the resources, including both men and
money, which the Air Force could devote to research and
development. Thus, even if studies showed that the B-70
project was practicable, it was not very likely that the
US would be able to commit the necessary resources to it.
But on October 4, 1957, shortly after the study started,
Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite, was
launched into space by the USSR. The political atmosphere
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both in Washington and throughout the country was
transformed by the sudden shock of discovering that the US
was not the first in achieving a technological feat of
that sort. Frightened by the Soviet's apparent technical
superiority, Americans were disposed to listen to anybody
with an advanced technology program to sell. Thus, when
North American was selected as the prime contractor for
the B-70 project on December 23, 1957, the firm was
ordered by the Air Force to proceed on a high-priority
basis with the weapon system development which had come to
be known then as the B-70 bomber (York, 1970). Figure 2-2
on page 44 shows artist's conception of the B-70 bomber at
that time.
One of the biggest technical jumps which made Mach 3
aircraft possible was the advanced turbojet engine.
General Electric (GE) design was chosen by North American
to power both its B-70 and F-108 interceptor over Rolls
Royce and Pratt and Whitney. The GE J93 engine was
redesignated to be X279 for this work. The qualification
test version was named YJ93. The after burner was around 5
1/2 feet in diameter, the length of the engine was around
19 3/4 feet, and the thrust class was of 30,000 lbs at
standard conditions.
These engines, though they used standard JP type
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Figure 2-2: An Artist's Conception of the B-70 Bomber
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hydrocarbon fuels, were projected to use high energy fuels
in their afterburners. The high energy fuel containing
boron was intended to be used only for around 25% of the
time. The alkyl-boron type of fuel released about 25,000
BTU/lb compared with the average heating value of 18,600
BTU/lb for JP-4 fuel. The new fuel was believed to
increase the endurance and thrust of the aircraft. The use
of this new fuel inspired the name of chemical bomber to
the B-70. It was also thought that the corrosive action of
this high energy fuel might limit it use. In spite of
this, both the Navy and the Air Force put some $200
million (then year dollars) toward the development and
manufacture of Hical exotic fuel which they planned to use
in airplanes and missiles in order to make new altitude
records. Another unique characteristic of the B-70 was its
ability to ride its supersonic shock waves, called the
compression lift. This principle markedly reduced the drag
and was the secret of the B-70 performance. The initial
characteristics of the B-70 bomber are provided in Table
2-III on page 46 ("Mach 3 Manned Aircraft Designs Pushed",
1958). The B-70 developments are further discussed by
Gallois (1958).
By the end of the first full year of the B-70
contract, there were more than forty first and second tier
subcontractors and approximately two thousand vendors
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* Steady-state-cruise actually will be in
excess of NMach 3 for the plane's entire
intercontinental mission. Higher Mach
number dash speed could have been de-
signed into the B-70 potential but this
would mean that the entire plane-
structure and powerplant-would have
to be designed to withstand higher
temperatures generated by the dash
condition, and increment of speed
gained might not justify engineering
refinements which would have to be
achieved.
* Cruise altitude may be as high as
80,000 ft.
* Range will be over 7,000 mi. at 70,-
000 ft. at bMach 3 using boron-base high
energy fuel.
* Gross weight, originallv scheduled
for 500,000-550,000 b., mav grow to
600,000 lb., but the airplane will have
to use existing runway facilities.
· Payload-to-gross weight ratio will be
approximately 4.5 to 5%.
* Crew of f6ur will have unusual pro-
tection for maximum capability to con-
tinue mission in event of damage.
* Fuselage is boxv, has verv high fine-
ness ratio and long nose. From a point
well fonrward, the fuselage body sweeps
up to the top of the engine inlets on
the underside of rear of plane, minimniz-
ing flow interference to central portion
of engine inlet areas. Starting at the
junction of the fuselage and wing lead-
ing edge, the body is necked, then fans
out as it continues aft.
* Canard horizontal tail is mounted
high just aft of crew compartment,
sweeps back at an angle of about 60
deg.
Canard configuration was selected
for aerodynamic advantages at the air-
plane's cruise speed and for favorable
weight distribution.
* Delta wing has about 60 deg. sweep.
meets fuselage somewhere between mid-
dle and top levels. W'ing trailing edgec
has substantial cutout in middle one-
third of span, above turbojet exhaust
nozzle area.
* Vertical tail surfaces are mounted at
each side of wing trailing edge cutout
area.
* Six General Electric J93 turbojet en-
gines installed in lateral pack on under-
side of wing each will furnish approxi-
mately 25,000 lb. of thrust without
afterburner. Although tailpipes are lar-
ger than inlets, the engine package has
constant depth from front to rear.
* Missiles would be accommodated in a
recess under the engine pack, will in-
clude guide bombing type or self-
guided air-to-surface type. Countermis-
siles may also be carried. Undoubtedly,
special weapon design will be required
to cope with B-70 and F-108 opera-
tional conditions. Missile warheads
would have to be designed to resist high
heat generated byv ach 3 speed. Some
missiles may require propulsion ss-
tems which will ensure sufficient ac-
celeration at launch to pull awav from
plane traveling at iMach 3. Techniques
wtill have to be refined to ensure proper
separation of missile from aircraft.
* Lightweight, rigid construction will
incorporate about 10,000 sq. ft. of
sandwich panels. This will be substan-
tially in excess of the amount of sand-
wich ever used in any aircraft previ-
ouslyv. Convair's B-58, a big user of
honeycomb construction, uses 282
stainless steel honeycomb sandwich
panels, totaling 1,082 sq. ft.
Table 2-III: B-70 Characteristics, 1958
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involved in the program. Some seventy of then ninety-six
US Senators had a major part of the program in their
states and something like a majority of the Congressional
districts had atleast one supplier of consequence! The
popularity of the B-70 was based on its quick and flexible
response capability over the missiles. Also, other uses
such as the B-70 serving as a launch platform for missiles
and satellites were promoted at that time. By October
1959, some $300 million had already been spent on the B-70
program. The multistage ICBMs were in their early stages
of development and were catching up very fast. In
September 1959, the first successful field test of the
Atlas-D missile was conducted (York, 1970) and it reached
a range of some 4,000 miles. Under these circumstances,
there was a rising opposition in the White House to spend
large sum of money ($460 million as requested by the Air
Force for the next fiscal year (FY)) on B-70 program while
its alternatives - the missiles - were beginning to show
promise. President Eisenhower himself decided to cut the
program all the way to $75 million for FY 1960. Such a
decision curtailed the Air Force's hopes for the
deployment of the system and the first casualty was the
high energy boron fuel program ("Air Force, Navy Face
Procurement Cuts", 1959; Eastman, 1959). There was a
considerable Congressional uproar on the subject of the
waste of public funds and the mismanagement of the boron
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fuel program by both the Navy and the Air Force. The B-70
engine development was effected because of this and a new
engine, J93-3, burning JP-6 fuel was selected.
Budget cuts forced the stretching out of the B-70
program. The Air Force canceled contracts for the three
major B-70 subsystems under development (Butz, 1959).
These were: an inertial type bombing-navigation system,
electronic counter measure systems for passive defense and
a missiles and traffic control package consisting of
communications, navigation and avionics identification
equipment. The earliest possible operational date was
extended from 1965 to 1967. The funding situation
curtailed test aircraft to only one from thirteen as
planned before. USAF also initiated extensive studies of
the aircraft's multi-mission capability such as a
recoverable first stage booster for satellites, a
supersonic transport with about 80 passenger capacity, an
all weather interceptor and ballistic and air-to-ground
cruise missile launchers. The large engine thrust to
weight ratio of 3.33 was the key to this multi-mission
capability.
The intense Congressional opposition to the B-70
cutbacks and the Presidential campaign year politics of
1960 provided a brief new lease to the program. By August
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of 1960, a total of $80 million was added to allow the Air
Force to buy one more prototype. By November 1960, just
days before the Nixon-Kennedy election, the Air Force
brought the total B-70 budget for the then current FY up
to $265 million, bringing the prototype number to four.
For FY 1962, the Air Force did ask for $580 million while
directing the program towards a weapon system prototype
rather than an airframe test vehicle ("Air Force Asking
$580 Million for Fiscal 1962", 1960). Presidential
candidate Sen. John F. Kennedy vehemently opposed this
outpour of money to the B-70 program and said that these
developments were to increase Republican votes in the
election ("Kennedy on B-70 Budget", 1960).
Another event which played a significant role in the
development of both the B-70 and later the B-1 was the
shooting down of the high-flying Lockheed U-2 espionage
flight over the Soviet Russia on May 1, 1960 ("U-2
Missing; Soviets Say U.S. Plane Down", 1960). This
incident forced mission planners to look for a low
altitude penetrator bomber as opposed to a high-flying
(80,000 ft) B-70 bomber. This requirement is further
discussed in the later part of this chapter and in the
next chapter.
In 1960, Kennedy won the presidential election, and
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the B-70's new lease on life ran out immediately. The
success of long-range missile flights convinced the new
administration to push back the B-70 program in the
development phase with no more than two aircraft to be
built. Over the next full year, a battle of growing
intensity raged between the Executive Branch and Congress
over the B-70 program. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force
Chief-of-Staff cited the aircraft development at the
Russian Tushino Air Show (Hotz, 1961) and told the Senate
Appropriation Defense Subcommittee that more money must be
spent on long-range bombers and fighters to keep up with
the Russians (Wilson, 1961). He recommended spending $448
million in FY 1962 on the development of the B-70 and $500
million annually the following "three or four" years.
President Eisenhower requested $358 million and President
Kennedy $220 million for the B-70 program in FY 1962.
Congress did provide an additional $180 million for FY
1962 for the B-70 program in response to constant demands
by Sen. Symington and Sen. Goldwater. But defense
Secretary Robert McNamara was prepared to stand firm and
impound the extra funds voted by Congress for this
long-range bomber (Booda, 1961a). The positive evidence of
the Russian advances in anti-aircraft technology,
specially progress in infrared detection and tracking at a
range of more than 30 miles, was used by Secretary
McNamara as an argument for favoring the phasing out of
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manned bombers (Booda, 1961b). It was this battle between
the Administration and Congress,which set a stage for the
Constitutional debate on the issue of "Congressional
rights to raise armies".
In the first week of March 1962, the House Armed
Services Committee voted to test Congressional authority
over Defense Department spending by ordering the Air Force
to spend an additional $491 million on the reconnaissance
strike version of the North American B-70 bomber in FY
1963 ("House Unit Orders Use of B-70 Funds", 1961). The
additional funds were meant to be used to build three more
planes now designated as RS-70. The House Armed Services
Committee's action of early March could have led to a
Constitutional debate. An expected debate over the
Constitutional authority of Congress to require the
Executive to follow a course of action (in this case, to
spend more funds than were budgeted for development of the
RS-70, a variation of the Mach 3 B-70 bomber), was averted
after Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Vinson (D Ga)
met with President Kennedy just before HR 9751 was called
up for debate ("Military Procurement", 1962). At conflict
were the interpretations of Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution which emphasized the President's
constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief and Article I,
Section 8, which gave power to Congress to raise and
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support armies (Tribe, 1978). Secretary McNamara assured
Chairman Vinson that he would proceed with the study of
the RS-70 and spend any funds necessary to develop it
further.
The B-70 program did finally worked out well in its
technical phase. See Table 2-IV on page 53 for XB-70A
characteristics (Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1968-69,
pp. 341-342). The airplane had its first flight on
September 21, 1964. Figure 2-3 on page 54 shows the first
XB-70A in flight. A comparison of these illustrations
(Table 2-IV and Figure 2-3) with those presented earlier
(Table 2-III on page 46 and Figure 2-2 on page 44)
provides a perspective on the historical development of
the B-70 bomber over a period of some six years. The plane
had a few problems with its landing gear mechanism which
were corrected in subsequent flights. The designed
cruising speed of Mach 3 was attained for the first time
on October 14, 1965 at an altitude of around 70,000 ft.
The second XB-70A flew for the first time on July
1965. Mach 3 was attained on January 3, 1966. On June
it was lost when a F-104 chase plane collided with
during the in-flight formation photo session ("XB-70A
2 Destroyed in Crash", 1966). There was a great deal
Congressional uproar over this tragic loss. On March
1967, the management of the program was turned over
17,
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TyrF: Mach 3 aerodynamic tet aircrft.
Wros: Cantilever delta wing of very thin ec.
tion with slight camber at root. Aspect ratio
1-751. Chord 117 ft 9 in (3589 m) at root, 2 ft
2t in (0.67 m) at tip. Anhedral over entire
pan and slight washout twist. Sweep.
back on leading-edge 656 34'. Entire wings
covered with brazed stainlea-.steel honeycomb
sandwich panels, welded together. Leading.
edge of honeycomb sandwich attached directly
to front spar. Spars of sine-wave-webbed
type. Wing.tips are folded down hydraulically
to an angle of 2' for low-altitude supersonic
flight and to 65° for high-altitude Mach 3
cruising flight, to improve stability and
manoeuvrablitv. Ttal of 12 levnnu of
similar construction to wings, each powered by
two hydraulic atuators, operated by indepen.
dent hydraulic systems. Two outboard elevons
on each side are on wingtipe and are not
operable when tips are folded down. A three.
axis stability augmentation system is fitted.
FozrLAr x: Large canard foreplane of very thin
section adjustable for trim purposes and is
fitted with trailing-edge flaps. This makes it
possible to droop the elevens also to act as
nap, giving the aircraft a take-off and landing
performance such that it can fly from airfields
used by current USAF heavy bombers. Fore-
plane torion box is made of titanium corrugated
pars and skin pnels. The leading-edges are
of stainless steel honyoomb sandwich. Flaps
are of titanium. Foreplane and flaps are
controlled by hydraulic actuators, each powered
by two independent hydraulic systems. Aspect
ratio 1-997. weepbak 31' 42'.
FusnrzAoz: Semi-monocoque structure of basic
circular section, changing to a flat-top section
in the crew cabin area. Built mainly of
titanium forward of wing, and of stainless
steel honeycomb sandwich over wing. Nose
radome of laminated Vibran.
Powzt PwT DucT: Rectangular-section power
plant duct under wings is built of brazed
stainless steel honeycomb sandwich panels,
welded together, except for H-ll steel section
around engine compartment at rear. Ducts
incorporate Hamilton Standrd inlet control
system. A basic function of this system is to
position the shook-wavec ore td at supersonic
speeds so that the air moves freely to the
engines, and so that hock-wave interaction
between the duct and the wing provides a
rearkably high liftldrag ratio. It also
measures the speed and pressure of the air
entering the intake and reduces or increase
velocity and pressure as required for optimum
engine efficiency.
T-AL UNr: Twin vertical fins and large augle.
hinged rudders of similar construction to wings.
Rudders are controlled by hydraulic actuator,
each powered by two independent hydraulio
vrtems. Sweeobaek on leading-edge 51' 46'.
LaIDvno GuA-. Retractable tricle type,
manufactured by Clevoeland Pneumatic Indust.
ries. Hydraulic retraction. Twin-wheel steer-
able nose unit retracts rarward between intake
ducts. Four-wheel bogie main units retract
rearward. Goodrich 40-in high temperature
tyres and multi-dis brakes. Small reference
wheel on each bogie provides sensing for
automatic anti-rskid braking system. Three
28 ft (8.53 m) braking parachutes housed in
rear fuselage.
POWEs PL.Vr: Six General Electric YJ93-GE-3
turbojet engine (each 31,000 lb- 14,060 kg rt
with afterburning) clustered side-by-side at rear
of power plant duct under wing trailing-edge.
Eleven integral tanks for approx 00,000 lb(136,000 kg) of fuel. Three tanks in each wing,
occupying virtually the entire area between the
front spar and elevonr, from root to wingtip
hinge. Five tanks in fuselage from about the
wing leading-edge point to the engine bay,
including a U haped rear tank that is not
utilied on the first XB-70A. Fuel tanks
presurised by nitrogen gas system as fuel is
consumed.
ACCOMMODArIOO: Crew of four was specified for
the operational B-70, consisting of pilot, co-
pilot, bombardier navigator and defensive
system operator. XB-70A carries crew of two.
Cabin is completely air-conditioned and seats
form presurised elf-contained ejection capsules
in an emergency, so that crew do not need
pressure suits or oxygen equipment. Door aft
of flight deck on port side. Retractable visor
streamlines nose in cruising flight.
SYsms: Hamilton Standard air-conditioning
and pressuristion system for cabin and
electronics compartment, with two Freon
refrigeration units driven by engine.bleed air.
"Water wall" cooling system for landing gear
bays and braking parachute compartment.
Four independent hydraulic systems, pressure
4,000 lblsq in (281 kgemn), powered by 12
Vickers engine-driven variable-output pumps.
115/200V 400cfs AC electrical system, supplied
by two 2401416V primary engine driven
generators.
DImYI:sIO1s, xmvAL:
Wing span, tips spread 105 ft 0 in (32-00 m)
Foreplane span 28 It 9 in (8-78 m)
Length:
including nose-probe 196 ft 0 in (59-74 m)
without nose-probe 189 t 0 in (57 61 m)
Wheel track 23 & 2 in (7-06 m)
Wheelbase 46 It 2} in (14-08 m)
Wings, gross 6,297-15 sq f (586502 n')
Foreplane, gross 41559 sq ft (38-61 m)
Vertical tal area (total) 23396 sq ft (21-73 i)
Table 2-IV: XB-70 Characteristics, 1964
-54-
·?--·- . _??;
-·-· '"il·
a Sif 'LZ"-
-·-- ·-·· :·I'.
-n, ;
 ,:trttrFT,;S:'fC1I(TTYAs'R:- P-U7CLZiCI ·i
t)rr I C
·'
r
·In* ·-
·-
,i a-··
I" ,
;21i, -"
·e rL-"--`-1.1·  i?
:**-. tl-: -· I·
·. -···. · · i--
r
rr; ,C:
ry; - · .··
;'' ".'-K;r·s*C-'",,3,'7 . -·l-C
sul- 5' I..:i. ?ic
.-- u
s-i;t;Cr ~I·" (r dl`
*;;L Ci ·J-iC1I,
;libr':;iX·v ·rij
fj'c ;r cix·
;-· ri;5 '''
- ··- -- ·-· ·-I·· ., , r .-
-;··r-·i.·-· -·
,, 1t ;i--""t -CL sr..
Si"-' rF."L~.-Crcl·
h. I.xpllnrl fCff-l.
·- ..,.
jiCTt. LI:2.·.··:r-l--.·nIq- · , __ 5_
·--rl*. ·- -·x nr :T"
r ·1-;· .·.-...,
,t·': · ,P
·-
_ I 'LC    ·- ,,
·f-
r··
- -- -·--.I
··- `·
:...;. rc· - a-i
r-i· ·.- ···:i ·-· .,,i r·
·n ,, L. ·- *- .rrl-;I ·r·r z z
-..r=J.  L · j - ·- L -· -'·
"·-· -s ;`··
i -
,c . · · ·; "'·
z·,? -·4 C1r.- "F ·i, .·-,
"rrr-r.
-*·
·-: ·· ·.
.i41
'·
F ?- -- "- - Y'
i·"·r=-'"·;··· · · · *3 ""
,, ·craj :-aJ·"--4r ·- '·*x.·· ···-ti·e ,y· ,
- "+ ·-IV"; ·takhrunr, c
·e -=u; c·LiC
·Ct 'CI-
 f-5";·;L1;5;C _L ·ry : C C L 1*
ma;~~~~~~~~~. I *W- A - - w; 11 VA& - r--
-. . G o_-Y_ w "0 j -
B-70 Flares on its First LandingFiqure -3:
-55-
NASA in support of National Supersonic Transport Program
("NASA Assumes XB-70 Research Efforts", 1967). On February
4, 1969, the first XB-70A was delivered to the USAF for
display at the Air Force Museum near Dayton, Ohio (Jane's
All the World's Aircraft, 1968-69, pp. 341-342). Thus goes
the story of the predecessor of the B-1. The lessening of
the interest on the part of the Air Force in the later
years of the life of XB-70A were due to the promising
results of new studies of the fore-runner aircraft to the
AMSA. These studies are discussed in the later portion of
this chapter.
2.5 The Naming of the B-1A Bomber
The event which played a significant role in
providing the name to the B-1A aircraft was the Defense
Secretary's confusion over Air Force designation (F-110)
of its version of Navy's F4H plane in the testimony before
Congress ("Washington Roundup", 1962). This led to an
order for standardization of nomenclature of all defense
aircraft. The new designation scheme fully, revealed in
September 1962, ("Defense Issues New Aircraft
Designations", 1962) declared that the new bomber, if it
was to be built, would be called the B-1A. As will be made
clear later on in Chapter 4, the name given to the B-1A
bomber preceded its birth by at least eight years.
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2.6 Studies of the Fore-runner Bomber Aircraft
In the aftermath of the funding difficulties faced by
the B-70 program, the USAF Chief-of-Staff Gen. Thomas
D. White announced the Air Force's intention to study a
multi-purpose aircraft system for the first time in
September, 1959 ("USAF Considers Development of Multi-
Purpose Aircraft System", 1959). This multi-purpose
long-range aircraft would be used interchangeably for
offense, defense, reconnaissance and high-speed combat
airlift. It would also incorporate supersonic speed with a
high altitude capability and a long load-carrying
capacity. Initial studies were accomplished under generic
classification as the Subsonic Low Altitude Bomber (SLAB).
The low-flying capability was essential to avoid detection
by enemy radars. The U-2 shooting down episode indeed made
this point clear. This work got under way in 1961 and was
followed in 1962 by "Project Forecast" which was in broad
terms, a seven-year evaluation of that the direction that
strategic deterrance should take (Peacock, 1987). In
consequence, it encompassed not only manned bomber
resources but also land-and-sea-based ballistic missiles;
one of the key conclusions was that there was still a
place for the manned bomber which had the priceless
advantage of being able to be recalled. In addition, it
could also perform conventional bombing missions and at
low could altitude can escape enemy radars.
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In 1963, four bomber related studies got under way.
Two were undertaken by the USAF itself, these being known
as the Extended Range Strategic Aircraft (ERSA) and Low
Altitude Manned Penetrator (LAMP); consequently DOD funded
two more broad based studies accomplished by industry and
known as the Advanced Manned Penetrator (AMP) and Advanced
Manned Penetrating Strategic System (AMPSS). A brief
discussion of these studies is provided in Booda (1963);
"USAF to Propose Long-Endurance Aircraft", 1963; "Low
Altitude Penetration Plane Studied", 1963; and Plattner
(1964). Two years later, the best features of these
studies provided the basis for the Advanced Manned
Strategic Aircraft program, which is discussed in Chapter
3. In 1964, the Congress appropriated $52 million for the
AMSA towards its FY 1965 funding (Brownlow, 1964).
Figure 2-4 on page 58 shows a large number of design
configurations which were explored under these studies
(Logan and Miller, 1986) by Rockwell International
(formerly North American Aviation). Reading clockwise from
the left is an early configuration shaped to accommodate
subsonic through Mach 3 performance and was designed to be
fabricated primarily from titanium. The second
configuration is an all subsonic study configuration
shaped to desensitize aerodynamics for low altitude ride
qualities and to be fabricated generally from aluminum.
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Figure 2-4: Candidate Configurations for AMSA Concept
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The third configuration is the baseline for a 10,000 lbs
payload capability. The fourth configuration had a Mach
1.2 sea-level capability with 25,000 lbs payload, and the
wings were moved aft to balance the aircraft. The fifth is
an assessment of a fixed wing design with emphasis on
subsonic cruise while retaining Mach 1.2 supersonic
capability. The sixth configuration incorporated variable
sweep wings to optimize both subsonic and supersonic
cruise (Himba and Weagner, 1981).
2.7 Development of Variable Geometry Sweep Wing
No history of the B-1 bomber would be complete
without discussion of the evolution of its variable
geometry sweep wing. The B-1 owes its swept wings to their
successful integration in Bi-Service TFX (Tactical Fighter
Experimental) General Dynamics F-1ll aircraft and Grumman
F-14A Tomcat aircraft. The USAF's interest in variable
sweep wings dates back to early 1950 ("USAF Drops Mach 2
VTOL for STOL", 1960). The Bell X-5 variable sweep
research aircraft incorporated the variable geometry wings
which could sweep back upto some 45 degrees for its high
speed flights. On X-5, it was necessary to move the wing
root forward as the tip moved to the rear and the sweep
increased in order to keep the center of lift within its
proper limits of overall aircraft stability ("Variable
Sweep Wing May Aid Transport", 1960). Both Bell X-5 and
-60-
Grumman XF1OF used sliding wing mountings to shift the
center section forward as the tips moved aft (Braybrook,
1975). There, the wings hinged at the root. The weight and
the complexity of this scheme limited its operational
application.
The solution to this problem of aerodynamic center
(AEC) shift was discovered by NASA and was made public in
December 1959 ("Variable Sweep Wing May Aid Transport",
1960). Computer studies at NASA's Langley Center were
backed by extensive wind tunnel testing. It was
established that an outboard hinge on a well tapered wing
could (given the correct tailplane position) eliminate the
need for a sliding center section. In essence as the wing
is swept back, the AEC initially moves aft slowly, but at
higher seep angles the downwash gradient at the tailplane
reduces its contribution to stability, which moves the AEC
forward again. NASA's outboard hinge makes possible an
overall AEC shift that is actually less than for a fixed
wing. Figure 2-5 on page 61 (Coulam, 1977, pp. 40) shows
the development of stable variable sweep wing
configurations. Wind tunnel test of the new wing showed
that with the wing root fixed, the wings could be swept
back from zero to 80 degrees (almost double than that of
the X-5's sweep) without experiencing a significant shift
in AEC. These results increased the attractiveness of the
-61-
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variable sweep wings for both the high-speed low level
military attack aircraft and supersonic commercial
transport.
Early in 1961, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
insisted on massive economics savings through commonality
of new fighters for both the Air Force and the Navy, using
the technology of variable geometry to provide the
necessary versatility. The Bi-Service TFX requirements
were generated, and eventually in November 1962, General
Dynamics was awarded the contract to develop F-ll
fighters (Braybrook, 1975). As discussed in Chapters 5 and
6 and in Appendix B, the bomber version of this design was
produced and purchased in limited number. The mission
requirements for the B-1 (see Chapter 3 and 4) led to
selection of the variable wings, and Rockwell
International benefited from this previous experience on
variable geometry sweep wing technology.
Thus, it is with this background - of different
bombers, wealth of technologies, and national defense
policy debate on the role of the bombers and the ICBMs, -
that the story of the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft
begins. It is this AMSA which eventually became the B-1B
bomber of today. By 1965, it was beginning to look as
though the manned bombers had been able to justify their
-63-
presence as a viable leg of the US triad strategic defense
policy (using land-based ICBMs, ship launched ICBMs and
manned bombers).
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Chapter 3
ADVANCED MANNED STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT STUDY (1965 - 1970)
To study the influence of policy on technology of the
AMSA, any discussion of the AMSA study should consider the
Congressional politics of the funding for the program; the
technical details of the program; and the description of
the potential versions of the bomber aircraft which
emerged out of this study. Details of these issues are
presented in this chapter. At this point, one could say
that the reconciliatory gesture by the out-going Johnson
Administration of allocating additional funding for the
bomber studies, played a significant role in the
development of the AMSA and hence the B-1 bomber. This
action ended an era of some eight years of strained
relations between the Office of the Defense Secretary and
Congress, wherein, both had a hard time coming to an
agreement on the issue of development of the replacement
bomber for the aging B-52s.
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3.1 Congressional Politics of the Funding
In early 1965, Brig. Gen. Howard A. Davis told the
New York Academy of Sciences ("Cost of Soviet AMSA Defense
Appraised by USAF at $21 Billion", 1965) that the Air
Force intelligence estimates of Soviet air defenses
indicated that it would cost the Russians $21 billion over
a five year period to defend against an AMSA. He further
added that the Soviet Union would need to spend $6 billion
over a similar period to defend their air spaces if AMSA
were not developed. To him, such Soviet diversion of her
limited critical resources, both fund and talent, in
response to the AMSA program could be looked upon as
further weakening of her economy, which would be in the
obvious interest of the US. Using this argument, he
attempted to justify funding of $52 million for the AMSA
program for FY 1965 (Brownlow, 1964). For FY 1966, the
House prevailed in the case of the USAF AMSA ("Conference
Unit Restores Funds for E-2A; AMSA Gets $22 Million",
1965). The Air Force had wanted to go into the program
definition phase in FY 1966 at a cost of $121 million.
Since $24 million of FY 1965 funds were left over for the
AMSA and since the Defense Department approved $15
million, the Air Force was $82 million short of its goal.
The Senate voted to provide the entire $82 million
difference. But the House added only $7 million to the $15
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million in new money requested. In the final conference,
the House got its way, arguing that it would not be
sensible to spend more than $22 million under the AMSA
program laid down by the Defense Department.
In 1966, the AMSA funding debate reached its peak.
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was far from convinced
that AMSA was required. As a possible hedge, he approved a
FY 1967 request of $11 million for avionics development
and said that the additional $7 million appropriated by
Congress in FY 1966 would be used for airframe and
propulsion studies ("Status of Major U.S. Defense
Systems", 1966). He sought only $6 million for the AMSA in
FY 1968 (Brownlow, 1966b). He was pushing for the FB-111
bomber version of the Bi-Service F-ill variable geometry
fighter (Witze, 1966; Butz, 1966). USAF Chief-of-Staff,
Gen. John P. McConnell, saw range as the limiting factor
in F-1ll's bomber role, though he reluctantly recommended
that 210 operational FB-llls be procured as intermediate
bombers to the AMSA. He pinned his hopes for the AMSA on
the reversal by Air Force Secretary Harold Brown and Dr.
John S. Foster, Jr., his successor, as Director of Defense
and Engineering. Both of them favored the advance manned
bomber but contended that, at that moment, they were not
convinced that it should be the AMSA. By May 1966, it
looked as though the AMSA program definition might be
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approved in 1968. The Defense Secretary was facing
continuing pressure from the House Armed Services
Committee. The committee chairman, Rep. L. Mendal Rivers
(D.-S.C.), was confident that Congress was going to
authorize and appropriate the additional $11.8 million for
the AMSA, bringing its funds to $22.8 million for FY 1967.
He also indicated that he would attempt to follow through
and see that, once authorized, the funds be used by
Secretary McNamara to begin contract definition (Brownlow,
1966a). SAC's reaction to improved version of the
USAF/General Dynamics FB-111 was cool. On June 8, 1966,
XB-70A, No. 2 was destroyed in a mid-air collision with
NASA's F-104N chase aircraft (see Chapter 2 for details).
This event put additional Congressional pressure on the
Pentagon for approval of the AMSA.
During 1967-68, the variable geometry AMSA was
studied in greater detail. The USAF concept called for an
aircraft which is between the FB-111 and the supersonic
transport plane in size. The details of these studies are
discussed in a forth-coming section of this chapter. The
manned bomber stayed on the back burner throughout the
Johnson Administration. The details of the AMSA program
financing during these years are provided in Table 3-I on
page 68 ("More Funds for Advanced Bomber may Reopen
Dispute", 1969). The manned bomber reemerged after Hubert
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Table 3-I: AMSA Program Financing
AMSA Program Financing
The following figures show the amounts request-
ed by the Johnson Administration for the AMSA pro-
ject from fiscal 1965 (when funds were first allocated
specifically for the program) to fiscal 1968, the last
full fiscal year. The second column shows the amounts
appropriated by Congress for each year and the
third set of figures shows the amounts actually re-
leased by the Secretary of Defense for the AMSA.
Figures were supplied by the U.S. Air Force.
Fiscal' Administration Congressional Amount
Year Request Appropriation Spent
(In Millions)
1965 $ 5 $ 52 $ 28
1966 15 22 46
1967 11.8 22.8 18.8
1968 26 47 26
Total $57.8 $143.8 $118.8
I. For fiscal 1969 the Administration requested $5 million in new obligational
authority and designated an additional $25 million in holdover appropriatiomn
for the AMSA program. The request for fiscal 1970 was m77 million.
SOURCE: Department of the Air Force
-
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Humphrey's defeat in November 1968. During the lame duck
period before President Nixon took office, McNamara's
successor at the Defense Department, Secretary Clark
Clifford, put into the Defense Budget $77 million for the
AMSA for FY 1970 (Bezdek, 1982, pp. 4-5; "More Funds for
Advanced Bomber may Reopen Dispute", 1969). His efforts
repaired damaged relations between the Pentagon and
Congress. He allowed the AMSA to enter the competitive
design phase.
The Presidential election year politics did play a
key role in these developments. Early in 1968, the
Republican National Committee appointed Neil McElroy and
Thomas Gates - two former Secretaries of Defense (1957-59
and 1959-60 respectively), who, with Nixon, had served
under President Eisenhower - to formulate party policy on
national defense. The paper written by Gates and McElroy
attacked McNamara' s military policy as "appalling",
particularly because he had failed to order production of
two major weapon systems, an advanced submarine (Trident)
and a new advanced manned bomber which was to become B-1.
Nixon ran on the platform these men helped to write and
when the Nixon Administration came to power, Secretary
Melvin R. Laird accelerated the initial request based on a
blue-ribbon committee report (the committee was chaired by
Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard). He raised the
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AMSA budget to $100.2 million, though Packard proposed
that $135 million be made available to the AMSA (Brownlow,
1969). Congress took the cue to slash the disputed FB-111
program even further. The details are discussed in
Appendix B.
The following milestones were established for the
AMSA program:
(1) May 1, 1969: Air Force's release of revised
technical request for proposal to industry for the
airframe, power plant and avionics.
(2) May 15, 1969: Air Force's release of request for
proposal for industry's management of the AMSA program.
(3) August 15, 1969: Industry responds to the revised
USAF technical request.
(4) November 1, 1969: Air Force selects the AMSA's
prime contractor.
(5) April 1973: First AMSA flight scheduled.
By early May, 1969, the AMSA was officially
designated to be the B-1A bomber ("Industry Observer",
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1969). USAF sought additional B-1A funds ($300 million)
for FY 1971 ("USAF to Seek Additional B-1A Funds for
1971", 1969). Throughout these years various technical
details emerged, which shaped the B-1A design. They are
discussed in the next section.
3.2 The AMSA program
The primary requirements for the AMSA was for a
cost-effective replacement for the aging B-52s. The
aircraft's mission was to deter nuclear war by being
capable of surviving an enemy first strike, successfully
penetrating enemy defenses, and accurately delivering
offset or laydown weapons on both industrial and military
targets.
Many new technologies have been made available since
1950 (the B-52 period). For example: vertical/short
takeoff and landing (V/STOL); all supersonic penetration
(the B-70 technology); stand-off missile launcher; and low
altitude penetrator. They had to be reviewed for the B-1
design. The results of these reviews quickly showed that
low altitude penetration at high supersonic speed was the
preferred mode. A supersonic, high altitude capability
further provided flexibility and helped dilute enemy
defenses. These combined modes became a prime requirement
for the AMSA studies. These studies started in 1965 and
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continued for four years - oriented at defining a
cost-effective B-52 replacement.
The AMSA studies approached this primary requirement
with a three pronged effort: (1) detailed analysis on a
point design aircraft, (2) parametric analysis centered
around the point design, and (3) specific studies and/or
tests in new technology and high risk areas (Patton, 1974,
pp. 1). Major studies were: propulsion; avionics;
airframe; survivability/vulnerability; and advanced
penetration aids. More than $143 million were spent on
engineering development. About half of this went into
propulsion (the F-15 engine development drew very heavily
on the advanced engine research of the B-1 program;
(Bartsch and Posson, 1980)). Of the remainder, about
two-third was allocated to the avionics and one-third to
the area of airframe and the rest of the studies (Ulsamer,
1970, pp. 38). The details of the program plan are
presented in Figure 3-1 on page 73. The first column in
the figure provides the names of the contractors who
participated in these studies (London, 1970).
The concept definition phase was long and slow. The
parametric studies were very extensive and they provided
data to support firm requirements. Rockwell's early
conceptual studies covered many variations in
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Figure 3-1: AMSA Program Details
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requirements, including all point designs and their
variations approximately 300 aircraft configurations were
studied. Some of the studies conducted by Rockwell during
the concept formulation phase supported evolution of the
operational design. They are briefly summarized by Himba
and Wegner (1981). They were:
(1) Point Design Study - which identified appropriate
physical characteristics of an aircraft meeting specified
mission and design requirements.
(2) Enduring Survivability Study - which analyzed
potential dispersal concepts and recommended dispersed
basing concepts to maximize system survival.
(3) Crew Factors Study - which resulted in
description of optimum work stations, escape system,
encodement of display information, and control system to
most effectively meet mission objectives.
(4) Program Acceleration - which developed schedule
and cost data for several approaches to system
acquisition.
(5) Wind Tunnel Test Program - which conducted three
series of aerodynamic force tests and three series of
inlet tests using wind tunnel models.
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(6) Limited War Analysis - which reviewed possible
worldwide situations for potential targets, defenses, and
bases available for operations; and an analysis to
establish limited war operational and performance
requirements.
(7) Design Characteristics Study - which evaluated
new and refined system requirements and their effects on
the design criteria to integrate results of allied
programs into configuration development.
(8) System Baseline Planning - which developed
required pre-contract definition phase specifications.
(9) Survivability/Vulnerability Study - which
conducted quantitative analysis of vulnerability to
nuclear effects and conventional weapons both while
airborne at high and low altitudes and on the ground.
(10) Bomber Decay Analysis/Bomber Defense Missile
(BDM) analysis - which developed parametric designs for a
family of BDM's and decoys designed to counter significant
threats and conducted preliminary analysis of two decoys
and two BDM's.
(11) Subsonic Aircraft Design Study - which provided
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technical and cost data for supersonic and subsonic
aircraft. This served as a base for comparing the effect
of variation in major design parameters on performance,
gross weight and cost.
(12) Program and Vehicle Study - which provided a
series of eight tasks for a point design to meet SAC/ASD
guideline requirements; integrated results of supporting
technology programs; and conducted trade studies for
developing data for selection of design criteria
requirements.
(13) Program Point Design and Modeling Studies -
which updated the latest point design in specific areas
and prepared a mission effectiveness model.
(14) Point Design Trade Studies - Involved 10
specific trade studies to determine the effect of relaxing
or changing design ground rules on aircraft weight and
performance.
Typical results of one such trade study are given in
Figure 3-2 on page 77 (London, 1970, pp. 33). It presents
range vs. leading edge sweep; range vs. aspect ratio; and
survivability vs. altitude trade-offs. Range and
penetration were crucial to the AMSA mission, and variable
-77-
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sweep was necessary for both. A fixed wing AMSA, at some
constant gross weight (Figure 3-2A), could achieve a
maximum range with little sweep in a high-altitude
subsonic cruise; for a high-altitude supersonic cruise,
large degrees of sweep were necessary to decrease drag and
increase range. Locating the wing at a high sweep created
a low aspect ratio for maximum range (Figure 3-2B) at
supersonic speeds, but was inefficient for producing lift,
and thus range at subsonic speeds. Locating the wing at a
low sweep created a high aspect ratio for maximum range at
subsonic speeds. The variable sweep wing could thus be
positioned for optimum aspect ratio and maximum range at
all flight conditions. A large degree of sweep was needed
to penetrate enemy defenses as well as for supersonic
cruise (around Mach 2.5). Survivability studies (Figure
3-2C) showed that high subsonic speed at low altitude was
as important in reducing losses as supersonic speed at
high altitude. Although the high cost of supersonic
on-the-deck flight did not provide better performance than
high subsonic on-the-deck flight, both required larger
sweep to provide a smooth ride without severe bounces due
to gusts.
Since cost effectiveness was a major criteria,
payload (SRAM - Short Range Attack Missiles - and - SCAD -
Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy) was a major variable. The
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B-52 carried 8 SRAM on a rotary rack with missiles
attached. For a new bomber it was natural to look at
multiples of this design, i.e. 16, 24, 32 SRAMs. With 24
SRAMs (three times the B-52 payload), the impact was
severe as shown in Figure 3-3 on page 80 (Patton, 1974).
Here one can see the advances in technology needed to
accommodate this larger payload. They are:
(a) Hold structural fraction at 22% while
incorporating variable sweep and large payload bays.
(b) Hold systems fraction to within 10% of that of
B-52 while adding terrain following radar, improved
sensors, additional penetration aids, etc.
(c) Accomplish required range with 29% less fuel (41%
vs. 53%).
In order to hold the structural fraction while
incorporating large weapon bay cutouts and variable sweep,
new materials and alloys were studied. Composites (both
boron and carbon) were also investigated. High strength
alloys and steel were considered. Unique structural design
concepts were also looked at - such as blended wing bodies
to minimize wetted area and maximize structural depth. The
primary effort was centered on titanium and the most
efficient ways to use and manufacture it were studied.
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As mentioned earlier, two other major studies
undertaken during this period were related to the AMSA
propulsion and avionics. In each of these areas major
developments were undertaken.
A light-weight-augmented turbofan demonstrator
program was initiated. The developments included (a) high
turbine temperature (cooled blades), (b) short annular
combustion chamber, (c) short mixer and augmentor, (d)
minimum length design. Two contracts (see Figure 3-1 on
page 73) were awarded for the building and running of
technology demonstrator engines to incorporate the above
mentioned features.
Avionic studies were made of seven different areas. A
summary of these and the progress achieved are provided in
Table 3-II on page 82. Later, these studies were grouped
under three major areas: offensive electronics, defensive
electronics and Central Integrated test System (CITS). The
AMSA was expected to survive a nuclear environment and
appropriate precautions were taken. The electronics were
expected to be hardened to a level consistent with the
available state of the art from the past Minuteman work. A
brief description of these tasks is provided below.
In offensive avionics areas, new technology offered
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Initial B-1 Avionics Studies
At a cost of more than $41 million, the Air Force, in
concert with IBM and North American Rockwell's Autonetics
and with the assistance of many electronics industries, has
studied and carefully defined the B-l's avionics requirements
and examined seven advanced development tasks.
They are:
* Advanced Development Task No. 1: Inertial navigation
and transfer to facilitate long-range, precise navigation,
accurate SRAM launch, and low-level flight. Contractors:
Autonotics (NR), AC Electronics (GM), Singer-General Preo.
cision. Status: Flight tests completed.
* Advanced Development Task No. 2: Forward-lookng
radar resolution to improve low-altitude fix-taking. Contractors:
Autonetics (NR), Philco-Ford. Status: Flight tests completed.
* Advanced Development Task No. 3: Doppler radar damp.
ing to improve Doppler radar performance for damping
inertial navigators and reduce bias and noise errors of Dop-
pler radars. Contractors: General Precision Labs (GPL), Labora-
tory for Electronics. Status: Flight tests completed.
* Advanced Development Task No. Ai Infrared surveillance
to provide track-while-scan detection and tracking capability
of enemy aircraft based on infrared emissions of their pro-
pulsion systems. Contractors: Hughes Aircraft, Aerojet-Gen-
oral. Status: Flight test complete.
* Advanced Development Task No. 5 Radio frequency sur.
veillance to provide passive warning, location, and tracking
capability on radiating enemy threat systems. Contracton
Daimo Victor. Status: Flight test now in process; to be com-
pleted May 1970.
* Advanced Development Task No. 6: Integrated controls
and displays to ease the crews' tasks and workloads and to
provide better human-factor interface with avionics. Contrac-
tors: IBM, Autonetics (NR). Status: development and simulator
testing completed.
* Advanced Development Task No. 7 Multimode radar
to provide simultaneous capability for a variety of air-to-air
and air-to-ground radar functions in a single radar equip
ment. Contractor: Raytheon (Lexington, Mass.). Status: devel-
opment and laboratory test complete; flight test began
March 1970.
Table 3-II: Initial Avionics Studies
.
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the promise of simplification, higher reliability and
easier installation. The Emphasis was on digital systems.
The phase array type antennas doing multiple function were
prime candidates. A multi-role radar hardware development
was established to pursue this possibility (see Figure 3-1
on page 73).
Defensive avionics used new concepts of digital
technology to support penetration requirements to provide
adequate growth and flexibility. This system included
radar jamming equipment and an infrared counter measures
system that could detect heat-seeking missiles. A
worldwide communication capability was planned for the
future. Development programs for key technical features
were supported and the technical feasibility was
demonstrated.
The requirements for initial survivability led to
dispersal and hence need for the CITS. The primary purpose
of this system was to provide assurance that while at the
dispersed site, the airplane should be ready to fly at
very short notice. To incorporate this system within the
constraints of weight and cost targets was another
challenge.
The requirement of accomplishing the mission with 25%
-84-
less fuel was met with success in two areas. The engine
technology program offered 10-15% improvement in specific
fuel consumption. Variable sweep wing was another
aerodynamic advancement which helped reach the fuel saving
requirement. The AMSA designs were initially like F-1ll's
and started from the same NASA data base (see Chapter 2
for details). As the configuration evolved it become
apparent that the larger payload fraction and aircraft
balance required the engines to be near the aerodynamic
center rather than at the rear as they were in the F-1ll.
This new arrangement led to the problems of fuselage
heating and horizontal tail placement. Wind tunnel tests
on various configurations showed that any selected
configuration would require much tuning up. As discussed
at the end of this chapter, the mounting of the engines on
the aircraft frame was the major difference among leading
candidates of the AMSA design.
The studies mentioned above led to a development of
the specific point design aircraft. Their evolution is
discussed next. Figure 3-4 on page 85 shows 1967 AMSA with
engines at the rear. The weight fraction distribution
among various systems is shown in Figure 3-5 on page 86.
The gross weight was 350,000 lbs. By 1968, the
configuration had changed recognizing the need to separate
the tail and the wings. See Figure 3-6 on page 87. The
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required payload had been increased to 32 SRAMs as a part
of the conceptual definition and design. Gross weight,
range and payload were the primary variables. The typical
trade-off studies included:
(1) landing gear floatation requirements vs.
dispersal capability.
·(2) Crew escape modules vs. ejection seats.
(3) On-board integrated test capability vs. Aerospace
Ground Equipment (AGE).
(4) Ride quality vs. Crew effectiveness.
(5) Nuclear hardness vs. initial survival.
Throughout these studies, cost effectiveness was the
prime objective. Also, relative effectiveness of the AMSA
in destroying a given target system played a significant
role. For most of the studies, gross weight, and its
associated empty weight were the primary cost input. The
point design aircraft were used to do a more complete cost
analysis which became the baseline for the trade-off
studies.
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The results of the crew escape studies are summarized
in Figure 3-7 on page 90. Alternate designs were made with
a six ejection seats and six-man module. While the AMSA
had a basic crew requirement for four (two pilots, an
offensive system operator and a defensive operator), the
training mission called for six being on-board, and
therefore, provisions were made for six men escaping. The
parametric studies showed that the aircraft with six
ejection seats was heavier than the one with a module.
Hence the cost was greater. The requirement for a crew
module was thus firmly established at that time (Patton,
1974, pp. 5).
By 1969, thousands of configurations had been
analyzed and detailed requirements were established
(Patton, 1974). Thus, a four year AMSA study program,
which began in 1965, entered into contract definition
phase (Defense System Acquisition Review Council, DSARC I)
on July 1 1967. In December of 1967, the Air Force
received permission to proceed with the B-1 program
(official title of the AMSA program from then on) and
formal industry competition was initiated through a
request for proposals (Holder, 1986, pp. 33). The program
was structured as a "Fly Before Buy" type. Hence, the
request was limited to the design, development,
manufacture and testing of five aircraft. Three companies:
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Boeing, North American Rockwell and General Dynamics
submitted their bids. The major configuration differences
between their designs are discussed in the next section.
3.3 The B-I Versions Submitted in the Bids
Configuration differences in the submitted versions
for the B-1 bomber reflected varying propulsion
integration philosophies and the past experiences of the
three companies. Boeing for example, never built a
supersonic airplane; its supersonic experience was limited
to the Bomarc air defense missile which used rocket and
fuselage-mounted ramjet engines. The Boeing company's B-1
design incorporated aft fuselage-mounted engine pods and
reflected its 727 and 737 subsonic experience as well.
North American gambled on variable geometry wing
configuration and made extensive trade-off studies to
demonstrate its greater performance which showed that the
requirements could be met with growth potential offered by
their design. Perhaps, the riskiest concept was that of
General Dynamics, which selected wing mounted engines.
General Dynamics' bad experience with the F-1ll induction
system (Coulam, 1977, pp. 167-235) drove the company away
from fuselage-mounted inlets. However, the company faced a
new set of problems in putting engines on the
variable-sweep wing of a supersonic aircraft. Engines that
hang from the fixed root portion of the wing are close to
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the fuselage and produce high interference drag at
supersonic speeds. General Dynamics examined a solution
that called for locating the engines on the moving portion
of the wing, away from the fuselage. There, the engines
were to be suspended on swiveling pylons to keep them
aligned in the direction of flight at all wing angles. The
company had some past experience with swiveling pylons
which were used to support the Phoenix and SRAMs on the
F-1ll aircraft. But, this turned out to be an expensive
proposition. One consequence of swiveling engine pylons
was extremely large engine-out moments. The only solution
for directional trim with such a design was probably twin
tails with wide lateral separation. The artist's
conceptions of the General Dynamics and North American's
B-1 designs are shown respectively in Figure 3-8 on page
93, and in Figure 3-9 on page 94.
With these supportive studies and the political
maneuvering which shaped their development, the B-1
entered into a new phase in early 1970. North American
Rockwell was selected in June 1970 as the B-1 system prime
contractor and General Electric was selected to build
engines for the new B-1. The details of the birth and the
growth of the B-1 bomber are discussed in the next
chapter.
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Figure 3-8: General Dynamics' Version of the B-1
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Figre 3-9: North American' s Version of the B-1
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Chapter 4
BIRTH AND GROWTH OF THE B-1A BOMBER (1970 - 1976)
This portion of the B-1A history includes the
description of the winning of the contract by Rockwell
International and early details of the program; design
modifications and reorganization of the program; the B-1A
technology; program funding, evaluation, and rising
controversy over the B-1A program. During this period, at
five different times, the B-1 (B-1A) technology program
was sharply influenced either by a shortage of funding or
by micromanagement efforts by cost-conscious members of
Congress. The micromanagement efforts included frequent
close scrutinies of the technical contents of the program.
Also, these members of Congress requested frequent
evaluations of the program as to whether it met its
objectives in the most cost effective way or not. These
congressmen once proposed a study to investigate a cost
effective alternative to the B-1A bomber. Such scrutinies
made the Air Force take a harder look at the B-1 bomber to
justify the program's existence.
The first major reorganization took place in late
1970 under the auspices of two projects titled "Project
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Focus" and "Project Innovation". This reorganization
limited the scope of the program to three prototypes
instead of to five as planned earlier. Many technical
systems were simplified to meet budget constraints. The
close scrutiny of Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre (D.-N.H.) played
a key role in this reorganization. In 1971 an organization
called the Members of Congress for Peace through Law
(MPCL) made a bitter attack upon the program. Their
action made the Air Force justify the revised cost
estimate of the program but did not significantly
influence its technical contents. A third major program
evaluation and change occurred in late 1973 and in early
1974 on the recommendation of Bisplinghoff panel. Congress
accepted the panel's recommendation to provide a better
transition to B-1A fleet production and later granted
additional funding to build one more prototype after
successful flights of the first B-1A aircraft had been
made. As a result of this, both the defensive electronics
program and the flight test program were extended. The
objective behind this strategy was to save a large sum of
money in future modifications at later date by spending
some money upfront in developing mature aircraft systems
before production. A fourth scrutiny of the program was
made again by Sen. McIntyre. He challenged DOD's study
which justified the need for the B-1 bomber. Immediately
after this criticism, a broad coalition of public interest
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groups attacked the program and provided military,
economic, environmental and political arguments against
it. The last two events occurred between March and June
1975 and had, as we shall see, a significant role in
bringing the B-1A program to the limelight in a
presidential election year.
The details of the birth and growth of the program
are discussed below.
4.1 Contract Winning by Rockwell and Early Details of the
Program
On June 4, 1970, DSARC II was completed and the B-1
was given an okay for full scale development. Rockwell
International was selected as the B-1 system contractor
and General Electric was awarded the contract to build the
engines. The USAF cost-plus-incentive fee contract
incorporated Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard's
"Milestone Concept", designed to prevent any costly price
overruns and reduced performance. It set a target price of
$1.23 billion for the production of seven B-1 prototype
airframes by North American Rockwell (Brownlow, 1970). The
total cost of development and procurement of 40 General
Electric F101 advanced technology turbine power plants for
the B-1 (B-1A) program was estimated at $406.65 million
including the projected incentive fee of $30.12 million.
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The estimated total cost of the program was $1.35 billion
including Rockwell's incentive fees. This estimate was
compared with the $1.45 billion figure submitted by
General Dynamics and $1.56 billion by Boeing Company.
Rockwell was the lowest bidder and received the highest
weighted score and was the unanimous choice at every
reviewing level during the lengthy airframe competition.
The winning B-1 configuration and artist's conception of
the B-1 bomber are shown in Figure 4-1 on page 99, and in
Figure 4-2 on 100.
It was announced that an avionics subcontractor would
be selected by the Air Force within the next 90 days to
act as avionics systems integrator for the program. This
company would have the prime responsibility for
integrating the navigation, communications, electronic
counter measures and guidance systems. This development
was a result of the Air Force's critical analysis of the
subject which concluded that the proposed B-1 avionics was
likely to weigh 12,000-14,000 lb and to cost $12-14
million per aircraft. Much of this total resulted from
electronic countermeasures and other penetration aides
designed to meet anticipated future improvements in enemy
air defenses (Klass, 1970). The Air Force hence decided to
adopt a two stage avionics system configuration for the
B-1 bomber to hold down initial cost while providing for
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an expanding capability which might be needed to penetrate
future enemy air defenses. An additional study period of
90 days was intended to fine tune these requirements.
The following milestones were laid down for the B-1
program:
(1) Mockup review - January 1971.
(2) Design validation - October 1971 and July 1972.
(3) Critical Design Review - March 1973.
(4) First flight - Summer of 1974.
(5) Complete initial structural tests - December
1975.
(6) Complete flight testing for airworthiness,
performance and flight loads - January 1977.
(7) Complete contractual testing - December 1977.
According to Packard's concept, if a milestone were
not met at a specified time on a cost/performance basis,
the program would be reopened for the Pentagon's review.
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Five of the seven prototypes on order were to be flight
test aircraft. The sixth was to be a static test vehicle
loaded to the ultimate design weight. The seventh, a
fatigue test aircraft, was to be so tested for the first
time in the history of Air Force's procurement.
The predicted performances of the B-1 bomber are
presented in Table 4-I on page 103. Table 4-II on 104
provides details on B-1 armament which were under study at
that time (Brownlow, 1970). Rockwell included many
features to minimize the size of their airplane. They
proposed a 4,000 psi hydraulic system, a 230-volt
electrical system, electrical multiplexing, structural
mode control fins (soft ride fins), a maneuvering rocket
control system for a crew escape module and a high
percentage of titanium in basic structure. The design
featured a pair of variable sweep wings, a large
horizontal tail and a mixed compression engine inlet to
satisfy the supersonic requirements.
4.2 Design Modifications and Reorganization of the Program
The first major contractual task after the contract
was awarded was to change the design and restructure the
program to be compatible with the existing and projected
funds available. This effort was named "Project Focus".
The changed philosophy with regards to avionics was
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Maximum speed:
Design cruise speed:
Maximum range
without refueling:
General Electric
F101 engine
thrust rating:
approximately Mach 2.3 at an altitude
of 50,000 ft
approximately Mach 0.85 at an altitude
of 50,000 ft
6,100 miles, flying a mixed flight
profile including cruise, supersonic,
and high subsonic speed at low altitude
30,000 lb approximately
Maximum gross weight: 360,000 lb approximately
Weapons payload
capability: 50,000 lb plus
Table 4-I: The B-1 Performance Characteristics
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B- Arrnaman Alre dy Under Sty
nerican Rockwell 81 strategic bomber will the Fiscal 1971 budget would be spent on preliminary de-
carrying several new penetration weapons, sign, propulsion and electronic countermeasures (ECM) for
ed. for the aircraft, as well as the full range SCAD. The AGM-86A SCAD is envisioned as a 1.000-mi.-
rried by the Boeing 8-52 bomber whichit range armed decoy, initially intended for the B-52 and
late in' the decade. The new weapons are General Dynamics FB-111 strategic bombers. The 1,350-lb.
prove the ability of the four-man bomber to turbofan-powered vehicle will carry ECM ammers and de-
Soviet Union's airborne warning and control coys designed to simulate radar returns of the launching
ACS). bomber-and to spread confusion among enemy radar.
)ons contemplated for the new aircraft In- Armed with 200-lb. warhead, SCAD would have a speed
of Mach 0.55 to 0.85, in conformance with sea-level velocity
ifens missile (short range)--Preliminary profile of launching bombers. It will be inertially guided in
a of a short-range bomber defense missile -midcourse with a terminal aid. ECM and propulsion studies
1-1 against hostile defense interceptors were currently are under way at Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories
taytheon Co. on May 10. Followion funding and Williams Research Corp., respectively.: 
hrust management technique .for the mis- Alternate proposals aimed at reducing the estimated
in system is expected. Initial studies ex- $2-billion cost of SCAD development by as.much as a factor
configurations required to meet anticipated of five call for using modified Teledyne RyaniAeronautical
salsile probably will be radar-guided. drones as SUAWACS killers rather than as decoys or modi-
efense missile (long range)--Proposal re- fled Northrop MQM-74A drones in arger quantities than
liminary studies of a long-range, probably SCAD vehicles, but solely as unarmed decoys.
omber defense missile to defend the air- *Short-range attack missile (SRAM)-Boeing (AGM-
enemy interceptors at ranges as great as 69A) SRAM air-to-surface missile now in' flight tests is
irface-to-air missiles (SAM) are to be issued planned for the B-1. in addition to the '5Z and FB-111,
e soon. A proposed low-altitude penetration for which it originally was earmarked. The inertially-guided
;n shelved. missile can be fired at short ranges against radiating tar-
:ruise armed decoy (SCAD)-Proposal re- gets (radars), detected and acquired by a paisive radiating
ttract definition phase studies: of the sub- site acquisition system on the bomber prior to launch,
nrmed decoy (SCAD) are expected to be re. All B-1 weapons aretbeing sized against the SRAM as a
F in August, pending approval of plans now reference, since B-1 bomb bays are to be configured to
Council. Most of the $34 million requested in carry what is believed to be 24 SRAM-sized articles.
Table 4-II: The B-1 Armament
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mentioned earlier. Cost-weight tradeoffs were examined
more carefully. The percentage of titanium, steel and
aluminum were varied. For cost reduction, the percentage
of titanium was dropped from about 40% less than 20%
without significantly influencing the performance (Patton,
1974).
As a result of "Project Focus", the requirements were
modified as shown in Figure 4-3 on page 106. The "Project
Focus" B-1 airplane is shown in Figure 4-4 on page 107.
The North American Rockwell concept of diffusion bonding
of titanium was retained. The aerodynamic technology
requirements were straight forward. Finally, the
definition of the engine/inlet distortion recognized the
high level of technology necessary in this area.
In August 1970, the Senate Armed Services Committee
recommended a funding cut of $50 million in B-1 program
budget (Winston, 1970). Skepticism over the Air Force's
estimate was centered in an adhoc subcommittee on research
and development headed by Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre
(D.-N.H.). In his report to the Senate he declared that
the changes in the B-1 specifications since the beginning
of calendar year 1969 (and those discussed above) should
have resulted in a reduction of the estimated cost of the
B-1 program. These changes included:
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FOCUS CHANGES TO B-1 REQUIREMENTS
ITEM
* Takeoff Distance
* Supersonic Distance
* Refuel Altitude
* Thrust/drag at SL 0.85M
CHANGE
Increased 500 Ft
Decreased 100 Mi
Decreased 500 Ft
Decreased 10%
Figure 4-3: The Changes in B-1 Requirements
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(1) A 25% decrease in the number of Boeing AGM-69A
missiles, SRAMs and SCADs to be carried by the bomber.
(2) A 20% reduction from supersonic to high subsonic
range in the aircraft's low-altitude speed.
(3) A decrease in the size of the avionics package
which would result in savings of at least $5 million per
aircraft.
He called for a formal study of these changes in the
B-1 specifications and their relationship to cost, prior
to consideration of the FY 1972 budget session. Also, he
raised questions as to the cost of upgrading the life of
the KC-135 tankers which would serve to refuel the B-ls.
Long-term cost consideration dominated the subcommittee's
concerns. As a result of all these reductions, the
subcommittee questioned the rise in the Air Force's
procurement cost estimate from $8.96 billion in December
1969 to $9.37 billion in Spring 1970 for a fleet of 244
B-ls.
This inquiry was followed by an exercise involving
program reorganization. This exercise was named "Project
Innovation" (Brownlow, 1971). Deputy Defense Secretary
Packard and Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seaman, Jr.,
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ordered a restructuring of the program to tighten
management procedures and to reduce the cost. The steps
taken resulted in:
(1) The reduction in number of planned flight-test
aircraft from five to three and flight-test engines from
40 to 27.
(2) Reductions in the flight test program, so that
the Air Force would not duplicate the flight tests that
already had been successfully demonstrated by the
contractor.
(3) The decision to test fly the aircraft for a year
in order to ensure that all necessary data were in hand.
(4) The decision to place Air Force personnel in the
North American and General Electric plant on a day-to-day
basis.
Other technical details needing solutions were
attended to in early 1971. The mockup was unveiled in late
October of 1971 and a preliminary design review was also
completed in the same time frame. By mid 1971, the
configuration had finally been settled upon but the cost
tradeoffs were continued for the coming few months. Some
specific examples of this period are discussed below.
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The flap system started out as a double slotted
translating design. The detailed design showed this to be
complex and heavy. Wind tunnel tests indicated that a
simpler single slotted flap could be designed to meet the
requirements. The slats were extended slightly inboard
resulting in high lift capability in excess of
requirements.
The crew escape system was proposed with a primary
rocket motor and a gimballed (both axes) maneuvering
rocket motor. The system was simplified to a one motor
design. This resulted in a slight reduction in low
altitude adverse altitude capability and a big cost
savings.
In July 1972, Rockwell was requested by the Air Force
to reevaluate the inlet concept in an effort to reduce the
weight and life cycle cost. It was determined that an
external compression inlet could meet program requirements
only with a minor degradation in supersonic performance.
Therefore in September 1972, the inlet design was changed
to the external compression type from the original mixed
compression type. As a result, approximately 1,350 lb of
weight per aircraft was saved. Schoenheit and Krager
(1981), and "B-1 Engine Inlet Design Simplified" (1972),
discuss these developments in detail.
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Boeing Company was selected ("B-1 Avionics", 1972),
as the avionics subsystems interface contractor. Boeing
was made responsible for five subsystems. They were:
airborne computer; software; control and display; weapons
stores management; low-light-level television (Elson,
1972). Further, the offensive and the defensive segments
were separated and a Central Integrated Test System (CITS)
was also proposed.
The airplane design changes that occurred throughout
this early period are summarized in Figure 4-5 on page
112. As mentioned earlier, these technical changes were
made in response to the realities of a limited budget and
the technical scrutiny of the program by Sen. McIntyre. In
the upcoming section, I shall discuss the details of the
B-1 technologies which came out of this program during the
period 1972-1976.
4.3 The B-1A Technology
The discussion of B-1A technology includes details of
its flight mission, air frame, engines, other systems,
armaments, and avionics. This section also includes a
chronology of the roll-outs of various B-1 prototypes and
the results of their flight test program.
-112 -
DESIGN REFINEMENT.
AFT RADOMES
& HORIZONTAL TAIL SWEEP
VANE NACELLE
Figure 4-5: The B-1 Design Refinements
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4.3.1 The B-1A Flight Mission
The B-1A was designed to carry out two major flight
missions. The mission profiles included a low-level
subsonic penetration, see Figure 4-6 on page 114; and a
high-altitude supersonic cruise, see Figure 4-7 on page
115. Fink (1974) discusses B-1A's mission in great detail.
Here, it is important to note that the individual pieces
of a mission scenario significantly influenced the design
and selection of the aircraft frame and its engines. The
wing sweep position of 15 degrees would be required for
takeoff and landing. Intermediate sweeps of 25 degrees
would be used for efficient subsonic cruise. High-speed
penetration modes would use a wing sweep of 65 to 67.5
degrees (Schnakenburg, 1973). The obvious target was
assumed to be somewhere in Soviet Union and the aircraft
was supposed to fly an optimum polar route. The airframe
should stand the aerodynamic loads put upon it by such
mission requirements and was designed to meet them
accordingly.
4.3.2 The B-1A Airframe
The results of "Project Focus" led to significant
reduction in the amount of titanium that was used in the
construction of the airframe. The accepted B-1 material
composition is shown in Figure 4-8 on page 116.
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Figure 4-6: Low Level Subsonic Penetration Mission
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Figure 4-7: High Altitude Supersonic Cruise Mission
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Figure 4-8: The B-1 Material Composition
__
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Fiberglass, composite materials and polyimide quartz were
used extensively. See Wilson and Broadbent (1975) for
further details. The use of titanium was principally
confined to high load areas or "hot" spots such as engine
bays and firewalls, tail support structure and aft
fuselage skinning. Relaxing of Mach 2 sustained
performance of the aircraft reduced structural aerodynamic
heating concern and such a compromise of lesser use of
titanium was acceptable. The B-1 fabrication was carried
out in 13 different subassemblies at four different plant
locations. Figure 4-9 on page 118 shows the details of
these subassemblies and their fabrication locations
(Geddes, 1975, pp. 135; Holder, 1986, pp. 32).
By FY 1976, total of four B-is were acquired. One of
the B-ls was used for static testing while the other three
were used for fatigue evaluation. Structural testing
tested to 100% of design limits the aircraft was expected
to encounter in operational service. All types of
maneuvers were simulated in the testing which included
low-level flight, approach and landing, and ground taxi
maneuvering. The B-1 No.2 was designated as a structural
test aircraft. Figure 4-10 on page 119 shows a picture of
the static test (Holder, 1986, pp. 25). Design
verification tests of the wing carry-through structure
were carried out to four fatigue life times. The USAF set
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Figure 4-10: Structural Testing of the B-I Bomber
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one fatigue lifetime for the B-1 at 1280 missions or
13,500 hours ("B-1 Meeting Tests for November Review",
1976). The B-1A's planned life span was 27 years. In
addition to the criteria of static and fatigue limits,
fracture mechanics limits were also considered
(Hieronymus, 1971, pp. 42-44). The cutaway drawing key
providing some structural details is presented in Figure
4-11 on page 121, and in Figure 4-12 on page 122 (Godfrey,
1975, pp. 60-61).
The forward fuselage section had a set of the
structural mode control fins. They were a part of the
system called Structural Mode Control System (SMCS). These
fins basically improved ride quality for crew members when
engaged in terrain following mode at low level where
turbulence could be near intolerable. Employing small
swept-back movable vanes with 30 degrees of anhedral on
each side of the nose ("Aircraft Design at the AIAA",
1972) in conjunction with the bottom rudder segment, SMCS
employed accelerometers to determine turbulence level
which, if unchecked, could cause movement in lateral and
vertical planes. Yawing movement was damped by rudder
displacement while motion in the pitch was corrected by
the nose vanes which had an operating arc of plus or minus
20 degrees. These vanes were made of graphite epoxy bonded
to aluminum honeycombs with titanium employed for leading
and trailing edges.
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The weapons bays were located in the fore and aft
intermediate sections. They had to be fitted with a
spoiler door to reduce acoustically induced vibrations.
These vibrations were found during the open bay bombing
operation of the aircraft. The aft intermediate section
also housed the main under carriage which consisted of
hydraulically retractable units incorporating anti-skid
braking systems. Two tandem pairs of wheels retracted
inwards and rearwards, lying snugly against the wing
carry-through base when in stowed position. Moving to the
front fuselage, the twin-wheel steerable nose units
retracted forward. This entire tricycle landing gear
arrangement could be extended or retracted by electrically
controlled hydraulic actuators in approximately 12
seconds.
In fully forward position, the variable geometry
wings had a leading edge sweep of just 15 degrees. This
could move to 67.5 degrees in fully-swept configuration.
The wing basically consisted of three components, the
fixed wing carry-through box, and two moving outer wing
panels. The latter were of conventional two spar aluminum
alloy construction which were appropriately stiffened. The
blended wing/body structure bestowed additional life while
also providing a convenient place for stowing elements of
avionics packages. The details of the avionics are later
-124-
discussed in Section 4.3.4. The outer moving wing panels
doubled as integral fuel tanks (wet-wings concept), as did
the wing carry-through box. This box was a massive
structure fabricated mainly from diffusion bonded
titanium.
This material was also used for the wing pivot, a
kind of "shrink-fitting" procedure was used for wing
attachment with heating blankets being placed on the wing
carriage fittings in order to expand them, while the pivot
pin was immersed in a liquid nitrogen bath which caused it
to shrink ("First B-l's Test Components in Production",
1973). With the outer wing panel already in position, the
cooled pin was dropped into place. Once seated, the pin
was unlikely to be disturbed for some 30 years.
Sweeping of the wings was accomplished by
hydraulically driven screwjacks and could be achieved by
any two of the four hydraulic systems. A torque shaft
connecting the two screwjacks inhibited the possibility of
asymmetric movement while the sweep actuators were covered
by a "knuckle" fairing on the leading edge eliminating the
risk of a gap opening as the wing was translated to an aft
position. The details of the wing pivot and the hydraulic
system are given in Stambler (1972) and Ropelewski (1971).
Overwing fairing located to the rear of the pivot blended
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the wing trailing edges and engine nacelles. The wing
carry-through box is shown in Figure 4-13 on page 126.
Figure 4-14 on page 127 shows details of B-1A wing pivot.
Control surfaces included leading-edge slats,
trailing-edge flaps and airbrakes/spoilers. With one
exception, operation was achieved electro-hydraulically by
means of rods, pulleies, cables and bellcrank levers. Only
the two outer airbrakes/spoilers segments on each wing
were actuated by a fly-by-wire system. Control surface
comprised a full-span, seven segment leading-edge slat on
each outer panel, drooping 20 degrees for takeoff and
landing; six segment single slotted, trailing-edge flaps,
again on each outer panel offering a maximum downward
deflection of 40 degrees; and four segment
airbrake/spoiler with maximum upward deflection of 70
degrees. Inhibition devices prevented flap and slat
operations at wing sweep settings which could cause
structural damage, while outer spoilers sections were
automatically locked at speeds in excess of Mach 1. There
were no ailerons. The lateral control was provided by the
spoiler surfaces.
Turning to the empennage, that was a cantilever,
fail-safe structure featuring a very marked degree of
sweep in all surfaces. Construction was made from titanium
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Figure 4-13: B-1 Wing Carry Through Structure
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Fuselage Pivot for Wing MatingFigure 4-14:
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and aluminum alloy and was mated to the aft fuselage by
means of double shear attachment bolts on the tailplane
spindle, a vertical shear pin in the tailplane spindle
fitting and a shear-bolt joint on the front beam of the
torsion box. Movable surfaces comprised a three-segment
rudder of aluminum alloy construction and "all flying"
tailplane. Maximum rudder deflection was 25 degrees to
left and right. The tailplane operated collectively for
pitch control and differentially for roll control. In the
former case, movement might be achieved through an arc
extending from 10 degrees up to 25 degrees down, while
operating differentially, the arc was plus or minus 20
degrees. As with most other control surfaces, actuation
was achieved hydraulically but a back-up fly-by-wire
system was also made available for use in the unlikely
event of mechanical failure. The details of the
fabrication of these systems are provided in Loyd, M. et
al (1977) and in Dustin and DeAngelis (1976).
For B-lA, the crew compartment included a module
which would separate from the aircraft during ejection.
The rocket system would separate it from the fuselage and
stabilize it before parachute deployment. The escape
module was later canceled when sled tests at Holloman Air
Force Base ("B-1 Escape Capsule in First Sled Test", 1973)
found that capsule stability was limited up to speeds of
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300 knots (kt) and would require redesigning for use at
higher speeds ("USAF Presses B-1 Cost Effort", 1974).
Ejection seats that would be capable of ejecting a crewman
at speed of about 600 kt with 85% certainty that injuries
would not occur, were selected instead. The capsule system
was however retained in the first three research and
development aircraft for further testing. Only the fourth
aircraft was fitted with ejection seats. As mentioned
earlier, a crew of six was supposed to fly the aircraft
during training missions. In the fourth aircraft, each of
the four B-1 crewmen would use the advanced technology
ejection seat for escape. Two other seats were installed
for flight instructors. They would have to escape through
the bottom of the bomber (via entrance door) using their
parachutes. The changeover to ejection seats was believed
to have provided savings of an estimated $270 million on
life cycle cost over the next 10 years together with an
immediate savings of $70 million at the time of the
decision in October 1974. The B-1 ejection seat contract
was awarded to McDonnell Douglas in March 1976.
4.3.3 The B-1 Engine
The B-1 vehicle requirements with particular
significance to the propulsion system included:
(1) Low subsonic range.
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(2) Supersonic cruise capability at high altitude.
(3) "On the deck" high subsonic terrain following
capability.
(4) Short takeoff distance.
(5) Small radar cross section.
(6) Compatibility with KC-135 tanker.
(7) Fast reaction time (engine starting).
(8) 30-minute engine change.
The basic mission for the aircraft were discussed
earlier in Section 4.3.1. The propulsion system required
the sizing of the system, the determination its
configuration on the vehicle, and the fine tuning of its
performance from the results of ground and in flight
tests. Further details of these requirements are discussed
by Christenson (1975); Ward, G. et al (1975); Hawkins and
Hampton (1775); and Dobbs and Stevenson (1977).
Power for the B-1A was furnished by a quartet of
General Electric F101-GE-100 augmented turbofan engines,
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sited in pairs beneath the fixed center section of the
wing. As discussed earlier in Section 4.1, the inlet
geometry was significantly altered to an all external
compression type. To ingest more air on takeoff, an outer
lip extending sideways was provided to increase throat
area.
Figure 4-15 on page 132 shows the schematic of the
engine (Yaffee, 1974). The F101 was an advanced-concept
turbofan in the 30,000 lb thrust class. It had a dual
rotor design with a bypass ratio of approximately two. Its
low pressure system consisted of a two-stage fan, with
movable flap inlet guidevanes producing a pressure ratio
greater than two. The fan was driven by a two-stage
uncooled turbine. The high pressure system, or core
engine, consisted of a nine-stage axial flow compressor
with variable stators, an annular-type combustor with a
carburetting fuel injection system, and a single-stage-
air-cooled turbine.
The engine was designed for modular assembly to
facilitate maintenance and repair. It was equipped with
numerous boroscope ports for combustors and turbine. The
advanced technology used by this engine enabled it to
achieve the same thrust as two J79 turbojets, yet it had
25% less fuel consumption and 30% less installed volume
(Geddes, 1975).
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Figure 4-15: Schematic of the B-1A Engine
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Design features of the F101 major components were as
follows:
Fan: The fan had inlet guide vanes with variable
trailing flaps. The two fan stages had solid titanium
blades with tip shrouds for improved clearance control and
higher resistance to foreign object damage. Inlet guide
vanes and fan vanes were installed in a horizontally split
fan casing. Fan pressure ratio was over two and inlet
airflow was approximately 350 lb/sec.
Compressor: High stage-loading technology developed
in the General Electric GEl series of engines was applied
to the F101 axial flow compressor to obtain over nine
stages a pressure ratio of above 11. The first two vane
stages, plus the inlet guidevanes were variable. The
horizontally-split compressor casing consisted of a
forward section in titanium, while the aft section - from
stage six back - was made of steel. Inertia welding was
used in making the compressor rotor by welding separate
rotor disks together to make a solid stiff drum.
Combustor: The F101 had a very short annular
combustor utilizing fuel tubes instead of nozzles to
inject fuel into twenty small scroll cups. The swirl
action in the scroll provided immediate mixing of fuel and
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air within a very short distance. Combustion in the
remainder of the combustor gave a uniform temperature
profile along the length of the high pressure turbine
nozzle.
High Pressure Turbine: The high pressure turbine was
an air-cooled, single stage, high energy extraction
design. A lightweight design was achieved with the use of
advanced materials. Vanes were hollow aerofoils which were
impingement - and film - cooled. The stationary shroud was
segmented and cooled making its growth characteristics
compatible with the rotor to provide tip clearance
control. Blades were individually replaceable without
rotor disassembly or rebalancing.
Low Pressure System: The low pressure turbine had two
stages which were tip-shrouded and uncooled. Power was
extracted from the lower pressure turbine to drive the fan
through a shaft concentric with the core engine. Low
pressure blades were individually replaceable and second
stage vanes were replaceable in segmented groups.
Augmentor: The F101 augmentation system was of mixed
flow type, using a daisy chute convoluted flow mixer to
provide efficient mixing and burning of both the fan and
core streams. The fan air flow and core exhaust flow were
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mixed in the plane of the flameholder where ignition began
on the flame holder's inner ring. Ninety percent of the
core engine flow was completely burned prior to fueling
any of the fan by-pass air. This system provided a smooth
and continuous temperature rise over the entire modulation
range.
Exhaust Nozzle: The exhaust nozzle of the F101 was
convergent-divergent and was primarily made up of,
divergent outer flaps and seals. Area variation was
obtained by translating the actuation ring by means of
hydraulic actuators. Hinged connections between the three
different flaps, running on cams and rollers, permitted
the required area variation. The exhaust duct was
constructed of welded titanium. Stressskin steel honeycomb
was used for primary and outer flaps and seals. During
earlier tests at high speed, nozzle leaves experienced
severe vibrations and were shed a few times. Redesign of
the nozzle eliminated this defect (Dobbs and Stevenson,
1977).
Further details of the engine are provided in Jane's
All the World's Aircraft (1977-78, pp. 740-741) and in "GE
Tests New Technology Engine for B-1", 1972). The engine
development took place over a period of approximately
eight years at the cost of more than $600 million (Bartsch
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and Posson, 1980). The Preliminary Flight Rating Test
(PFRT) which was required before the engine could be
cleared for flight testing, was completed in March 1974.
Critical Design Review (CDR) on the F101 engine was
completed in July 1975. Product Verification Program (PV),
which consisted of more than 100 separate tests and
analyses, including a 314 hour endurance test that was
directly related to B-1 operational mission was completed
in November 1976.
4.3.4 Other Systems
This discussion covers aircraft systems such as the
hydraulic system, the fuel tanks, the fuel/center of
gravity control system (FCGMS), the environmental control
system, the electrical system and the secondary power
subsystem. These systems were theoretically all either
fail-operative or fail safe. Thus the loss of any single
system would not jeopardize the completion of the mission
while a second failure in the same system would not stop
the aircraft from getting home safely.
4.3.4.1 Hydraulic System
The hydraulic power generation and distribution
system (HPGDS) consisted of four independent,
simultaneously operating hydraulic systems. These systems
drove various actuators which moved different control
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surfaces of the aircraft. The system pressure of 4,000 psi
was selected to minimize the weight and size of the
system. Figure 4-16 on page 138 illustrates the layout of
the B-1 hydraulic system. This system was linked to the
CITS to monitor and determine the "go, no go" status of
the system. The details of the associated reservoirs,
master and slave pumps, filters and oils used are provided
by Austin (1974).
4.3.4.2 Fuel Tanks
The bomber had eight regular fuel tanks and could
carry two more in the forward bay. The total fuel capacity
was kept secret. The recommended fuel was type JP-4. There
were four tanks in the fuselage - in the forward, forward
intermediate, aft intermediate and aft sections. Between
the two intermediate fuselage tanks the left main and a
right main tank straddled the wing fuselage intersection
areas. Finally in the left and right wings areas there
were two additional fuel tanks, totalling eight. Because
the wings carried fuel, they were called wet wings. For
additional range, fuel tanks could be placed in the
forward and intermediate weapons bays with approximately
22,000 lb of additional fuel (Yaffee, 1973). The
arrangement of the fuel tanks is shown in Figure 4-17 on
page 139 (Logan and Miller, 1986). The B-1A was designed
with in-flight refueling capability by KC-135 Strotanker.
This would increase its range even further.
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Figure 4-16: The B-1 Hydraulic Power System
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FUEL TANK ARRANGEMENT
Figure 4-17: Fuel Tank Arrangement
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4.3.4.3 Fuel/Center of Gravity management Subsystem
(FCGMS)
Yaffee (1973) discusses the details of this system.
The FCGMS measured fuel quantity by weight in all tanks
and computed the aircraft's center of gravity (CG). The
system could maintain CG within 0.25 % of the mean
aerodynamic chord. If this did not agree with a stored
target value for the particular flight condition, fuel
would be transferred between forward and aft tanks to
achieve target CG. The FCGMS could provide automatic
signals to the fuel pumps to transfer the fuel; or this
operation could be done manually by pilots. The total
system weight was approximately 133 lb and it required
some 300 Watts of electric power to operate.
4.3.4.4 Environmental Control System (ECS)
The B-1 ECS arrangement was tailored to an air
vehicle having two basic mission profiles discussed
earlier in Section 4.3.1. These missions were similar
except for a penetrating mode which was either low
altitude subsonic or high altitude supersonic. Figure 4-18
on page 141 shows ECS design requirements for these
missions. These missions included long range flights
which made it important to have a system producing low air
vehicle drag and low power extraction. These requirements
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led to extensive use of the air vehicle fuel as a primary
heat sink for as much of the mission as possible. The
conditioned area of the B-1 are shown in Figure 4-19 on
page 143. The refrigeration systems were centrally located
in the ECS bay and heat from the equipment bays and
refrigeration packages was transported via Coolanol 25
liquid recirculating loops, to a fuel tank heat sink. The
details of ECS, avionics compartment cooling, crew bank
and aft station air flow and refrigeration package are
provided in Stein and Scheele (1975).
For the B-1A prototype aircraft, an open loop oxygen
generating system (OLOGS) utilizing a fluomine based
thermal sorption cycle was designed to meet the onboard
oxygen requirements. This system utilized a cobalt chelate
compound, Fluomine, to reversibly absorb oxygen from
engine bleed air. This oxygen was then supplied to the
crew. This system replaced commonly carried liquid oxygen
stores for a longer mission. A yearly ground service of
this system was needed. The details are discussed in
Thornley and Bowen (1976).
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4.3.4.5 Electrical System
The B-1 main electrical system had three 115 kva
integrated engine-driven constant speed generators,
supplying 230/400 V three phase alternating current (AC)
power at 400 Hz through main buses. The distribution and
control of this power was integrated through avionics;
this is discussed later in Section 4.3.6. See Jane's All
the World's Aircraft (1977-78, pp. 389) for further
details.
4.3.4.6 Secondary Power Subsystem (SPS)
The B-1A SPS was an integrated auxiliary
power/accessory drive/engine starting system. It provided
aircraft self-sufficient capabilities for engine starting
and manned ground alert operations, as well as a
capability for aircraft system checkout and limited
maintenance operation of the main engines. Also, it
provided the means by which the main engines drove the
aircraft's hydraulic and electric power generating
accessories. The B-1A SPS installation included one left
and one right hand configured accessory drive gear box
(ADG) and an auxiliary power unit (APU) mounted in each of
the two dual engine nacelles as shown in Figure 4-20 on
page 145. The APU was a single rotor, constant speed gas
turbine designed for both bleed and shaft power
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Figure 4-20: The B-1A SPS Location
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extraction. It was a 400 Horse Power (HP) engine and could
be started by hydraulic power from an accumulator. The
electrical control assembly installed near SPS controlled
SPS's operation. The details of the SPS, ADG and APU are
further discussed in Covey (1984).
4.3.5 Armaments
The B-1A had three identical weapons bays in its
fuselage. Two of these were in the forward bay and the
third was in the aft section of the wing carry-through
structure. Each bay was approximately 15 ft long and had a
hydraulically actuated three position door. As mentioned
earlier, these bays were fitted with a spoiler to reduce
the intensity of a wind-generated acoustical sound. During
the inflight-open-bay bombing mission, air flow over the
bays excited their "organ mode" which subjected equipment
in the bays to unacceptable acoustical loads and caused
doors to vibrate. The provision of the spoilers
considerably reduced this problem. A retractable spoiler,
which would be deployed only when the bay doors were
opened, was installed on the under fuselage of the B-1A No
1. A blade-type spoiler that could be retracted into the
fuselage was designed for the fourth aircraft and for the
subsequent production model (Fink, 1976).
Each bay could accommodate up to eight 2,240 lb
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Boeing AGM-69A SRAMs on a rotary launcher, or up to 25,000
lb of nuclear or conventional weapons. In addition, there
was a provision for four hard points under the fuselage.
Each hard point could carry two additional SRAMs or 10,000
lb of other ordnance. The maximum possible weapons load
was approximately 115,000 lb. The B-1 was also made
capable of carrying BDM and decoy missiles. See Jane's All
the World's Aircraft (1977-78, pp. 388) for further
details. The loading operation of the SRAM onto the B-1A
bomber is shown in Figure 4-21 on page 148.
The SRAMs had a range of approximately 115 miles.
These SRAM were hardened to withstand as great a nuclear
force as the B-1. The SRAMs were loaded with software and
were connected to a computer to perform self-test
functions in the maintenance shop. The Air Force also
prepared the detailed logistics of the propellant change
from carboxy terminated polybutadine (CTPB) mix to
hydroxyl terminated polybutadine (HTPB) mix for these
missiles if such a changeover were to be needed. These
logistics were prepared because some studies of the
propellant indicated that the minimum shelf life of CTPB
mix was only about 6.5 years. The HTPB propellant could
maintain a proper chemical composition for at least 10
years. This could provide a longer life to SRAMs. The
details are provided in "Improvements Planned for B-l's
SRAMs" (1976).
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Figure 4-21: Loading of the SRAMs on the B-1A
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4.3.6 Avionics
In September 1971, The Air Force unveiled its first
plan for the development of the avionics for the B-1A
bomber. The avionics funding was initially divided among
four major programs. These programs were:
(1) Avionics for initial flight testing of the B-lAs.
(2) Avionics for subsystems interfacing.
(3) Defensive avionics or electronics
countermeasures.
(4) Infrared surveillance system.
North American Rockwell was awarded contract to
develop the avionics for the initial flight testing of the
B-1A aircraft. In April 1972, the Boeing Company of
Seattle was selected as the avionics subsystem interface
contractor. In January 1974, the AIL Division of Cutler
Hammer (now Eaton Corporation) was designated to oversee
the defensive avionics. The Air Force canceled its plan to
procure an infrared surveillance system for the prototype
aircraft in May 1972. The Air Force adopted a
three-pronged effort to hold down avionics costs. First,
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it provided direct control of the avionics development to
its System Program Office. Secondly, it insisted on the
use of existing hardware for the new avionics system.
Finally, it specified that the design of the avionics
system and airframe should permit modular expansion to
meet future needs as they arose. In 1972, B-1 No. 3
aircraft was designated the avionics test airplane. It
would have avionics systems which would be representative
of a production airplane. But, later in the program (in
1976), the second B-1 airplane was also fitted with a full
offensive avionics system for flight testing. In late
1976, the fourth aircraft was designated a defensive
electronics aircraft. The technical developments which
took place over the period 1971-1976 are discussed below.
4.3.6.1 Avionics for the Initial Flight Testing of the B-1
Radiation, A Division of Harris-Intertype Aviation,
developed the Electrical Multiplex (EMUX) system for the
B-1 aircraft. This multiplexing system of data transfer
brought the advantages of functional and configurational
flexibility to the B-1. At the same time it reduced the
overall weight and production cost, and increased system
reliability. It took on the function of over 25% of the
conventional aircraft wiring and supervised virtually all
electrical power, the utility systems, the engines and the
flight instruments. The high speed Boolean processors and
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message switching were an integral part of the EMUX
system. This system was designed with
nuclear/electromagnetic pulse protection built into it.
The system was divided into right and left hand sections
of the aircraft. Each section had redundant data links and
control boxes.
The system as configured in the B-1 performed the
functions of data conditioning, acquisition, command and
control for over 9,000 inputs and outputs. Functionally,
it replaced much of the signal/control wires and relay
logic found in a conventional aircraft. Some specific
functions performed by EMUX were:
(1) Control of electrical power distribution to
subsystems and avionics equipment.
(2) Landing gear.
(3) Engine instruments.
(5) Air inlet control system.
(6) Weapons system operation.
(7) Lights.
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(8) Heaters.
The EMUX provided two basic services. First, it
performed the classic multiplexing function of collecting
and conditioning signals at a remote terminal and
transmitting them from any point "X" to any point "Y" in
the aircraft over a common data bus. This resulted in the
elimination of almost 40 miles of wire, which saved
vehicle weight and internal volume. Second, all signal
data were supervised using a centralized Boolean control
processor. This control not only had the capability of
routing the data from point "X" to point "Y", but could
also save combinational sequential or interlock equations
to produce intelligent output commands. This processor had
a quarter megabit solid state memory which could be
reprogrammed to a new system or functional requirements.
The details of the processor, the code format used, the
memory module, terminal redundancy and the signal
conditioner, and an overall view of the system
architecture are provided in Ohlhaber (1973), Klass (1973)
and Courter (1975). This system matured over the flight
testing period of the B-1 aircraft and provided improved
reliability with the following benefits: reduction in
internally occupied volume by 15% , reduction in wire
count by 25%, reduction in wire length by 33%, reduction
in weight by 33% and reduction in maintenance actions from
5 to 1.
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Subsequently, North American Aviation developed the
CITS. This system continuously monitored all the B-l's
systems in flight and on the ground and displayed/recorded
failed modes of operation and isolated faults to the line
replacement unit (LRU) level. The Boeing company
participated in this program to interface the maintenance
of their software and their on-board testing and
monitoring of the advanced weapons system, with the CITS.
The interfacing of the Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE)
with the CITS was provided by Automatic Test Equipment
Associates, Inc (ATE). ATE incorporated SAC's maintenance
philosophy, aircraft and shop operational criteria and
electronic/avionics test station requirements in their
work program and developed simplified ground station
operator procedures. Further details are provided in
Holden (1976), Stephens (1975), and Alpine and DeTally
(1975). Next, I shall discuss the CITS..
The B-1 CITS provided on-aircraft information
relative to the health of the aircraft subsystems. This
information served three different but related functions:
(1) It informed the aircrew of aircraft malfunctions
for immediate evaluation of remaining mission
capabilities.
-154-
(2) It provided data and specific test capabilities
to the maintenance crew to detect, isolate and identify
aircraft failures.
(3) It recorded data for engine conditions and ground
data processing.
To accomplish these functions, the following CITS
subsystem capabilities were required:
(1) Test and verify the aircraft
performance both in flight and on the ground.
subsystem
(2) Display failed modes of subsystem operation to
the aircrew.
(3) Provide onboard identification and isolation of
failed LRUs.
(4) Provide selected test data and results for
identification and isolation of a failed LRU on the ground
with minimum use of AGE.
(5) Record
malfunction data.
malfunction/trend data and print
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In order to perform the identified functions, the
CITS provided three basic modes of operations:
(1) In-flight performance
(2) Ground readiness.
(3) Fault isolation.
The CITS implementation was based on the use of an
onboard digital computer and a stored real-time software
program to control data acquisition, data processing, and
data dissemination operations for performing the B-1
bomber tests. The CITS was an aircraft subsystem that
automatically and continuously tested the operability of
the aircraft subsystems. In addition to this, it also
provided the capability to manually access in excess of
10,000 pieces of data including analog and discrete signal
values.
Figure 4-22 on page 156 shows CITS for the B-1
bomber. It consisted of a digital computer and a resident
stored software program to control processing, five data
acquisition units for interfacing with aircraft subsystems
to transmit/receive test signal data, a control and
display panel for operator interface, and an airborne
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CITS System Diagram
Figure 4-22: The CITS Diagram
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printer to provide a hard copy of the resulting data. The
CITS maintenance recorder provided a magnetic tape output
for ground data processing and analysis. A serial digital
data bus provided the communication link between the CITS
computer and CITS data acquisition/data dissemination
hardware. A second such bus provided the communication
link between the CITS and the avionics control unit
complex.
All the CITS functional operations were performed
under the control of the digital computer. The computer
was a high-speed, stored program, general purpose
computer. It had a flexible repertoire of approximately 70
instructions and a memory capable of holding 65,000
instructions and data words. It could perform upto 200,000
logical operations a second and transmitted 40,000 data
words on each CITS data bus per second. All these
capabilities were packed into a space of less than one
cubic foot and weighed 55 lb. A further description of the
system and its operation is provided in Derbyshire and
Pieratt (1977) and Lowson (1976). Lowson (1976) also
discusses the successful integration of CITS with F101
engines. The CITs was operational in the B-1A from its
first flight in December 1974. As the CITS matured, the
percentage of false indicators were reduced from 13 % of
total to 3 % of total. This resulted in a substantial
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reduction in maintenance personnel, operational support
equipment and spares for the aircraft.
4.3.6.2 Avionics for Subsystems Integration
The USAF designated 16 major avionics components
already in its inventory as government furnished avionics
equipment (GFAE)to be used in the B-1 (B-1A). Table 4-III
on page 159 describes these equipment. Boeing's
responsibility was to supplement this nucleus with
software and additional hardware that would result in an
integrated system efficiently and economically meeting
B-1A's performance and environmental requirements. The
major elements of the system were:
(1) Avionics control unit (ACU) complex (computer).
(2) Control and display subsystem.
(3) Mission and traffic control subsystem.
(4) Navigation and weapon control subsystem.
(5) Stores management subsystem.
Boeing's contract required it to:
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Gouvernment furnished avionic equipment for the B-1
Equipment Designator Manufacturer Previous applicatlon
Forward looking radar' ..... APQ-144 General Electric F-itF
Terrain following radar' . . .. APQ.146 Texas Instruments F-111F
Radar altimrneter ......... APN-194 Honeywell A.7. F-14
DoPoler radar ......... APN-185 Singer FB-ll1
Inertial Measurement Unit . . . LN-15S Litton B-52 ISRAMI
UHF. ADF . . . . . . . . .... ARA-50 Colings Radio F-.4 UH.. A-7A. A-37B. F-111
UHF Communicatlon ..... ARC-109 Collins Radio C-5. A-37B. F-111
UHF Rescue beacon ...... PRC-90 Florida Communications New item
HF Communicaton ....... ARC-123 AVCO F-111
X-Band Tracking transponder . APX-78 Motorola F-111
IFF ............... APX-64 Stewart-Warner C-5. C-141. A-7A. F-111
TACAN ............. ARN-84 Hoffman F-14. A-4M. A.4K. A-7E. P-3C.
S-3A. TA.4M. TA-4K
ILS ....... ........ ARN-108 Collins Radio A portion of ARN-108 (R-17551
used on F-15
Intercom ............ AIC-27XA-3 Hughes New
Code enabling switch ...... DCK-175/A-37AIV Sandia FB-1ll
Coded switch system control . DCK-175/A-37A{V) Sandia FB-111
Modified
Table 4-III: Government Furnished Equipment.for the B-1
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(1) Develop or acquire additional hardware to adapt
the GFAE to the B-1 environment.
(2) Develop or acquire additional hardware needed to
perform the B-1 mission.
(3) Develop software to process sensor data and
coordinate and control the diverse avionics subsystems.
(4) Demonstrate by analysis and testing the
compatibility of hardware and software and their ability
to meet the B-1 specifications.
In all, Boeing identified 32 different major items
that had to be supplied as contractor furnished equipment
(CFE). Figure 4-23 on page 161 shows a cutaway of the
aircraft showing the density and location of the equipment
that made up the avionics system. The system included a
forward looking radar, a terrain following radar, a
Doppler radar, radar altimeters, two identical computers
(one for navigation and one for weapons delivery), mass
storage units, display units, a low light level television
camera, missile platform alignment units, and air-air and
air-ground communication and radio navigation units. A
complete description of the system hardware, operational
sequence and interfacing are provided in Elson (1973b;
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B-1 AVIONICS INTEGRATION
Figure 4-23: The B-1 Avionics Integration
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1973a). The avionics system was connected by a dual
redundant multiplex system over which data were
transmitted in serial digital fashion. This multiplex
system was called the avionics multiplex system (AMUX).
AMUX also connected the avionics subsystem to the vehicle
avionics system and to the CITS computer. AMUX was
furnished by Rockwell. The details of the AMUX system
design, serial data word format, codes and hardware are
provided by McLaren (1975). To simplify the job and cut
the cost of programming, Jovial-J3B, a higher order of
programming language was used. The entire avionics system
was nuclear effect hardened.
Ground testing of antennas and radomes for mission
and traffic control and the offensive avionics system was
completed at Rockwell's microwave test facility in Weed
Patch, California, before fall 1975. This provided a data
base for a wide range of the performance parameters of the
avionics system. This data base was used to update the
system ("B-1 Antenna, Radome Test Near End", 1975). The
second B-1 was fitted with a full complement of offensive
electronic gear. A forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system
was also provided to supplement forward-looking radar
during low level, high speed penetration flights. The No.2
B-1 joined the flight test program in late June 1976
(Fink, 1976).
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4.3.6.3 Defensive Electronics or Electronics
Countermeasures
The defensive electronics consisted of a radio
frequency surveillance/electronic countermeasure subsystem
(RFS/ECM). The defensive avionics was intended to counter
surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft and air-to-air
missiles, fire control radar, and to degrade by noise
jamming early warning and ground controlled intercept
radar. When earlier sponsored studies indicated that the
technology needed to meet all desired performance, cost
and technical risk goals was not fully available in the
desired time frame, the Air Force instituted a change to
align the performance requirements more closely with the
anticipated threat. The threat was prioritized with eight
bands covering the electromagnetic spectrum from 50 MHz to
18 GHz (McGee, 1974). The cost goal for the design was
established at $14 million. Development was limited to
highest priority capabilities which could be produced at
established cost.
Two contractors were selected to participate in a
risk reduction and hardware demonstration effort. A backup
design using off-the-shelf hardware was developed by an
additional contractor in conjunction with the Air Force
Avionic Laboratory. After approximately 10 months of work,
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the Air Force selected the new design and subsequently
issued a request for proposals to two competing
contractors. A final contract was awarded in January 1974
to the AIL Division of Cutler Hammer. The Air Force
planned to purchase the RFS/ECM system at an average unit
production cost of $1.27 million and a 125 percent
ceiling. A total of 241 subsystems were planned for
production. Capability for avionics growth was included in
this design and performance was maximized against a
prioritized threat spectrum, cost goal and schedule
parameters.
Figure 4-24 on page 165 depicts the USAF/Rockwell
international B-1 strategic bomber's RFS/ECM system. The
Air Force relied heavily on its experience on the Boeing
B-52 ECM system. A large number of receiver, radio
frequency sources, jammers, amplifiers and computer
interfacing units were use to make sure that the B-1 could
penetrate to strategic targets deep within the Soviet
Union if ever called upon to do so. "USAF Stresses B-1
Penetration Ability" (1975) discusses this subject in
further detail. A brief description of the subsystem is
provided in Miller (1976) and is presented here. The ECM
subsystem was so configured that receiving antenna and
jammers in each of the three main sections (two wing
gloves and tail) provided 120 degree coverage in azimuth
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Figure 4-24: The B-1A's RFS/ECM System
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and about 90 degree in elevation. The hardware in two wing
gloves was identical. Drivers, transmitters, receive
antenna and electronically steerable antenna array for the
higher two bands, and two fixed horn antenna for the lower
pair of jamming bands. The frequency-determining receivers
for all bands for all three sectors were located along
with the power supply and direction finding encoder in the
wheel well. The radio-frequency sources and transmitters
for the lower two transmitter bands in the wing glove were
in the right central bay; the jammer logic waveform
generator and power supply were in the left central bay.
The jammers and antenna associated with the aft sector
were in the tail; the receiving antenna were in the tail
cone and in the top of the vertical stabilizer. To supply
precise directional indication, an interferometer network
was coupled to the direction finding antenna. Miller
(1976) also provides a detailed description of threat
processing sequence, jammer logic and control switching by
these subsystems. Later, the Systems Development
Laboratory of Boeing Corporation supported the integration
of the defensive avionics system for the B-1 bomber. The
development cost of this avionics system was high and
hence the system mockup was deleted from the program.
The lower radar signature or smaller cross section on
the B-1 was an invaluable aid in lightening the burden on
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electronic defense. This was so because the ability of
ground radar defense to detect aircraft is directly
related to the vehicle's cross section. Initial
measurements with a B-1 scale model indicated that the
radar cross section was reduced by an order of magnitude
from that of the B-52. Thus, the radiated power to jam
enemy radar was effectively improved. The B-l's lower
cross section resulted from placing the General Electric
F101 fanjet engines deep in the ducts so they could not
reflect radar energy when viewed from different angles.
The USAF discarded a B-1 engine infrared suppression
design when it appeared that the continued development
would impose unacceptable cost and performance penalties.
Because of this decision, the bomber's infrared detection
range in the tail were expanded ("USAF Stresses B-1
Penetration Ability", 1975).
Another electronic development worth noting was the
nuclear flash protection shields covering the B-1 windows.
These shields provided limited forward and side visibility
during "close curtain" operations with small electro-
optical portholes that would protect the pilot's eyes from
the effects of nuclear flashes. The portholes would have
transparent ceramic panes, which were sandwiched between
two layers of polarized glass composed of a material
called PLZT, a name derived from the periodic element
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symbols for lead, lanthunum, zerconium and titanate. The
pane would be kept transparent by an electric charge,
which would be interrupted when a sensor on the pane
detected early radiation from a nuclear flash. When the
current to the pane was interrupted, the properties of the
material changed making it opaque, screening out the
harmful rays (Fink, 1976, pp. 50).
The B-1A also used an expendable countermeasure
(EXCM). Two parallel 400 lb chaff and flare dispensers
were located in the upper forward fuselage, see Figure
4-25 on page 169, aft of the flight deck. These
dispensers were connected to the ejection systems through
the defense management computer. The computer would
receive threat warning data from sensors and receivers.
With its threat prioritizing logic, it would determine
whether or not to command a chaff/flare ejection (Miller,
1976; Logan and Miller, 1986). In addition, the threat
warning could also activate the radar jamming transmitters
to further delude enemy radar.
The critical design review of the RFS/ECM subsystem
was held on April 14 1976. Delivery of the first system to
be installed in the test facility at Edwards Air Force,
California, was scheduled for mid-1977. Defensive
avionics testing actually began in February 1979 with the
flight test program of the B-1A No. 4 aircraft.
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4.3.7 Roll-out of the B-lAs and Results of their Flight
Test Program
The technologies discussed in the earlier section
were incorporated in the production of the B-1A prototype
aircraft. This section briefly discusses the roll-out and
first flight chronology of these prototypes. The flight
test program of the B-lAs is also discussed at the end of
this section.
4.3.7.1 Roll-out of the B-lAs
The first B-1A bomber was unveiled in a roll-out
ceremony at Palmdale, California on October 26, 1974
("First B-1 Bomber Prototype Rolls Out", 1974). On
December 23, 1974, it made its first flight from Palmdale,
California to the USAF's Edward Air Force Base Flight Test
Center. See Figure 4-26 on page 171 for this historic
flight ("The Historic Flight of the B-1A", 1975). In 1975,
Rockwell completed full-scale static/strength and proof
loads test on B-1A No. 2 and started working on aircraft
No. 3 and 4. The B-1 No. 3, the offensive avionics test
aircraft, rolled out on January 16, 1976 and made its
first flight on April 1, 1976. The B-1 No. 2 (the
structural test aircraft) rolled out on May 11, 1976 and
flew for the first time on June 14, 1976. At that time,
the B-1 No. 4 was scheduled to fly in February 1979 with
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Figjure -26: The First Flight of the B-1A No 1
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all its defensive avionics gear. B-1 flight mission
objectives were formulated in detail in March 1974 and
initial flight testing was successfully completed by
September 30, 1976 (Holder, 1986, pp. 34-35). The next
section discusses the results of the flight test program.
4.3.7.2 B-1 Flight Tests
On March 13, 1974, an internal B-1 Division document
titled "B-1 Flight Test Mission Objectives" was published.
This document established the approach to be taken to
achieve the primary goal of a joint contractor/USAF flight
test program. This goal was to demonstrate that the B-1
could satisfactorily perform its intended missions.
September 1976, was set as the program completion date and
the production decision (DSARC III) date was to be in
December 1976. The details of the flight test program are
discussed by Bock (1975), Sturmthat and Benefeild (1976)
and Bock (1976).
The primary mission of the B-1 was a low altitude
high speed penetration to a target. The aircraft was also
equipped to have a capability for high-altitude supersonic
missions. Typical primary/secondary flight missions are
shown in Figure 4-27 on page 173. Take-off, subsonic
climb, and cruise with air refueling were essential stages
to be taken before target area penetration. The predicted
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Figure 4-27: The B-l's Mission Profile
-174-
accumulation of flight time to reach these goals during
the phase I of the program is shown in Figure 4-28 on page
175. The upturn in the curve beginning in mid June
reflected the expected contribution of the B-1 No. 2 (air
load) and No. 3 (offensive avionics aircraft). The early
milestones to be achieved are shown in Figure 4-29 on page
176. The use of a milestone chart was considered a better
way to measure the progress of the program.
A large number of refueling tests were performed over
the test ranges which covered the Pacific ocean between
Los Angeles and San Francisco. For the B-1 aircraft, the
flight test program proceeded without any major technical
problems with exception of the No.1 engine access doors
which failed in the beginning. Precautions were taken to
prevent any further engine damage and new doors were
installed. There were a few problems with the electrical
power generation systems and they were also solved. The
initial flutter envelope for the aircraft was also
determined. The results are shown in Figure 4-30 on page
177. A hydraulically inertial exciter beam was mounted in
a special tip attached to each wing and to the tips of the
horizontal and vertical stabilizers. During a flutter
sweep, the exciter was driven in angular oscillation and
it imposed a combination of bending and torsion loads upon
its supportive structures. A frequency range of 1 to 65 Hz
-175-
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was swept in 45 seconds. The force generated on the
aircraft were measured to plot the flutter envelope.
Single frequency operations were also performed. After the
installation of the air induction control system,
supersonic Mach number of 2.12 was attempted and was
achieved on flight 31 at 50,000 ft above the sea level.
Later, the flight envelope of the B-1 was determined.
Figure 4-31 on page 179 illustrates that envelope. Weapons
separation tests were performed over the Edwards Air Force
Base bombing range. On April 1, 1976, aircraft No. 3
joined the test program. The flight testing of this
aircraft concentrated on the testing of offensive
avionics. Much effort was devoted to the testing of the
terrain-following radar. Two typical sets of results
obtained from these tests are shown in Figure 4-32 on page
180. This figure shows the contours followed by the B-1A
using the terrain following radar. The details of this
radar - its operational theory, avionics and hardware are
- provided in Sharp and Abrams (1977). Aircraft No. 2
joined the program in June 1976. This aircraft was
primarily instrumented for air load measurements. The
summary of the early milestones achieved and the actual
accumulated flight hours is provided in Figure 4-33 on
page 181 and in Figure 4-34 on page 182.
The flight program progressed according to the
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FLIGHT ENVELOPE
Figure 4-31: The B-l's Flight Envelope
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2
MACH NO.
-180-
TF MFOMANCE
1E.39/ 3 /385
z 1 t T I It _
/t I ---- ,ItI2' ,./.x
53~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-- ," 
U -m
*n·oammMu mhsw , o Miml sulk
Figure 4-32: Terrain-Following Performance of the B-1
I
mm
-181-
I VAUA IOI
FLIGHT HOURS
120 
I0I VQI AO .!fkIi To U
100 _ O"sstO IVM^IP, I"_mL Hi i B |
IO0 miAlL PLUtT. COPT .: ..
A dz:·:::~:~::- ,."' " t '' . '.
~.~, \ ::..--.;.
20 A. PAIfATS
1974 1975 1976
Figure 4-33: Milestones Achieved by the B-i
-182-
B-1 AIRCRAFT
FUGHT HOURS I
32C
210
24C
20C
160
120
Adll4U
FLIGHT HOURS SUMMARY
PHASE I TESTING AErAoLLIaorT
CWUNTIOUAL W SEPARATION (Mi
FIRST ALERT START I
UFlWROMC tn wAY OPEo
ProIIC TE DITE I
APPITMPALOtt 
K l w rr 2m T% I
allUWl,,,o,...,. \~~ZP BP I
IO. . .
Figure 4-34: The B-l's Flight Hours Summary
I
I
I
I
I
I I I !oI Ii
-183-
established plan and had very few unexpected difficulties.
In all, approximately 56 flights were flown. The B-1
logged 8 hours at supersonic speed and 24 hours at 5,000
ft above 0.80 Mach number. Swept wing operation was also
fully achieved. Initial Operational Test & Evaluation
(IOT&E) missions, simulating SAC's combat missions were
successfully completed in September 1976. DSARC III was
completed on December 1, 1976. A test of the B-l's ability
to withstand nuclear blast radiation was postponed to 1980
("Nuclear Blast Resistance Test Scheduled for B-i", 1976)
because the Kirkland Air Force Base, N.M., test facility,
was still under construction at that time. This facility
was to include wooden full scale trestle. The final
dimensions and performance characteristics which emerged
from both the technology development program and the
flight test program are listed in Table 4-IV on page 184.
See Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1977-78, pp.
390-391) for details.
4.4 Program Funding, Evaluations and Rising Controversy
The B-1A bomber had foes in Congress since its birth
in mid 1970. Throughout the next six years, congressmen
and special interest groups vehemently opposed its
development and demanded studies to be made for a more
cost effective alternative to the B-1. These scrutinies
strongly influenced the technical contents of the program.
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DuiEaSIONS, EXTERNAL:
Wing span:
fully spread 41-67 m (136 ft 82 in'
fully swept 23 84 m (78 ft 2 in
Length overall:
incl nose probe 45-78 m (150 ft 2 in
excl nose probe 43-68 m (143 ft 3 in
Height overall 10-24 m (33 ft 7 in
Tailplane span 13-67 m (44 ft 10 in
Wheel track (c/I of shock-absorbers) 4.42 m (14 ft 6 in
Wheelbase 17.53 m (57 ft 6 in
AEA:
Wings, gross approx 181.2 m' (1,950 sq ft
WEIGHTS AND LOADING:
Design max T-O weight 176,810 kg (389,800 lb
Design max ramp weight 179.168 kg (395,000 lb
Max landing weight approx 158.757 kg (350.000 lb
Max wing loading approx 976 kg/m (200 lb/sq ft
PERFORMANCE (estimated, with VG inlets):
Max level speed at 15,240 m (50,000 ft)
approx Mach 2-'
(1.145 knots; 2,125 km/h: 1.320 mpl
Max level speed at 152 m'(500 ft) - . ..
·;:f - rx .approx 650 knots (1,205 km/h; 750 mph)
Cuising speed at 15,240 m (50,000 ft) 
-A Mach 0-85 (62nots (1,042 k/h; 648 mph)
Max range without refuelling 
..-- 5,300 tn (9,815 km; 6,100 miles)/
The B-1A Dimensions and Performance DataTable 4-IV:
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During the presidential election year, public discussion
made the program even more controversial and set the stage
for its eventual cancellation in 1977. In this section, I
shall discussion these events. I shall also discuss the
program funding which was made available during this
period and the changes it initiated.
In Section 4.2, I discussed the concerns of Sen.
McIntyre. His inquiry was followed by a Pentagon exercise
involving a major program reorganization. This led to a
reduction in the number of planned flight test aircraft
from five to three. In addition, the flight test program
was stripped down. In spite of the recommendation for
funding cuts, Congress approved DOD's funding request of
$180.2 million for FY 1970-71. All the same, one should
not underestimate the role Sen. McIntyre played in
restructuring the program.
The termination of the Air Force/North American B-1
advanced manned bomber program and the initiation of
studies leading to an alternative weapons system was
strongly recommended by the Members of Congress for Peace
through Law (MPCL). Winston (1971) and Witze (1971) fully
discuss MPCL's proposal. MPCL was first organized in 1966
with the aim of coordinating congressional concern for
world peace into the specific actions of Congress. Its
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goal included the development of international
cooperation, the strengthening of the United Nations and a
disarmed world under enforceable world law. The MPCL
military committee was headed by Sen. William Proxmire
(D.-Wis) and Rep. Ogden Reid (R.-N.Y.). As a part of the
plan to register its opposition to several weapons
systems, MPCL recommended the reduction of the FY 1972
authorization for the B-1 bomber from the requested $370.3
million to $20 million. This minimal funding, MPCL
declared, was necessary to preserve the advanced research
and development option for a possible renewal at a later
date.
Rep. John F. Seiberling (D.-Ohio) joined Sen.
McGovern in recommending that the supersonic capability of
the B-1 should be dropped on the grounds that it was not
cost effective. They recommended that the aircraft should
be redesigned as a standoff platform that would utilize
long range air-to-ground missiles which were about to
enter the services at that time. The congressmen
questioned the advantages of the B-l's penetrability over
the B-52's at that time and later in the post-1980 period.
They expressed doubts over the accuracy of the Air Force's
estimate of $11.124 billion as the overall program cost of
the B-1. Like Sen. McIntyre, they too were skeptical about
the cost of a new tanker fleet to refuel the B-lAs. Their
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own estimate of the cost of the new tanker fleet ranged
from approximately $20 billion to $75 billion. The latter
figure was a life cycle cost.
Because of this uproar, the Air Force took a harder
look at their cost estimate. Maj. Gen. Douglas T. Nelson,
the B-1 Systems Program Director at that time, informed
the congressmen that the new estimate of $11.124 billion
was not a cost overrun, but a "necessary and appropriate
update of the preliminary program estimate" which was
continually being documented to Congress. He said that the
"adjustment to the preliminary estimate" included:
(1) The inflationary adjustments over the life of the
program as converted to Fiscal 1970 dollar values added
which $982 million to the estimate.
(2) The funds formerly attributed to the AMSA
program, the B-1 fore-runner, which accounted for an
additional $139 million.
(3) The testing support and SRAM interface costs not
previously charged to the program which accounted for an
additional $187 million.
His revisions brought the Air Force estimate to $10.1
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billion for the entire program in September 1970.
According to him the cost had risen again this time to
$11.4 billion for 241 aircraft. He mentioned that this
cost increase was of great concern to the Air Force and he
assured the congressmen that he was doing all in his power
to curtail the costs through tighter program controls.
Later, avionics development was hard hit by these
considerations and its cost was reduced by more than $55
million from the fiscal baseline set in May 1970.
In spite of the opposition by MPCL, Congress finally
approved DOD's B-1 funding request of $370.3 million for
FY 1972. Also, a funding of $444.5 million was approved
for FY 1973. Though, most high performance characteristics
of the B-1 were maintained in the scaled down development
version because of the concern over the cost rise. Sen.
Proxmire continued his opposition to the cost estimate of
the program and requested the GAO to study the matter in
further detail. The report was released in March 1973
("USAF Counters Proxmire's Charges", 1973). This report
noted the possibility of a $530 million add on as a
penalty for the increased weight of the aircraft. It also
added $510.8 million in logistics support and additional
procurement costs over a 25-year period. An increase of
$164 million was also added due to a change in the
production dates bringing the total cost to $12.56
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billion, or $51.5 million for each of 244 aircraft. The
Air Force admitted that the weight of the aircraft would
be increased to 389,000 lb (from an estimated 360,000 lb).
This would lead to increasing the takeoff distance by 190
ft and would cost an additional $1.9 million per plane
($457.9 million for a total of 241 aircraft). The Air
Force included $164 million to install offensive avionics
equipment in the third B-1 and decided to postpone flight
testing by a year or so. They said that it was ridiculous
to add the cost of logistical support material and life
cycle equipment to the procurement cost of the bomber. The
Air Force also confirmed its intention to buy 241 aircraft
instead of 244 as quoted by the senator. Maj. Gen. Nelson
explained the primary reason for the program stretchout
was Rockwell's diversion of its manpower to help in the
airframe assembly of the first aircraft in the hope of
meeting schedules at the expense of the installation of
the subsystem ("B-1 Prototype Production Stretched",
1973). He commended Rockwell for its efforts to assure
solid structural integrity at every level. As a matter of
fact, this did slow down the program to such a degree that
the General estimated its development might have increased
cost by $80 million. Eventually, Rockwell lost a portion
of the B-1 incentive fees because of this stretchout
("Rockwell to lose B-1 Incentive Fees", 1973). Thus, it
was clear that the close scrutiny of the program by Sen
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Proxmire indeed pressured the Air Force to maintain
tighter program controls.
This program stretchout had its repercussion in
Congress and a large cut of $100 million was recommended
by the Senate Armed Services Committee from DOD's $473.5
million B-1 funding request for FY 1974 ("$100 Million
Slashed from B-1, Senate Unit Cuts Other Weapons", 1973).
According to Brownlow (1973), the proposed cut might have
reduced the B-1 to a crippled prototype status with the
possible fate of its predecessor the B-70 (see Chapter 2
for details). But, the worst did not happen. Funding of
$4448.5 million was approved for FY 1974 with a firm
request to meet the schedule. The Air Force expressed its
unhappiness with Rockwell's top management's inability to
control cost and schedule and criticized Rockwell's
reorganization plans. Concerned by this, Air Force
Secretary John L. McLucas ordered a "special management
review to assess the management aspects" of the Rockwell
International B-1 bomber ("Review Panel to Assess B-1
Management", 1973) in late August 1973. The review panel
was headed by Dr. Raymond L. Bisplinghoff who was the
deputy director of the National Science Foundation and
former dean of engineering at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. The members of the panel were drawn from
the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and other
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governmental agencies, the aerospace industries and
retired military and civilian government employees. The
panel was asked to make a broad, objective assessment of
the management and policies of both the contractor and the
Air Force in meeting the stated requirements and technical
specifications. The group also studied the cost impact of
the stretchout of the B-1 program and reported its
findings in November 1973.
The findings of the Bisplinghoff panel were made
public through Air Force Secretary McLucas testimony
before the US Senate's Armed Services Committee on
February 7, 1974 ("Secretary McLucas on B-1 Program
Changes", 1974). The major conclusion was that the B-1
program should be structured to provide a better
transition to production, so that additional vital
developmental tasks could be accomplished. The details of
the panel's findings are discussed in Brownlow (1974) and
Geddes (1975). The panel concluded that
(1) The program was success oriented but austere in
funding in order to make the appropriate transition from
development to production.
(2) Three B-1 prototypes were insufficient to achieve
a final development model which would reflect accurately
the initial production version.
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(3) The contractor's senior management was adequate
but morale was bad at the lower level because of program
uncertainty and associated layoffs.
(4) The flight testing program was barely adequate to
achieve the maximum speed of the aircraft and additional
flight testing was needed before the production decision
could be made.
(5) There were many differences between the
prototypes and the production models These would
significantly impact future cost, schedule and
performance. Difficulties in the design of the EMUX was an
area of great concern. According to the Panel, the
following probable variants in design performance
parameters were expected:
(a) Takeoff weight - an estimated increase of 10%.
(b) Empty weight - a possible gain of 10%, a probable
increase of 19% and a "reasonably adverse" gain of 26%.
(c) Subsonic variable range - a possible decline of
4%, a probable decrease of 11% and a "reasonably adverse"
drop of 20%.
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(d) Subsonic constant range - a possible decline of
6%, a probable decrease of 18% and a "reasonably adverse"
drop of 29%.
(e) Supersonic variable range - a possible decline of
range of 4%, a probable decrease of 9% and a "reasonably
adverse" drop of 14%.
(f) Standard day takeoff distance - a probable
increase of 15%.
(g) Landing distance - a probable increase of 6%.
(h) Specific fuel consumption - a deficiency of 3% in
qualification test goals and additional 5% in subsonic
mission, although the General Electric F101-GE-100 engine
"would meet goals in the supersonic mission".
(6) The propulsion system development was unusually
good and the engine program had an excellent opportunity
to reach cost and schedule goals.
The findings of this panel set the stage for the
major restructuring of the program. Though the cost of the
B-1 acquisition was tagged at $13.7 billion for 241
aircraft at that time ("Defense Outlook: Estimates Point
-194-
to Moderate Cuts", 1974), both the House and the Senate
turned back the move to kill the B-1 program. The proposal
to eliminate the entire FY 1975 request of $499 million
for the B-i was offered by Rep. Otis Pike (D.-N.Y.) and
was badly defeated. The House approved the entire amount.
An amendment by Sen. George McGovern (D.-S.D.) to limit
the FY 1975 outlay for the B-1 to 200 million, compared
with $445 million recommended by the Senate Armed Services
Committee was also rejected by the Senate. The funding to
start construction of a fourth aircraft was eliminated and
management reserve was substantially increased. Finally,
Congress approved $445 million in B-1 funding for FY 1975.
The details of these debates are discussed by Johnson
(1974b), Johnson (1974a), and are also provided in "Senate
Turns back Amendment to Slash B-1 by $255 Million" (1974).
The conferees, however specifically responded to
Bisplinghoff panel's recommendations and said that after
the successful testing of the first B-1A, the Air Force
could request a reprogramming of available B-1 funds to
finance the start of the fourth aircraft ("Defense
Authorization Bill could Permit Fourth B-1", 1974). But
the condition was that the reprogramming, if found
unsatisfactory, would be brought to an approval vote by
both the House and the Senate Armed Services Committees.
There were approximately 9,000 people working for the B-1
program at that time ("Air Force Seeks to Avoid Break in
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B-I", 1974). Approval of the fourth aircraft was
considered essential by the Air Force in order to reduce
further delays in the overall program, and to boost the
morale of the B-1 workers. The latest SAR at that time
estimated the B-l's program cost to be $18.4 billion. A
figure of $15.1 billion was quoted for procurement cost
only ("USAF Presses B-1 Cost Effort", 1974). This estimate
was believed to be in then-year funds. All the aircraft
starting with B-1A No. 4 were to be equipped with four
ejection seats and the capsule ejection idea was abandoned
by the Air Force (see Section 4.3.2).
The funding for FY 1976 was debated for two time
periods. The first was FY 1976 and the second was the FY
1976 transitional period. Because 1976 was a presidential
election year, how and when to approve the production for
the B-1 was crucial and a serious challenge for Congress.
For the Air Force too, the bid for production funding was
critical in order to maintain continuity in the program.
Moreover, some details needed to be worked out in relation
to the upcoming acceptance of Congress's new definition of
"fiscal year" budgeting policy and its implementation.
Before FY 1977, the fiscal year was defined as the year
running from July 1 to June 30 and it was designated by
the calendar year in which it ended. According to a new
definition, to begin in FY 1977, the fiscal year would be
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defined as a year running from October 1 to September 30
and would still be designated by the calendar year in
which it would end (Wildavsky, 1984, pp. 285). This change
would make FY 1976 three months longer. The B-1 program
plans had to be scheduled accordingly for congressional
approval.
For FY 1976 and the FY 1976 transition period (a
total of 15 months), DOD requested $948.5 million for the
B-1 program. For B-1 research, development, test and
evaluation (RDT&E), $672.5 million were requested for FY
1976 and $168 million were requested for the FY 1976 3
month transition. For long lead procurement, DOD sought
$77 million in FY 1976 and $31 million in the FY 1976
transition. This long-lead procurement was for the first
operational aircraft. Funding for the fourth developmental
aircraft was also included in the total sum. Rockwell
reduced its workforce to a total of 6,900 which according
to some defense industry observers, was a strategy on the
part of Rockwell International to put extra pressure on
Congress to come to a decision concerning the fate of the
fourth aircraft. In addition, by that time, the flight
testing of the first B-1A was successfully on its way. All
of encouraged both the House and the Senate to authorize
$125 million for the production of the fourth prototype.
These funds were provided for the total period of 15
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months ("Industry Observer", 1976). The fourth aircraft
was to be used for the testing of defensive avionics. The
Senate cut the procurement of the long-lead items but the
House approved the funding ("Washington Round Up", 1975).
The conference committee finally approved a total budget
of $812.1 million for the 15 months period. For FY 1976,
$596.5 million were approved for RDT&E and $64 million
were earmarked for the long-lead item procurement. For the
transitional period, $129 million were allocated for RDT&E
while $22.6 million were approved for long-lead production
items. The details of this funding are cited in "Bid for
Production Funds Critical to B-i" (1975) and in United
States Congress (1975).
Between March and June 1975, two major events
occurred which significantly influenced the outcome of the
funding for FY 1976 and the FY 1976 transition. These
events also fueled the ongoing controversy about the B-1
program and brought the program back into the limelight in
this presidential election year. The first was the
challenge made by Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre (D.-N.H.),
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Research and
Development Subcommittee, to Defense Secretary James
R. Schlesinger. He challenged the Secretary to prove the
need for a new manned bomber program which could justify
the production decision for the B-Is. He also faulted the
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Joint Strategic Bomber Study put forward by the DOD
(Robinson, 1975). This study justified the need for B-1
bombers against an overall scenario of Russian strategic
threats. The threats included specific assumptions
regarding USSR's warning and control ground radar,
interceptors, airborne alert systems, and sea and ground
based missiles. The senator doubted these assumptions. The
DOD defended its study by citing another study which was
made at that time by the GAO. The GAO agreed that such a
study could only be based on assumptions concerning the
degree of Soviet threat which would be difficult to
quantify.
Sen. McIntyre was also worried about the rising cost
of the B-1 procurement which was estimated approximately
to be $20.6 billion (then-year funds) at that time. Please
refer to "Defense Cutbacks Likely as Arms Cost Soars"
(1975) for details. The senator explicitly mentioned that
he was deeply disappointed with the B-1 program and he
expressed his full intentions to fight against the program
to its end. The second major event was an attack by a
broad coalition on the B-1 funding. In early May 1975, the
coalition of groups opposed to the USAF/Rockwell B-1A
strategic bomber attempted to rally support to cut out the
entire $948.5 million sought for the program for FY 1976
and transitional period ("Broad Coalition Attacks B-1
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Funding", 1975). In the House, Rep. Les Aspin (D.-Wis) and
John F. Seiberling (D.-Ohio), and in the Senate Sen.
George McGovern (D.-S.D.) with three other cosponsors,
launched an attack by introducing amendments for both
partial and full deletion of the funding for the program.
The coalition which opposed the program included Americans
for Democratic Action, Common Cause and Federation of
American Scientists. Also included were four unions, none
of which which was active in the aerospace industry, and a
number of environmental and religious groups. They
offered military, economic, environmental and political
arguments against the B-1. The environmentalist group,
called the Environmental Action Foundation, used many of
the same arguments which were offered against the
Anglo-French Concord supersonic transport, including sonic
booms, ozone depletion in the upper atmosphere and
depletion of scarce fuel. Common Cause linked
congressional support of the B-1 program to strong special
interest lobbying groups which provided huge campaign
contributions. Also, Common Cause highlighted the presence
of conflict of interest in US' military decision making.
As a result, special attention was given to the
program during the DOD's appropriations for 1976 (United
states Congress (1975)). This hearing covered many issues
related to the B-1 bomber. They were: the cost of the
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bomber, possible environmental hazards created by the
bomber, manned bomber alternatives, and weapons delivery.
Part of this hearing was classified. The members of the
committee were provided with the constant dollar cost of
the bomber program of $ 15.3 billion (or flyaway cost of
$10.24 billion) in 1975 dollars as against the then-year
cost of $20.6 billion for 241 aircraft. Various bomber
alternatives such as the retention of B-52s/FB-llls as B-1
was being deployed, the reengining of the B-52 (B-52I), a
stretched version of the FB-111A (FB-111G), standoff
cruise missiles and cruise missile carriers, tanker
survivability, rebasing options, and bomber weapons
loadings were discussed in detail. The B-1 was cited as
the most effective way for defense beyond 1980s.
The Environmental Action Foundation charged that the
241 B-1 bomber fleet would produce enough pollution to
reduce the ozone layer by 3%, which would increase solar
ultraviolet radiation by 6%. This would then be
responsible for an estimated 25,000 additional cases of
skin cancer per year in the US. According to Gen. Evans'
testimony, the B-1 Aircraft fleet would put an estimated
500 tons per year of NOX into the stratosphere in
comparison to an estimated 720,000 tons for a fleet of
supersonic transport (SST). According to him the Air Force
planned to limit the supersonic flight of the B-1 to 20
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minutes per crew per year. Gen. Evans also testified that
the B-1 aircraft used 25% less fuel than that of the B-52
and carbon dioxide quantities released by the aircraft
would not have any appreciable impact on earth's
atmosphere and eventually the earth's surface temperature.
He also informed the committee that the B-1 engines met
environmental standards established as far into the future
as 1979. Gen. Evans further compared the sonic boom of
the B-1 to that of the Concord supersonic plane. The B-1
flying at an altitude of 40,000 ft and Mach 2 speed would
cause an overpressure of 2.7 pounds per square foot
compared to 2.5 pounds per square foot for the Concord
flying at Mach 1.4 speed at the same altitude. He
explained that the Air Force planned to use more of the
simulators for pilot training to reduce the environmental
impact and he assured the committee of Air Force's
continued commitment for a better environment.
In the later part of 1975, Maj. Gen.
H. M. Darmstandler defended the B-1 bomber program in
public in his address before the Commonwealth Club of
California in San Francisco ("B-1 Bomber Need Defended,
Critics Hit", 1975). His major comments were based on the
testimony of his colleagues before the House in May 1975.
He urged people to recognize that deterrence being the
primary objective of the US, the unique capability of
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bombers to be en route to their targets but recallable,
could make the difference between success and failure in
avoiding an all-out missile exchange. Those several hours
of en route times, according to him, could very well be
the time needed to negotiate a nonviolent solution with
the enemy (Darmstandler, 1975). Public relation efforts on
the part of Maj. Gen. Darmstandler could be considered an
earnest effort on the part of the Air Force to create a
constituency which would support the B-1 program.
Thus, with a wealth of technology, successful flight
testing behind it and frequent political controversies,
the B-1 program entered the presidential election year of
1976. As we saw in this chapter, the B-1 technology
program was sharply influenced both by a shortage of
funding in the early period of its history and by
continuous micromanagement efforts by members of Congress.
In the upcoming chapter, I shall discuss the events which
led to the cancellation of the program on June 30, 1977,
by President Carter.
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Chapter 5
CANCELLATION OF THE B-1A BOMBER PROGRAM (1976 - 1977)
1976 and 1977 were the gloomiest years in the history
of the B-1A bomber. The major reasons for this were the
rising controversy over the program during the
presidential election year, the subsequent congressional
action to postpone the production decision until February
1, 1977, and the cancellation of the program by President
Carter on June 30, 1977. The essential policy decision
behind this cancellation was the contemplated use of mass
attack by standoff cruise missiles as a retaliation
against a first strike by the USSR. This strategy replaced
the earlier one which called for the use of penetrating
bombers. In addition, the B-1A's air defense capability
was slow in emerging and there were some doubts within DOD
that it could be made available by the operational date
set in 1982. Moreover, it was estimated that the cruise
missiles option could be procured at a much cheaper cost.
The latest DOD SAR released estimated the B-i's
procurement cost at $22.6 billion which included the
impact of delay in production decision and heightening
inflation rates ("Inflation Boosts B-1 Unit cost", 1976).
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These developments did not significantly influence
the program till mid July, 1977. However, for the three
and a half years after the cancellation, the program was
granted a very low level of funding - just enough to
perform the flight testing of the avionics systems. As a
result of the cancellation, many studies were initiated to
determine the feasibility of making the B-1 a multi-role
bomber aircraft which could accommodate the popular cruise
missiles. The repercussions of the program cancellation
are further discussed in the next chapter.
5.1 Action in the 94th Congress
1976 was a quadrennial election year. During this
year, efforts similar to the previous years (see Chapter
4) were mounted to terminate or freeze the program.
However, a legislative strategy was becoming apparent that
was related to the anticipation by many Members of
Congress that the national elections would bring a change
of administration. With the B-1 program facing a critical
production decision in late 1976, some Democratic members
of both the House and the Senate sought to halt, at least
temporarily, expenditure for the procurement of
operational aircraft, and to continue the developmental
phase of the program only on a limited basis until a new
President took office. The details of these developments
are provided in "U.S. Defense Policy and the B-1 Bomber
Controversy: Pros and Cons" (1976, pp. 295).
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5.1.1 The House Action
On April 8, 1976, the House of Representative began a
floor debate on H.R. 12438, the FY 1978 military
procurement authorization bill. The B-1 authorization got
special attention. Rep. John F. Seiberling, Jr.,
(D.-Ohio), proposed an amendment which would defer
expenditure of $960.5 million in authorization for
procurement of three operational B-is until February 1,
1977, when the incoming President certified their need and
Congress approved. After protracted debate, this amendment
was defeated. On April 9, 1976, the House passed the
military procurement authorization bill, with proposed B-1
funds included without constraints, and sent it to the
Senate.
5.1.2 Action in the Senate
In the Senate, debate was equally intense. On May 20,
1976, the bill reached the floor, and an amendment was
adopted, introduced by Sen. John C. Culver (D.-Iowa),
which - like the Seiberling amendment in the House -
prohibited the expenditure of funds prior to February 1,
1977. In a related action, the Senate rejected an
amendment proposed by Sen. George McGovern (D.-S.D.),
which would have in effect, terminated the program by
barring the use of any funding for the purpose of
procurement for the B-1 bomber.
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The military procurement authorization was adopted by
the Senate on May 26, 1986, after that body rejected an
attempt by Sen. Robert Taft, Jr., (R.-Ohio), to circumvent
the Culver amendment by permitting the President to use
B-1 procurement funds prior to February 1, 1977, if he
should determine that production of the aircraft would
improve chances for successful Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks.
A subsequent conference committee, appointed to
resolve difference between the House and the Senate
versions, on June 25, 1976, rejected the Culver amendment,
however, and the authorization bill that was finally
adopted provided for continued B-1 funding without
interruption.
5.1.3 Final Appropriation for the B-1
Once the authorization bill was passed, providing
$1.53 billion (including $487.2 million for research and
development which was unaffected by the long-lead
procurement) in FY 1977 funding, the focus of action by
B-1 opponents shifted to the appropriation process. On
July 21, 1976, the Senate Appropriation Committee voted to
defer production, as in the Culver amendment, until
February 1, 1977. The military procurement appropriation
bill passed by the Senate on August 9, 1976, prohibited
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any B-1 outlays whatsoever until that date. The
House-passed appropriation bill had no such constraints.
On August 31, House-Senate conferees reached a
compromise, subsequently adopted by both Houses under
which B-1 expenditure were limited to $87 million per
month through the end of January 1977 for the continuation
of the developmental aspects of the program only.
The actions on B-1 in Congress were significantly
influenced by national debate on the program. In the next
section, I shall summarize that debate.
5.2 National Debate on the B-1 Program
On April 24, 1976, a public interest group presented
an address before the Democratic Party Platform Committee.
This group consisted of a coalition of labor, church,
environmental, professional, scientific and senior citizen
organizations. The theme of its address was "Stop the B-1
Bomber". They opposed B-1 for three reasons:
(1) It was not needed to maintain national security.
(2) Its price was very high in terms of both the
direct cost of the program and the indirect cost in lost
jobs and money lost to other programs.
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(3) The system was being pushed by the Air Force and
the prime contractor.
The group cited the superior suitability of the U.S.
missiles force to over the bomber force respond to any
level of nuclear conflict. According to the group, the
missiles force could successfully attack all targeted
Soviet positions in 30 minutes or about 1/12 the time
required for a bomber mission. Moreover, the group
endorsed the findings of the Brookings Institution's
publication on the use of an upgraded B-52 bomber force.
This B-52 force was seen as adequate to meet any
foreseeable Soviet threat well into 1990s. Also, the group
claimed that the projected US strategic deployment,
without the B-1, would bring strategic forces very near
the maximum limit prescribed by the Vladivostok Agreement;
in this case the likely passage of the upcoming SALT II
which called for even lower ceilings, might make the B-l's
deployment meaningless.
Coalition's estimate of the production cost of 244
B-1 aircraft totalled $21.4 billion. According to them,
the total price of fully arming, operating and maintaining
the B-1 fleet over its entire life might run as high as
$70.9 billion. The group declared that the opportunity
cost of the B-1 program was just too high (see Appendix B
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for further details on the discussion of this subject) and
an equal amount spent on education or a national health
care program might provide twice as many jobs. Their
estimate showed that for 41 states, the B-1 would cause a
significant economic drain. Millions of tax dollars would
flow out of these states to pay for the program but little
or no money or jobs would return to the state economies.
These 41 states would pay $17.5 billion in taxes for the
B-1 production, and only $6.09 billion would return in B-1
contracts and subcontracts. These 41 states would hence
suffer a net drain of $11.5 billions from their economies.
The coalition stressed that the upcoming administration
should concentrate on meeting the urgent social needs of
American people. To this group, unemployment, the
deterioration of the cities, hunger, racial tensions and
the quality of life should take priority over the number
of weapons needed to be produced to protect an internally
weakening society.
The Environmental Action Foundation repeated its
charges against the B-1 (see Section 4.4) saying that it
would pose a dangerous threat to the delicate ozone layer
in the stratosphere. They claimed that the program would
consume large levels of energy and tons of scarce metals
and fuel. According to them, the supersonic missions of
the B-1 would generate a more powerful sonic boom than the
SST, severely polluting the lower atmosphere.
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Coalition's appeal to the Democratic Party Platform
Committee was the driving force in shaping the party's
major policy which featured reductions in defense
spending. This policy was unanimously adopted by
Democratic National Convention in July 1976. Democratic
Presidential nominee Jimmy Carter's running mate, Sen.
Walter Mondale (D.-Minn.), had been a long time foe of the
B-1 bomber. The broad party policy mandate of reductions
in defense spending provided to Sen. Mondale with
additional impetus to continue his fight against the B-1.
Further details on the speech of the public interest group
are provided in "U.S. Defense Policy and the B-1 Bomber
Controversy, Pros and Cons" (1976, pp. 311-313).
The Brookings Institution's study cited by the public
interest group was the report of Quanbeck and Wood (1976).
The purpose of this study was to explore key issues
related to the modernization of the bomber force. Quanbeck
and Wood's inquiry included questions such as:
(1) Did the US need a bomber force?
(2) If so, was that modernization urgent?
(3) What approaches, other than the B-1, were
available to modernize the bomber forces?
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(4) Which of these were most economically efficient?
(5) What risk for the US did each of these involved?
They considered five alternative bomber forces:
(1) Modified B-52G/Hs (including rocket assistance
for faster takeoff).
(2) B-is.
(3) A derivative of large transport aircraft, such as
the C-5 or the Boeing 747.
(4) New aircraft designed for maximum ability to
survive a surprise attack.
(5) A derivative of large transport aircraft with
rocket assistance for faster takeoff.
Quanbeck and Wood evaluated the five alternative
forces and compared their cost, ability to survive
surprise attack (prelaunch survivability), and ability to
penetrate Soviet defenses. Their conclusions were:
(1) The effectiveness of the bomber force was more
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than adequate and with minor modifications would remain
so. With planned deployment of ten Trident submarines, US
strategic forces would rise approximately to the limit
established in Vladivostok guidelines and there was no
urgency to make major changes.
(2) There were marked economic advantages for a
bomber force that would carry standoff missiles, which
would be an alternative to the B-1 in modernizing the
bomber force.
(3) There appeared to be no significant military
advantages to be gained by a penetrating bomber such as
B-1.
(4) In light of these findings, the commitment to
produce the B-1 should be dropped and alternatives based
on the use of standoff missiles should be explored.
(5) Several pertinent strategic arms control measures
should be pursued.
Although the excellence of this study was widely
acclaimed at that time, it relied heavily on unclassified
data. Its conclusions provided additional ammunition to
the foes of the B-1 program who were eager to strike a
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massive blow at every possible opportunity during the
presidential election year.
In May, 1976, SAC's commander, Gen. Russell
E. Dougherty responded to a request from Sen. Barry
Goldwater (R.-Ariz.) for a SAC's B-1 position paper that
could be used to provide answers to opponents of the B-1
production program. Gen. Dougherty concluded in his paper
that if the basic aim of the U.S. national security policy
was deterrence, then a manned delivery system was a must
("Continued B-1 Development Urged", 1975). He further
added that by including a modernized manned penetrating
system like the B-1 as a part of a national mix of major
strategic systems, SAC would be confident of its ability
to continue a viable deterrence posture.
Gen. Dougherty praised the large weapons (both
conventional and nuclear) carrying capacity of the B-1
bomber in comparison to the B-52 which had been in SAC's
inventory for more than 20 years and was aging fast.
According to him, modifications to FB-111 aircraft might
constitute an all new aircraft development program. Larger
carrier aircraft fitted with standoff cruise missiles, a
widely proposed alternative to the B-1, was not flexible
enough and he would place it in SAC's inventory as a
secondary mode of attack in the strategic force mix.
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Finally, he said that in the context of B-l's importance
to the nation's future security, its cost of $20 billion,
a mere 1.95% of DOD's expected budget requests during
those years, appeared completely understandable. Sen.
Goldwater and his colleagues used these arguments to
secure the passage of the B-1 appropriation for the FY
1977. Although they could not secure the production
decision for the program, they were successful in keeping
the program alive.
In July 1976, the controversy over the B-1 spilled
over into major national news papers when the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
published a series of three-quarter-page advertisements
calling for a stop to the B-1 bomber. The advertisements
of the Federation requested that the funds should be used
for municipal purpose instead. The Federation called the
B-1 bomber an expensive plank and they called on the
Democratic Convention to endorse a "stop the B-1 move".
The Convention however, limited itself to a proposal
adopting for a delay in B-1 production money ("B-1
Debate", 1976).
In summer of 1976, Hoeber (1976) criticized the
Brookings Institution's study. He faulted Quanbeck and
Wood's cost model and claimed that the estimated future
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savings from the B-1 alternatives might not be realized.
He recommended that it was imperative to proceed with the
B-1 deployment and also to keep the cruise missile
development and other development options open. He
estimated that a 500-to-1,000-mile range air-launched
cruise missile would be available in the first half of the
1980s while the B-1 would be ready to enter the SAC much
before that.
Later, the article titled "Is the B-1 Vital to Our
National Defense" (1976) was published by the American
Legion Magazine. Therein, Rep. Robert Wilson (R.-Ca) and
Rep. Les Aspin (D.-Wis) expressed their views for and
against the program respectively. Their arguments
followed their party lines: Rep. Wilson called the B-1 a
vital aircraft which was a must for national defense. He
defended the price hike of the program on a constant
dollar base and praised the Air Force's attempt to keep
the costs under control. According to him, discounting
inflation, the B-1 program experienced only 12% cost
growth since 1970. He opposed putting increasing reliance
on aging B-52s and doubted the cost savings of the cruise
missile carrying standoff launcher aircraft. Rep. Aspin,
on the other hand cited the Brookings Institution's
analysis supporting the development of standoff bombers.
According to that analysis, a force of standoff bombers
-216-
would cost $59.6 billion to build and operate for ten
years compared to more than $70 billion for a B-1 force.
He criticized the Air Force for not paying enough
attention to the development of defensive avionics which
was necessary for B-l's penetrative capability. Also, he
claimed that a fleet of 100 standoff bombers launching
6,000 to 10,000 cruise missiles could overwhelm Soviet
missile defenses. By comparison, a fleet of B-l's twice as
large, could provide a mere 200 targets for Russia's
antiaircraft missiles and interceptors.
In 1976, this national debate on the B-1 (fully
discussed in "U.S. Defense Policy and the B-1 Bomber
Controversy, Pros and Cons", 1976), brought a mixed set of
results. The full funding for production was appropriated
at a rate of $87 million per month but the research and
development effort was left untouched. In addition, the
production decision was left to the incoming President.
The rising popularity of the Democratic Party and its
national defense platform presaiged a gloomy period ahead
for the B-1.
During February-May 1977, the backers of the National
Campaign to Stop the B-1 Bomber (a coalition of thirty six
church, pacifist and labor organizations by then) tried to
maintain the B-1 issue in the forefront of the national
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scene. They demanded a private meeting with the President
before he made his decision on the program. Also, they
arranged a press conference and reminded the President of
his pledge to oppose the bomber during his campaign. Witze
(1977a) gives a full account of the role of the National
Campaign in 1977. Otherwise, the Campaign drew no
attention in the newspapers and television networks.
5.3 Change of Administration and DOD's Response
The presidential election year brought a Democratic
administration into the White House. The outgoing Ford
administration had initiated the formal production program
for the B-1 bomber with the award of three major contracts
structured so that President-elect Jimmy Carter would
retain the option to ordering significant shifts in the
project after he assumed office in January 1977. These
contracts were awarded to Rockwell International, General
Electric and Boeing Company for their share of the work in
B-1 production work. The contracts authorized fabrication,
assembly, checkout, inspection and delivery of the first
three production aircraft. They were structured to limit
the government's obligation to $87 million per month as
authorized by Congress. The contracts also included an
option for restructuring at a later date if the President
were to grant further production aircraft.
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Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld approved the
production go ahead on the recommendation of the DSARC and
with the concurrence of outgoing President Ford. The Air
Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed announced that the program
structuring was such that it would provide:
(1) A drastic restructuring of the program during the
final week of January 1977 which would require the
approval of a recession bill by Congress.
(2) A reevaluation of the program during the
President's first 100 days in office which would require
him to forward his proposal to Congress with his
anticipated FY 1978 amendment to the final Ford
Administration's budget.
(3) A reevaluation of the program in the summer of
1977 with a decision on the planned production rate which
was set at 19 aircraft in FY 1979.
Secretary Reed urged the approval of the program in
light of increasing Soviet capabilities. He also appointed
an independent outside committee to review technical
aspects of the development program to determine any risk
that might be encountered in entering production at that
time. The committee was headed by Courtland Perkins,
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president of National Academy of Engineering, and it
unanimously recommended a production go-ahead based on
technical considerations. At the same time, Secretary Reed
formed a panel of experts to review possible alternatives
to the B-1. The panel included former Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul H. Nitze, Michael M. May of the Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory and Edward E. David, Jr., chairman of
the National Security Council's ad hoc strategic panel.
Mr. David chaired the panel which examined alternatives
such as the use of the Boeing 747 wide-body jet transport
modified to carry standoff cruise missiles backed by a
force of Boeing B-52s and relying upon a stretched version
of the General Dynamics FB-1llG and B-52Hs. The group also
considered various other force mixes and concluded that
the B-1 should be procured for inclusion in the Air Force
(Brownlow, 1976). Secretary Reed's strategy behind
initiating these studies was to seek justification for the
production decision on the B-1 aircraft. Looking at the
outcome of these studies, he was indeed successful in
achieving the experts' support on that decision.
In response to the contracts award, Rockwell geared
up its B-1 production for a rapid transition into full
scale production. Rockwell's planning included production
tooling and long lead items for the next lot of eight
aircraft. Projected manpower curves for Rockwell's B-1
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division showed the number of employees climbing from
10,250 to 17,000 by 1979/80. The production of B-1A No.4
was being treated as it were a production prototype for
the fleet of 240 operational bombers (Fink, 1976).
In January 1977, Defense Secretary-Designate Harold
Brown told the Senate Armed Services Committee that in
spite of his biases towards missiles and against nuclear
penetrating bombers, he would review the B-1 on cost,
penetrability, survivability, and possible alternatives,
including the B-52 with cruise missiles ("Brown Vows to
Maintain Military Strength of U.S.", 1977). His assurances
satisfied both Sen. John C. Culver (D.-Iowa), a long-time
foe of the bomber, and Sen. Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz), its
long-time supporter. Witze (1977b) also discusses the
details of political and program developments during the
transitional period before January 20, 1977. Witze
appears to have trusted in the 95th Congress to exercise
its ultimate authority in the matter of B-1 production
decision and he praised the Air Force for its excellent
management of the program.
On January 20, 1977, President Carter took office. He
slowed down advanced strategic projects in an attempt to
induce the Soviets to sign the long stalled SALT II pact
(Brownlow, 1977). Though he had intimated earlier in his
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campaign that he might block production of any operational
B-1 aircraft, he investigated three possible alternatives
to the Air Force's plan to procure 240 operational
aircraft. These alternatives were:
(1) The modernization of the G and H model of the
B-52 bombers by installing more advanced engines and
modifications to permit them to carry air-launched cruise
missiles.
(2) The procurement of Boeing 747 wide body jet
transports modified to carry cruise missiles.
(3) The reduction of the B-1 fleet to 150 aircraft.
At that time, it appeared that the President might
delay his decision on the production of the B-1 till
summer 1977. Rising inflation and the Administration's
decision to slow down the program boosted the final cost
of the program to $24.8 billion. Sen. Culver questioned
Lt. Gen. Alton Slay, deputy USAF Chief of Staff for
research and development, before the Senate Armed Services
General Procurement Subcommittee on this cost issue. The
Senator challenged the cost analysis of Lt. Gen. Slay,
suggesting that the program might cost $1.9 billion more
("B-1 Stretchout, Inflation Factor Could Boost Costs $1.9
Billion", 1977).
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In April 1977, details of avionics integration in the
production B-1 aircraft were revealed. The production
avionics would differ from developmental hardware in
nuclear effects hardening, producibility and economy. An
appropriate revision was made in the list of GFE and CFE
for the production program. Defensive avionics were to be
integrated in production program beginning with aircraft
No. 35 and full scale avionics tests were extended to
August 1979 (Elson, 1977).
By this time, the Air Force sensed the President's
reluctance to approve B-1 production and initiated a major
study of weapons for B-52s, FB-llls and B-Is. This study
was used to provide recommendations to Congress for
upcoming budget authorizations for weapons systems
(Johnson, 1977). The Senate Armed Services Committee
reviewed this report to make an informed decision on how
those developments should be paced, what the inventory
size should be and its composition in relation to
available state of development of weapons technology.
SRAMs, ALCMs, advanced strategic air-launched missiles
(ASALMs) and conventional and nuclear bombs were included
in this study. Various levels of development and
procurement fundings were requested contingent on
President's decision concerning production of the B-1.
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5.4 The Cancellation of the Program
On June 30, 1977, President Carter announced that he
was opposed to the production of the B-1 (Weinraub, 1977).
The decision not to continue with the deployment of the
B-Is was "one of the most difficult decision that I've
made since I've been in office" he said. He also said that
the United States should depend upon cheaper and already
existing weapons systems for its nuclear deterrent. He
cited the superior role of cruise missiles and favored
exploring their deployment B-52 bombers or on a military
version of 747. The President, however, allowed the B-l's
testing and development program to continue in order to
provide the needed technological base "in the unlikely
event that more cost-effective alternative systems should
run into difficulties." In the same press conference, he
announced his earnest desire to improve Soviet American
relations.
President Carter's decision not to proceed with
production of the B-1 bomber represented a basic shift in
the United States strategic doctrine, which had been built
around a three part, triad concept that had prevailed
since the early 1960s. The concept embodied three coequal
systems of nuclear deterrent. The three - manned bombers,
land-based intercontinental missiles and submarine-based
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intercontinental missiles - were designed to be
independently capable of responding to Soviet nuclear
attack. With President Carter's decision to discontinue
the B-1, the manned bomber aspect of the triad was
weakened and relegated to a complementary role. Thus a
major defense policy decision which down-graded the role
of manned bombers sharply influenced the B-1 program and
limited its scope to a research and development program
with substantially reduced level of funding.
In the next chapter, I shall discuss the
repercussions of President Carter's decision on the B-1
program. This will include the details of testing and
developmental program over the next three and a half
years. I shall also discuss the strategy adopted by
Rockwell International under the politically adverse
circumstances which prevailed during the Carter
Administration.
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Chapter 6
MULTI-ROLE BOMBER AIRCRAFT STUDY AND CONTINUED TESTING OF
THE B-1A BOMBER (1977 - 1980)
As a result of President Carter's decision to halt
the B-1A bomber, cruise missiles were introduced as a new
member of the triad basic delivery system. Their position
equaled that of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and
intercontinental missiles and the role of penetrating
bombers was hence downplayed. This major policy decision
sharply narrowed the scope of the B-1 program and
initiated new studies on cruise missiles and wide-bodied
jet transports as cruise missiles carriers, on B-52
upgrades to accommodate ALCMs with improved ECM
capability, and on FB-111 modifications, assigning it to a
limited role as a penetrating bomber after B-1 production
was canceled. Rockwell immediately responded to this
emerging interest in a penetrating bomber with its studies
on multi-role bomber aircraft wherein the core B-1
aircraft would be adapted to perform the role of either
the standoff missiles carrier or the penetrating bomber.
Thus, a presidential policy decision spurred a barrage of
new options making a final selection for a bomber more
difficult for him. At that time, the defense industry's
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strategy was to respond quickly to the desires of both the
DOD and Administration by providing adequate information
on the new launch alternatives sought.
In this chapter, I shall discuss the details related
to these developments. I shall conclude with a brief
summary of the flight program which covered a period of
three and a half years after the cancellation of the B-1
program.
6.1 B-1 Halt Aftermath
Shortly after President Carter startled the press,
the Pentagon and the defense industry with his decision to
stop the B-1 program, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, in
his press conference, said that his recommendation to the
President and President's decision not to proceed with the
production were based on the conclusion that aircraft
carrying modern cruise missiles would better assure the
effectiveness of the bomber component of the US strategic
forces in the 1980s ("Brown Explains B-1 Bomber Decision",
1977). The Secretary said further that the options study
preceded the B-1 decision and the Members of the Joint
Chief of Staff participated in a study group which
prepared the options for the President ("Options Study
Preceded B-1 Decision", 1977). The options included were:
-227-
(1) Cancellation of the B-1 bomber and use of
air-launched cruise missiles on the B-52 and/or on
wide-bodied transport missiles platforms.
(2) Holding the B-1 in research and development phase
for a longer period of time before making a production
decision.
(3) Production of the B-1 bomber at a slower rate.
(4) Continuation of the planned production rate with
the bomber reaching initial operational capability in
1982.
Secretary Brown assured that the bombers would be in
the inventory of the nation's strategic forces for an
indefinite time ("Brown's Bomber Views", 1977). He claimed
that the cruise missiles option was less expensive and he
would recommend to the President for transmission to
Congress, a budget amendment for FY 1978 that would
provide funding for cruise missile launching aircraft.
The national press knew very little about the
approaching B-1 decision. President Carter's decision
came to them as a complete surprise. All the major
national daily news papers except The New York Times,
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assailed the President for his decision on the B-1
cancellation ("Covering the B-1 Cancellation", 1977).
Former Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Kissinger was unhappy
about the President's choice on bomber option as well
("Kissinger Assails Carter's B-1 Decision", 1977).
Rockwell, the prime contractor, had 35 major
subcontractors working on the B-1. The Boeing Company with
responsibility for the aircraft's offensive avionics
package, had 13; the AIL Division of Cuttler Hammer,
integrator of the defensive avionics system, had 28.
Rockwell was the major loser. The company terminated
10,000 of its 16,000 employees. The General Electric
engine group planned to absorb most of the 1,100 employees
working on the F101. It curtailed its expansion plan and
started focusing on the B-52 reengineering program. Boeing
started the gears turning for the cruise missile program
speed up. Approximately 1,600 employees were assigned to
its portion of the B-1 program and it was getting ready,
at that time, to absorb most of them in other projects.
AIL had its hopes pinned on salvaging B-1 defensive
avionics package by adapting it for B-52s under a new
modernizing program. The immediate impact of the cutback
was less dramatic because the prototype defensive avionics
system was still under development at the time of the
President's decision to abort the B-1. The details of
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these repercussions are provided in "B-1 Halts Generates
Wide Impact" (1977).
The four principal B-1 contractors - Rockwell,
General Electric, Boeing and AIL Division of Cuttler
Hammer - submitted cost estimates for the alternative
research and development plan for the B-1A bomber. The
alternatives were as follows:
(1) Termination of the entire program (closing cost
estimate).
(2) Conduct flight tests with the three aircraft
existing at that time through December 1977. Work on
partially completed aircraft No. 4 and perform limited
tests of the defensive avionics in Boeing B-52 bomber.
(3) Extend the flight test program with three
aircraft till December 1979. Shift ECM testing to aircraft
No. 3. Abandon plan to continue vehicle No. 4.
(4) Same as alternative (3) but complete the air
vehicle No. 4.
(5) Same as alternative (4) with additional
investment to improve ECM capability. Relax the schedule
for completion for aircraft No. 4.
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(6) Same as five but add air vehicle No. 5 and phase
it into the research and development program.
(7) Same as six but add on vehicle No.6. Extend the
research and development program to incorporate aircraft
No. 6. This option was always intended by the Air Force
from the very beginning of the program.
Secretary Brown was expected to decide on the course
of the program from the menu of options presented to him
by the Air Force ("B-l R&D Decision Expected", 1977). With
this background, the President's plan for modernizing the
bomber leg of nation's strategic forces was submitted for
congressional approval. At this point, it is fair to say
that the policy decision by President Carter indeed made
the Air Force look into developmental options for the B-1
which were not even contemplated earlier.
In the next section, I shall discuss the action in
Congress which eventually led to a final approval of
funding for various related programs during FY 1977
through FY 1980.
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6.2 Action in Congress
Appropriation of FY 1979 and FY 1980 funding for the
research and development program for the B-1 program was
less difficult. Funding of $50.3 million and $54.9
million was appropriated respectively to continue the
flight test program for vehicle Nos. 1 through 3, and to
complete aircraft No. 4 and fit it with ECM avionics and
absorb it into the on-going research and development
program. Congressional jockeying for FY 1977 and FY 1978
was more complex and intriguing. By approving or
disapproving part of the money the President requested,
both the House and the Senate made him aware of their
preferences and priorities. This game influenced the pace
of the bomber alternatives study programs. This process
provides classic examples of "policies influencing
technologies".
The House had turned down a move to cancel B-1
production on June 28, 1977, two days before President
Carter's B-1 announcement. In the second week of July
1977, the Senate voted to eliminate FY 1978 production
funding for the B-1. An amendment proposed by Sen. Henry
L. Bellman (R.-Okla.), to reduce FY 1978 research and
development (R&D) funding for the B-1 by $200 million was
defeated and the Senate finally approved the full $442
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million requested by the President, which included $208
million for testing the three completed B-1 aircraft and
the rest for the fourth aircraft which was near
completion. The House agreed and approved similar funding
for the R&D portion of the B-1 program for FY 1978. Both
the House and the Senate Armed Services Committee balked
at the quick approval of President's $449 million request
for additional FY 1978 funding primarily to accelerate
cruise missiles development (Johnson, 1977). According to
some members, the low level of funding requested for
cruise missiles carrier study was itself an indicator that
the cruise missile force was a long way from its
operational date. Congress then decided to postpone action
on President Carter's request to rescind $462 million
appropriated for FY 1977 to initiate production of the B-1
bomber until after an August 6 - September 6, 1977, summer
recess ("Congress Postpones B-1 Bomber Fund Rescission",
1977; "B-1 Bomber Supporters Still Hopping", 1977). The
rescission would leave $611 million for the cost incurred
in connection with termination including cost of work
performed up to the time of cancellation. The stop-work
order was dispatched by DOD to Rockwell International on
July 1, 1977, three months before the end of FY 1977 on
September 30.
On return from the recess, the House killed FY 1978
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production funding for the B-1 by very narrow margin ("B-1
Funds Killed", 1977). Both the House and the Senate Armed
Services Committee approved a $20 million supplemental for
the FB-111lH prototype aircraft, but the Carter
Administration was handed a stinging defeat in its bid to
rescind B-1 funding in FY 1977 appropriation (Robinson,
1977a) . A major reason for members of the House
Appropriations Committee voting to overturn the rescission
of $462 millions earmarked for the B-1 R&D was DOD's plan
to built and test two General Dynamics FB-111H aircraft,
stretched versions of the FB-111 powered by General
Electric F101 engines which had been developed for the B-1
bomber ("FB-111 Reengining", 1977).
This development was very encouraging for Rockwell
International which was hoping for a revival of interest
in the penetrating bomber. As a consequence, in his
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Mr.
Bastian Hellow, president of Rockwell's Aircraft Group at
that time, trumpeted B-l's superiority as a penetrating
bomber. He further proposed that Rockwell could make a
cruise missile carrier out of a stripped down version of
the B-1 (Kozicharow, 1977c; Fink, 1977c). Before the end
of the year, Rockwell designers fine-tuned the new cruise
derivative of the B-1 and claimed that it would constitute
a more cost effective strategic force than a mixed fleet
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of B-52s, FB-111H bombers and wide-bodied transport
aircraft converted into cruise missile carriers (Fink,
1977b; Fink, 1977a). Perhaps the genesis of the B-1B
bomber lies in this development.
The General Dynamics executive vice president at that
time, Mr. James M. Beggs also testified before the same
committee. He emphasized the strength of an H version of
FB-111A bomber aircraft which was a proven technology
(Kozicharow, 1977b). SAC already had 68 FB-111A in its
inventory. Mr. Beggs said that the FB-111H model, a
considerably larger aircraft, would be much more cost
effective overall.
Many congressmen were dismayed by the "back door"
approach by the Carter Administration which canceled the
B-1 penetration bomber but showed interest in keeping the
penetrating bomber option alive by asking for $20 million
for FB-111H in the defense supplemental budget. To them,
this policy seemed to have undermined their support of the
B-1 program over the past seven years. Thirty-eight
congressmen signed a letter to President Carter asking for
a clarification of the Administration's position
concerning the penetrating bomber. The congressmen wrote,
" We cannot understand how it (FB-111H) would preserve any
option not offered by the B-I". As a result the House
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decided to delete the $20 million FB-111H study funding
from the House Defense Supplemental Authorization Bill
while keeping the funding for other bomber alternatives
studies intact. By doing so, the House sent a clear and
consistent message to DOD demanding that they be honest
and fair with the legislative body and ask for what they
really wanted (Kozicharow, 1977a). The trouble-filled
history of the Bi-Service F-ll fighter aircraft under
Secretary MacNamara's stewardship (see Chapter 2 for
details) was haunting their memories. Hence, these
congressmen were reluctant to endorse its revival in any
form. This group of congressmen was also suspicious about
the President's motives in supporting such a move because
the prime contractor for the modified FBlll-H was located
in the district of the House Majority Leader Jim Wright
(D.-Texas) and they thought that perhaps the President
owed him a favor. Thus it appears that the request for
FB-111H funding served to further complicate President
Carter's position on the role of penetrating bombers in
the US strategic forces. Details of this embarrassing
development are discussed in "Support for B-1 Bomber,
Second Thoughts on Cruise Missiles, Imperil Carter Plan"
(1977).
In retaliation, the House decided to flex its muscle
and restore $1.4 billion for the B-1 in House
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Appropriations Supplemental FY 1978 Bill but in the end it
failed ("B-1 Setback", 1977). On December 6, 1977, the
House did succeed in foiling an attempt by the Senate to
add the rescission of $426 million appropriated in FY 1977
for the production of the first two aircraft to a
supplemental appropriation bill. The Senate intended to
reaffirm its position on December 15, 1977, but it
adjourned without voting because Administration supporters
feared that heavy absenteeism might jeopardize the
outcome. Plans were made to bring the issue before the
Senate during the week of January 23, 1978. In the end,
the conference committee did insist on rescission. Under
the prudent management of the Air Force, Rockwell
International and the Office of the Comptroller General
which kept a close rein on the B-1 spending, only $284
million were spent on the procurement in FY 1977. Repoport
(1978) discusses this Congressional maneuvering in further
details.
To the veterans of defense systems acquisition, it
was becoming increasingly clear that the B-1 might rise
from its ashes in the near future at great cost to the
Administration only because it included the funding for
the FB-111H bomber option study in FY 1978 supplemental
bill. Figure 6-1 on page 237 illustrates that prophesy as
seen through the eyes of a cartoonist. Rockwell fully
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Figure 6-1: "Reports of My Death were Greatly
Exaggerated." - Mark Twain
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exploited this opportunity by proposing a multi-role
version of its B-1 aircraft which it claimed would be far
superior to the fleet of B-52s and FB-111H which was under
serious consideration by DOD at that time. Throughout
this period, Rockwell's lobbying efforts were low keyed.
According to Repoport (1978), they were not aggressive,
but they were prompt in supplying B-1 information
requested by Members of Congress.
In the next two sections, I shall summarize the
outcome of the technical studies which emerged from the
Presidential policy for the penetrating bombers and the
Congressional politics that followed.
6.3 Studies of the B-1A Alternatives
The B-1A alternatives included the use of
air-launched cruise missiles from the Boeing B-52 and/or
other wide-bodied transport missile platforms and a mixed
bomber force of the stretched version of General Dynamics
FB-1Hs and modified B-52s. All of these studies were
initiated as a result of the policy decision on President
Carter's part to rely heavily on the cruise missile
option. A total funding of $341 million was approved in
the supplemental bill for FY 1978. $64 million were
allocated to the Navy/General Dynamics Tomahawk cruise
missiles for its long-lead procurement items. Its
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operational capability was planned for June 1979. Congress
provided $103 million for R&D of the air-launched version
of the Tomahawk, called the Tomahawk air-launched cruise
missile (TALCM). Figure 6-2 on page 240 illustrates the
basic Tomahawk missile. The ALCM development was allocated
a total of $174 million (including $50 million for R&D for
ALCM-B, which was an extended version of ALCM-A). Figure
6-3 on page 241 depicts the ALCM-B version. The
operational date for ALCM-A was to be the summer of 1980
and for ALCM-B was in the summer 1981. Further technical
details concerning these cruise missiles are provided in
Robinson (1977b) and in Robinson (1977c).
The Pentagon received only $9.4 million (out of the
$90 million they requested) to modify a transport as a
prototype cruise missile carrier. It was to be chosen from
among the McDonall Douglas DC-10, Boeing 747, Lockheed
L-1011 and Lockheed C-5A. For initial studies, each
manufacturer received funding ranging from $3 million to
$3.4 million ("Manufacturers Define Wide-Body Concept",
1978). The enhancement to the B-52 fleet included $14
million added to the $26.5 million already granted in FY
1978 for modifications to old B-52s in order to make them
capable of penetrating the Soviet Union and $20 million
for modifications to enable the B-52 to operate with
cruise missiles and to increase its service life. The Air
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Figure 6-3: ALCM - Version B
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Force requested $43 million for an avionics update and $36
million were sought for ECM - a radar warning system and
update to the B-52 jamming system. See Robinson (1977b)
for further details on the B-52 modifications.
The FB-111H aircraft option was not pursued further
as a result of the House opposition (see Section 6.2).
This option would have allocated $20 million for this
program. Two FB-111As in SAC's inventory were to have been
fitted with engines developed and tested for the B-1
(Kozicharow, 1977) instead of the Pratt and Whitney TF30
engines they already had. In addition, the plan included
the enlargement of the weapons bay permitting a payload of
15 nuclear weapons, including ALCMs. The program cost of
65 FB-111H was estimated at $2.8 billion in then-year
funds and its operational date was to have been in
November 1979.
6.4 The B-1 as a Multi-Role Bomber
As described in Section 6.2, Rockwell International
fully exploited DOD's interest in penetrating bombers to
their own advantage. It did so by initiating two studies
of its own and later successfully using them for
publicity, which lead to the resurrection of B-1 program.
The first was the preliminary definition of a low cost
fixed-wing version of the B-1 that would function as a
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standoff launch platform for up to 30 cruise missiles. The
unit flyaway price was estimated at $40 million as
compared to $56 million for the original B-1. Then
Rockwell shifted its B-1 derivative work to the definition
of a dual-role aircraft that not only could function as a
cruise missile carrier but also as a cruise missile
carrier which could penetrate heavily defended enemy
airspace. This option would be a high cost option.
Cruise missile carrier modifications included the
elimination of the intermediate weapons bay permitting an
extension of forward and aft bays to accommodate 16 ALCMs
or TALCMs. The remaining 14 long-range cruise missiles
could be carried on hard points mounted underneath each
wing and on the weapons bay doors. The dual-role aircraft
would have pylons that would keep missiles aligned during
wing-sweeping operation of the aircraft. The estimated
weight of a full complement of 30 cruise missiles was
85,000 lb, well within the 115,000 lb weapons payload of
the B-1. ECM system and offensive electronics systems were
also eliminated from this cruise missile carrier version.
The aircraft's low level supersonic penetration capability
was no longer needed for this design. The takeoff gross
weight of the dual-role aircraft was estimated to be
395,000 lb, equal to that projected for the original B-1.
Fink (1977b) discusses this version in more detail.
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Rockwell did not formally presented these studies to the
Air Force but the company's interest in participating in
such a program was evident in Mr. Bastian Hellow's
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
(Koricharow, 1977c).
In September 1979, DOD did initiate an industry-wide
study to determine whether a multimission aircraft could
be procured which could combine the manned penetrating
bomber and cruise missile carrier aircraft roles with an
early initial operating capability ("Bomber/Cruise Missile
Carrier Studied", 1979). The Boeing B-52G emerged as a
leading candidate for the first cruise missile carrier
aircraft. Rockwell's core aircraft concept was equally
attractive to many within DOD because it could perform
more than one role in a cost effective way with an earlier
operational date.
Rockwell proposed the reestablishment of its B-1
strategic bomber manufacturing capability to produce a
family of aircraft that could be used as cruise missile
carriers, conventional bombers, manned penetrators, and
other military roles (Lenorovit, 1979). The Corporation's
new proposal called for the production of a core aircraft
that would be about 85% common to the basic B-1, drawing
on the estimated $5.9 billion in research, development,
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test and engineering which was already invested in the
program. Figure 6-4 on page 246 illustrates the core
aircraft proposed by Rockwell International. One of the
major differences was the use of a fixed wing set at a 25
degree sweep in place of B-l's variable-geometry wing. The
core aircraft hence eliminated the wing actuator
mechanism. All versions in this new aircraft family were
designed to be limited to subsonic flight. The top
altitude was lowered from 70,000 ft to 40,000 ft and
penetration flight Mach number was reduced to 0.80 instead
of 0.85 of the original B-1A. Elimination of supersonic
capability resulted in a lesser use of titanium, 8%, than
the 20% which was used by the original B-1. A simplified
tail was proposed to be used in conjunction with
conventional ailerons and spoilers for roll control. The
proposed basic members of the B-1 core aircraft family are
shown in Figure 6-5 on page 247. This multi-role
capability strategy of the new B-1 design tremendously
enhanced its prospects of being included in SAC's
inventory. Technical details of these aircraft are briefly
summarized below.
Strategic Weapons Launcher: This aircraft would be a
cruise missiles carrier and would be fitted with 30 ALCMs.
These would be carried both internally and externally. The
components that would be added to the core aircraft for
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this mission would be two weapons bay (instead of three as
on the original B-1). An appropriate nose radome and
tailcone equipment bay/radome to house the necessary
avionics would also be added. This aircraft could also be
adapted to conventional warfare missions.
Near-Term Penetrator: This aircraft would be used for
penetrating missions. It would be fitted with two rotary
launchers, each carrying eight SRAMs. The aircraft would
be fitted with SMCS which was developed for low altitude
penetration (see Section 4.3.2). A fuel tank would be
added in the aft portion of the aircraft and the necessary
nose radome and tailcone equipment/radome would be fitted.
This penetrator could be given a split-mission role with
addition of 15 externally mounted cruise missiles for an
early IOC date.
Conventional Bomber: A weapons bay module would be
installed forward of the wing accommodating conventional
weapons that would be mounted in vertical racks.
Fuel Tanker: This aircraft would be a nuclear
hardened aircraft with fast base escape capability and
would have the capabilities of an aerial tanker in
addition. The main components added to the core would be a
fuel tank forward of the wings, an aft fuel tank, a boom
operator station and a tailcone/boom section.
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At a manufacturing rate of four aircraft per month,
for a 100 aircraft production run, Rockwell estimated the
cost of the strategic weapons launcher at $43.3 million
each. The projected cost of the penetrator was $48 million
and $42.2 for the tanker. These cost estimates were unit
prices expressed in 1979 dollars - compared with the $68.5
million each for the B-1 at that time.
By the end of 1979, study contracts to evaluate the
suitability of wide-body commercial and transport aircraft
for the cruise missile carrier were nearing completion.
The conclusions were unfavorable. The reasons for the
dismissal of commercial aircraft as viable candidates for
the cruise missile carrier aircraft mission centered
around their performance and relative vulnerability in a
hostile environment (Ropelewski, 1979). Seymour
L. Zeiberg, deputy under secretary of Defense-Strategic
and Space Systems made this announcement in a speech
before the Air Force Association symposium. He elaborated
upon the difficulties involved in assigning a military
role to commercial aircraft. According to him, the limited
performance of the military cargo plane was also not
suited to this new role. Citing the B-52s, he announced
that a B-1 derivative in the 1984-85 time frame was DOD's
favorite solution as far as a cruise missile carrier was
concerned. With this evaluation and the Air Force's
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obvious preference, it was beginning to look as if the
B-l's comeback was certain. The only further validation it
needed was its success in the ongoing bomber evaluation
and flight testing program.
6.5 Continued Flight Testing of the B-1A Bomber
A low key flight development program had been in
progress since President Carter's decision in 1977 to
terminate B-1 production plans. The flight testing was
scheduled to terminate in early 1981. Most flutter, flying
qualities, airloads and performance tests on the B-1 were
concluded in early 1979 with satisfactory results. The
program then was restructured with the primary emphasis on
penetrativity and defensive system testing (Klass, 1978).
Smith and Fiedler (1980) review results of flight testing
of the B-1 in detail. The most significant improvements
incorporated in the B-1 as a result of the flight tests
were:
(1) Installation of spoilers at the leading edge of
each weapons bay to lower the noise level inside the bays.
This noise resulted from an open-bay-bombing mission of
the aircraft which caused an unacceptable level of
vibrations for the SRAMs carried within.
(2) A 35% mean aerodynamic chord center of gravity
-251-
limit was set only in the critical low-level, high-speed,
terrain-following, environment at below 10,000 ft aiding
the horizontal tail to provide sufficient hinge moment
(Ball, 1978).
(3) The electrical flight control system components
and the electrical power generating system were modified
to eliminate the uncommanded control inputs. This avoided
unplanned pitch and/or roll excursions which resulted on
three previous occasions from system failure.
A few problems were identified in relation to the
terrain-following system which consistently made the
aircraft fly up to 150 ft higher than the selected ground
clearance altitude. The limitations on the pitch trim and
out-of-trim conditions were causing this performance. In
addition, it was discovered that reflective objects such
as a water tank or mountain peak caused the system to
respond with a higher-than-desired altitude. The terrain
following system showed a greater deterioration in poor
weather than that which was acceptable.
Weapons drops from the B-1 demonstrated accuracies
within 54% of the specified circular error of probability
(CEP) for the aircraft or about twice as good as required.
Of two live SRAM launches, one of the missiles impacted
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within 22% of the specified CEP. The second missile scored
at the limit of the specified CEP. The errors were
attributed to SRAM and the B-1 system respectively ("B-1
Tests Identify Needed Improvement", 1979).
The remaining flight tests were oriented towards the
following areas in order of their priority:
(1) Penetrativity.
(2) Defensive system, which included a shakedown of
the AIL's ALQ-161 electronic warfare system and its
compatibility with the aircraft.
(3) Offensive systems.
(4) Basic aircraft systems.
(5) General Electric F101 engines.
(6) Electromagnetic penetration tests.
The decision to give priority to the
penetrativity/defensive systems tests and the guidance for
doing this were provided by an Air Force general officers'
steering committee in January 1979 (Ropelewski, 1979). The
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committee defined three phases of penetrativity testing.
They were:
(1) ALQ-161 defensive systems group shakedown
evaluation to verify whether the system met specifications
and performance requirements. Only the B-1 No. 4 was to
be equipped with ALQ-161. This system was designed to
detect, classify and identify hostile radar threats and to
direct appropriate jamming responses automatically.
(2) Evaluation of the B-l's penetration aids and
defensive systems against advanced threats using existing
USAF systems with similarities to the anticipated enemy
threats of the middle and late 1980s.
(3) Operational penetrativity phase, in which the
overall capabilities of the B-1 systems were being
examined in a total air defense environment rather than
one-to-one situations. Both flight test data and computer
simulations were planned to be used.
In October 1979, the B-1 No. 4 was painted in a four
color desert camouflage pattern. This scheme was preceded
by the all-white scheme. In addition, the aircraft was
equipped with the ECM monopulse wave guide assembly in the
form of a dorsal spine. A few low altitude penetration
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tests were performed over the southern Californian desert
for the early shakedown of the system. Figure 6-6 on page
255 illustrates one of these flights.
With this background, the B-1 entered the
presidential election year of 1980. As we saw in this
chapter, President Carter's decision to cancel the B-1A
resulted in many studies that were associated with bomber
alternatives. In response to the Air Force's industry-wide
request to study multi-role bomber aircraft, Rockwell
International proposed a new version of the bomber which
centered around a core B-1 aircraft. The multi-role
capabilities of this new design won the Air Force's heart
and it was beginning to look as if depending on the
successful results of the bomber evaluation program, they
were ready to recommend to the President the B-1 as a
ultimate cruise missile carrier.
In the next chapter, I shall discuss the program
history of the B-1 bomber during 1980-81 wherein the
program was given a new life under President Reagan's
Strategic Force Modernization Plan.
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Figure 6-6: The Fourth B-1A in its Flight
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Chapter 7
BIRTH OF LONG-RANGE COMBAT AIRCRAFT,
THE B-1B BOMBER PROGRAM (1980 - 1981)
1980 was a presidential election year. During this
year, the Republican Party sought every opportunity to
scrutinize President Carter's strategic policy. For the
supporters of the B-1, these years were filled with a hope
of a possible resurrection of the program. The B-l's
return was dependent on:
(1) The success of the on-going bomber penetration
evaluation program (BPE).
(2) Congressional initiatives.
(3) The recommendation of the Joint/Office of the
Secretary of Defense - Air Force Bomber Study (JBS) which
began in August 1980 and utilized the input of the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board.
(4) Approval of the President.
In late 1980, the results of the Air Force Scientific
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Advisory Board's investigations of available technology
permitted the Air Force to be responsive to the conference
committee compromise over the new multi-purpose bomber. In
October 1981, President Reagan announced the procurement
of 100 modified B-1 bombers. His strategic force
revitalization plan included continued deployment of the
cruise missiles and a commitment to develop an advance
technology bomber with stealth characteristics for the
1990s. These developments provide classic examples of
Congressional and presidential policies influencing the
development of new technologies.
7.1 Bomber Penetration Evaluation Program
On January 29, 1980, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense sent congressional notification extending the BPE
program to January 31, 1981, to provide an orderly
termination of the evaluation. Before the B-1A No. 4
equipped with both Boeing offensive avionics and Eaton-AIL
Division defensive electronics joined the program, the air
vehicle No. 3 had started making sensational news through
its successful evaluation. At the Neills Range complex
near Las Vegas, No. 3 vehicle successfully completed its
offensive avionics test against F-15 fighter aircraft.
Though initial sorties were limited to a series of single
threats, one on one (one B-1 against one threat), the base
line capability of one unit of ECM in the aircraft was
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found extraordinary when the B-1 fooled the Threat Four, a
ground controlled intercept system which was heavily
relied upon by Soviets ("B-1 Bomber", 1986).
The B-1 No. 4 was to obtain penetrativity data ("B-1
Tests Yield "Penetrativity" Data", 1980). The heart of the
defensive system package was the ALQ-161 system which was
developed by the Eaton Corporation's AIL Division. It was
designed to detect, identify and classify hostile radar
threats and to direct appropriate jamming responses
automatically against the most troublesome threats in a
descending order of priority. The components were expected
to counter antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles, and
air-to-air missile fire-controlled enemy radar. In
addition, the task of degrading by noise jamming
early-warning-and-ground-controlled radar was also
expected. At the expense of 6 months of slippage in the
program, a cross-eye monopulse jamming system was housed
in a raised dorsal fin beginning just forward of the wings
and extending to the tail of the B-1.
The plans were to evaluate air vehicle No. 4 first in
a one to one single threat situation and then to test it
against simultaneous multiple threats duplicating real
life scenarios. These results were to be combined with
intelligence estimate and combat experience to derive kill
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probability estimates of various threats. The kill
probability estimate would then be incorporated into
campaign models that would give planners the survivable
rates they could expect for the penetrating bomber force.
The penetrativity quotient, a secret number derived for
the B-1A No. 4, put a lot of smiles on the faces of SAC
and score keeping Air Force Test and Evaluation Center
(AFTEC) people. In October 1980, BPE General Officers
Steering Group met to resolve the orderly completion and
termination of the BPE efforts. In December 1980, a
decision was made to extend BPE flight tests through April
1981 and a letter of notification was sent to Congress to
that effect (Wilmer, 1982). The final report on BPE was
due on June 30, 1981.
As a side note, it is worth mentioning that in March,
1981, NASA became interested in participating in the B-1
testing program. NASA wanted to evaluate B-l's SMCS at
supersonic speeds in order to extend its data base. It
thought that this information might be useful for the
development of the civilian supersonic cruise aircraft
("NASA to Test B-I", 1981).
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7.2 Congressional Initiatives
While excellent scores on the penetrativity quotient
of the B-1 kept on pouring in, congressmen were busy
grinding their axes against President Carter on the new
strategic bomber issue. They were not happy with his
program for the air-breathing leg of the triad. However,
the dramatic events in Afghanistan served to heightened
their concern in early 1980, as the annual authorization
and appropriation cycle for FY 1981 began. Barlow (1980)
discusses the action in the House and the Senate at great
length. Here, I shall provide a summary of those
developments.
In January 1980, Rep. Charles Wilson sent a letter to
President Carter urging him to reverse his 1977 decision
on production of the B-1 bomber. And a few days later,
Rep. Robert Dornan introduced a resolution calling for
accelerated development and production of the B-1. These
actions were just the indications of a larger
congressional dissatisfaction with the Administration's
bomber program. In late 1979 and early 1980, Gen. Richard
H. Ellis, commander of the SAC, was promoting a more rapid
defense buildup. His study featured a graph representing
projected changes in the relative punch of the US against
Soviet Union: as new, accurate Soviet missiles entered
-261-
service in the late 1970s, the curve dropped sharply to
indicate a Soviet advantage; in the early 1980s, with
air-launched cruise missiles projected to enter the US
arsenal, the curve leveled off; not until the late 1980s,
when the MX missiles were scheduled to enter the service,
did the line curved back up to its original level. The
overall shape of the line resembled that of an old
fashioned bathtub ("B-1 Bomber Again Faces Uncertain
Future", 1981).
According to Gen. Ellis, only a new bomber would
quickly overcome the problem of the "strategic bathtub"
and he favored the modified F-lls at that time ("SAC
Urges F-lll Stretch As Alternative to B-I", 1981). A
fleet of 155 new FB-111B/C (modified long-range version of
66 FB-111As and 89 F-l11Ds) aircraft were estimated to
cost $5.49 billion in comparison to 100 B-ls whose price
estimate was $12.5 billion at that time. Moreover,
FB-111B/C aircraft would enter service more than a year
earlier than the new B-ls. Later, he provided a more
long-range reason for opposing resumption of the B-1
bomber. He told Congressional Committees that, the B-1
could not penetrate Soviet air defenses by 1990s. The
still secret stealth plane could (in fact, the stealth
technology was formally announced by Secretary of Defense
Dr. Brown on August 22, 1980) but Gen. Ellis feared that
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the cost of the B-1 program would slow the development of
a stealth bomber. Later, the Air Force Chief of Staff Lew
Allen testified before the House Armed Services Committee
and denied that an interim penetrating bomber such as
FB-111B/C had a high priority in the Air Force's thinking.
He indicated his support for the B-1 over its competitors.
The House Armed Services Committee seized the bathtub
argument as a reason for resuming work on the B-1. The
Committee favored the strategic weapons launcher (SWL)
which would be built around Rockwell's B-1 core aircraft,
but unlike the original bomber, it would have fixed rather
than variable sweep wings and it would be equipped only
for the role of a standoff bomber. The Committee approved
an authorization bill providing $400 million for research
and development and $200 million for procurement of
long-lead items for SWL. The House backed this move on May
14, 1980, by a large margin.
A web of forces drove the Senate Armed Services
Committee to approve $91 million for Gen. Ellis' F-ll
plan. On the Senate floor this proposal ran into
difficulty. Sen. John Glenn (D.-Ohio) submitted an
amendment which proposed the deletion of the $91 million
in funding for the FB-111B/C and called for the
substitution of an equivalent amount for the design of a
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strategic bomber which could perform conventional,
standoff and penetrating missions and which would achieve
IOC in the mid-1980s. The Glenn amendment kept the B-1
option open to be considered together with its other
competitors, the F-ills and the stealth bomber providing
more flexibility. Sen. Glenn's move was considered wise
because it avoided any direct link of the funding with the
B-1 which would otherwise risk a veto by President Carter.
In fact the President vowed to do so if he saw the funding
for a fixed wing SWL version of the B-1 bomber. Sen.
Glenn's amendment hence was a comfort to the supporters of
the B-1 in the Senate and they joined him in the hope that
a Conference Committee would surely allocate a larger
portion of funding. Sen. John Tower (R.-Texas) argued for
a strategic bomber to achieve IOC in 1985 but he was not
successful. Sen. Tower, however, was skeptical of the
Administration's promise of a new stealth bomber and he
said that he would always prefer a "bird in hand", the
B-1. Finally, a 1987 IOC deadline was accepted which was
in agreement with the Pentagon Research chief William
Perry who was very hopeful for a stealth bomber to meet
that date.
The Senate-House Conference Committee on the
authorization bill settled on the larger amount approved
by the House, but the broader list of candidates embodied
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in the Glenn Amendment were included. In the end, a total
of $301 million were appropriated in FY 1981 for the
design of a strategic bomber. In a related action, $203
million were approved to modify and reengine 300 KC-135
fuel tankers with General Electric/Snecma CFM56 turbofan
engines. This FY 1981 funding was appropriated to extend
the life of aging KC-135s which first entered the service
in 1957. Modified KC-135s were to carry more fuel and the
new fuel efficient engine had a noise foot print which was
much smaller reducing its noise contribution to commercial
airports (North, 1980). According to the Air Force plan,
this new fleet would be used to refuel SAC's bomber wings
for a few more decades to come.
7.3 The Air Force/DOD Plan for the Strategic Bomber
As discussed earlier, the Conference Committee bill
called for a multi-role bomber that could be based on
existing technologies, such as the B-1 and the General
Dynamics FB-111, and could incorporate the most modern
technology of stealth bombers. The stealth bomber would be
much harder for Soviet radar to detect than the B-1
because of its unique radar energy absorbing design.
In seeking to address the new bomber issue, the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board met in Monterey,
California, and completed its work on July 25, 1980
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(Robinson, 1980a). There were 50 members of
divided into a variety of panels, and industry
joined in. Major technology areas required to
new bomber were propulsion, avionics,
penetration and suvivability. Mission analysis
important consideration.
the board
consultants
develop a
structures,
was also an
According to the board members, the earliest a new
bomber could have an IOC using a new design and new
technology would be 1992, while a multi-role bomber using
some of the B-1 technology could have an IOC by late 1985.
One of the panels was assigned to determine what
technology could be applied if the Air Force was directed
by Congress to build a new multi-purpose bomber using the
technology already developed with the $6 billion under the
B-1 program. This panel came up with a list of
modifications to enhance the performance that would make
the aircraft capable of executing multiple missions as a
long-range combat aircraft. These modifications were:
(1) Removal of the forward weapons bay with more
overall volume and thus more flexibility in payload
capability.
(2) Reduction of the variable-geometry maximum sweep
wing from 67.5 degrees to 60 degrees because the aircraft
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would be operating at all subsonic speeds, and avoidance
of the fixed wing concept to retain flexibility.
(3) Change of wing fairing and control surfaces to
reduce aerodynamic drag.
(4) Simplification of the engine necelles for
subsonic flight and reduction of infrared and radar
cross-section signatures.
(5) Increase in the, fuel volume to a 477,000 lb
takeoff gross weight.
(6) Use of advanced composite materials for flaps and
horizontal stabilizers to reduce overall weight.
(7) Improvement in the defensive avionics system to
take advantage of advances in the state of the art and use
of the offensive avionics system developed for the Boeing
B-52 bomber with the air-launched cruise missiles.
The results of this panel's investigation of
available technology placed the Air Force in a position
where it could be responsive to Congress' language in the
Conference Committee bill. This development shows how a
policy initiative by Congress was translated to provide a
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new direction for the growth of technology and eventually
gave birth to the B-lB bomber. The Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board concluded in its study that a multi-role or
a long-range combat aircraft could underwrite the national
objectives. It concluded further that there was no major
new technology available - stealth or hypersonic speed
capability - that warranted a new aircraft design in the
near future. The board determined that there were no new
advances in areas of propulsion and structures or other
technologies that could offset the $6 billion investment.
In late August 1980, under the chairmanship of Dr.
Zeiberg, a JBS was initiated which utilized the input from
the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. The study was
divided into five panels: missions and requirements,
threats, aircraft system design, plan and program and
system evaluation. On December 8, 1980, Gen. Mathis, the
Air Force vice-chief of staff formally announced that the
new strategic bomber would be called the long-range combat
aircraft (LRCA). Moreover, Congress passed Public Law
96-342, FY 1981 Defense Authorization Bill, and required
the Defense Secretary to secure a multi-role bomber with
an IOC of no later than 1987. The final report was due in
March 1981.
election year brought in theThe presidential
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Republican Party candidate, Mr. Ronald Reagan, into the
White House. During his national campaign he scrutinized
President Carter's weakening strategic policy and vowed to
tip the balance in favor of the U.S. He strongly favored
the B-1 program and it was beginning to look as if the B-1
was in and it was just a matter of time before President
Reagan would formally announce his decision.
Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger delayed final
submission of the JBS until June 1, 1981. In the first
interim report ("Expedited Effort Expected for Bomber",
1981), the Pentagon examined three bomber options. They
were:
(1) Rockwell International's long-range combat
aircraft, a modified version of the B-1 bomber.
(2) General Dynamics FB-111 B/C, a stretched version
based on modified 66 FB-11lAs and 89 F-111D fighter
aircraft to extend range and increase payload.
(3) A new conventional aircraft, the stealth bomber,
applying the latest technology.
Because of security considerations the interim report
did not delve into the stealth bomber, leaving that
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program to the final report in June 1981. The report
questioned whether a fleet of single or mixed aircraft is
capable of meeting all objectives and what the IOC of such
a fleet would be. It also considered the risks in solely
relying upon the new stealth bomber as well as the
consequences of relying upon the B-52 force for a few more
years. In addressing technical issues the report
considered three areas. They were:
(1) Range and payload.
(2) Speed and altitude.
(3) Electronic counter measures.
Each candidate bomber had its pluses and minuses
along these technical dimensions. The FB-111B/C, with its
fuselage stretched from 73 to 88 ft, would have an
increased weapons capability and extended range, but it
would be heavily dependent on tanker aircraft support even
with its increased fuel capacity. In contrast the B-1 and
the stealth bomber were not limited by tankers. As per the
IOC date of 1987, reorganization of the General Dynamics
production base from the F-16 fighter to FB-111B/C was
substantive and an extensive test program was envisioned
to validate design and determine FB-111B/C's performance.
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For the B-1, modifications were substantial but were
relatively straight forward, the report said. In addition,
Rockwell's ability to reestablish the vendor structure and
production line, rehire manufacturing personnel and get
the production line moving was also addressed in that
report.
According to the initial assessment of the report, a
twoaircraft acquisition program was feasible and was only
slightly more expensive than a one-aircraft program. This
approach was thought to have enhanced the mixed-force
posture which was desirable. The report fell short of
making recommendations but it was beginning to look as
though the modified B-1 and the stealth bomber might be
the leading candidates for such a mixed force. Supporting
this approach, partial information was released which
related to LRCA's maximum capabilities, typical maximum
payload and necessary modifications to the B-1 to achieve
increased mission effectiveness was released. The details
available at that time are illustrated in Table 7-I on
page 271, and in Figures 7-1 and 7-2 on page 272 and 273
respectively.
By the end of March 1981, the Rockwell bomber
proposal was all set and the company was seeking
additional information on cost and schedule. If the
-2 71-
Table 7-I: Maximum Capabilities of LRCA
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Pentagon decided on the modified B-1 bomber, Rockwell
would require a workforce peaking at 26,000 people by
1985. More than 60% of the workers would be acquired
through an employee recall/rehire and company transfer
program ("Rockwell Bomber Proposal Set", 1981). The
company planned a peak production rate of four aircraft
per month and an IOC date was set in November 1985 with
delivery of 15 aircraft. A separate modification and
flight testing plan was configured for the existing four
aircraft for an early design validation of the modified
version before the end of September 1983. The company
contacted all its major subcontractors and it seemed that
the whole team was set to charge ahead. A detailed
description of Rockwell's successful strategy will be
discussed further in the next chapter.
In early May 1981, the USAF study to determine the
configuration for a new bomber aircraft was accelerated
(Robinson, 1981d; Lambert, 1981). All the data in the
study pointed towards the selection of the LRCA, a high
subsonic version of the B-1 with increased range and
stealth quantities to reduce radar cross section and
vulnerability to air defense weapons. At this time, some
additional information relating to LRCA's requirements was
made public. Information on requirements for the
operations in uncertain areas of the world is illustrated
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in Figure 7-3 on page 276 (Himba and Wegner, 1981). With
the LRCA based within the continental US, distances to
these uncertain areas were quite long (see Figure 7-4 on
page 277). In addition, details of LRCA's unrefueled
missions over the Soviet Union, and LRCA dimensional,
weight and engine data were also made public. Figures 7-5,
7-6 and 7-7 (on page 278, 279 and 280 respectively)
illustrate this information.
DOD announced that the LRCA derivative of the B-1 was
designed to meet the following six missions. They were:
(1) Initial response to a nuclear weapons attack in a
single integrated operation plan (SIOP).
(2) Protracted missions within the SIOP.
(3) Cruise missile standoff missions.
(4) Worldwide power projection, including a show of
force, reconnaissance, quick reaction and amphibious force
support.
(5) Conventional bomb missions in support of North
Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.
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Projected range requirements.
Figure 7-4: Projected Range Requirements for LRCA
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Figure 7-5: Air Launched Cruise Missile Mission
of LRCA
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Figure 7-6: SRAM and Nuclear Gravity Weapons
Mission of LRCA
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(6) Maritime supporting missions, including fleet air
defenses and protection of lines of communication and
mining.
Based on versatility of the LRCA derivative of the
B-1, on May 21, 1981, the USAF bomber study group
recommended two aircraft to DOD, the LRCA followed by the
advanced technology bomber. The procurement of 100
modified B-is was for the immediate future with
development and production of stealth bombers for the
1990s. A new B-1 prototype was estimated to cost $180
million a piece ("A NEW B-1 Bomber May Takeoff Soon",
1981). Avionics for the modified B-1 was substantially
advanced and was believed to have added a significant
portion to the new cost. Encouraged by the USAF's
recommendations, the House Armed Services Committee
provided $1.95 billion for the modified B-1 program in the
FY 1982 Defense Budget ("Armed Services Committee Suggests
B-I", 1981). By June 15, 1981, Defense Secretary
Weinberger was expected to recommend to the President a US
bomber aircraft program (Robinson, 1981c). By this time,
he had a revised estimate of a two-bomber plan. This input
was provided by Rockwell and Lockheed. One hundred LRCAs
would cost approximately $19.7 billion and a fleet of 110
stealth bomber would run $30 billion. The second industry
team of Boeing and Northrop also briefed the Secretary of
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Defense and his deputies about their version of the
advanced technology bomber.
Some inside stories suggest that USAF officials took
a strong stand in backing the modified B-1 against the
wishes of SAC's commander in chief Gen. Ellis, who pressed
for the FB-111B/C interim bomber. The story goes further
suggesting that both Secretary Weinberger and Deputy
Secretary Carlucci were unhappy with the Air Force because
opposing the wishes of SAC's commander in chief made
Administration's selection task more difficult.
Even as DOD deliberated, the B-1 tests not only
accelerated but broadened their scope. Improved
penetrativity quotient for the B-1 kept on pouring in. The
testing was concluded on April 29, 1981. Final results of
the BPE program were submitted by the AFTEC on June 30,
1981. The B-1 passed with flying colors. These results
were good enough to tip the balance in favor of the
modified B-1. By July 13, 1981, it was very clear that
involvement of the National Security Council in the bomber
decision might serve to prod President Reagan toward a two
bomber solution (Robinson, 1981b), and that the third and
the most flexible leg of the US triad would eventually be
the modified B-1 bomber.
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7.4 President Reagan's Announcement
On October 2, 1981, with his five point announcement
of decisions taken on strategic systems, President Reagan
ended months of uncertainty, rumors and leaks
("President's Strategic Plan", 1981). He directed the
Secretary of Defense to revitalize US bomber forces by
constructing and developing 100 modified B-1 bombers
starting immediately and to continue deployment of cruise
missiles on existing bombers. He also called for
development of advanced bomber with stealth
characteristics for the 1990s. In this announcement he
ordered the strengthening and expansion of US sea-based
forces, completion of the MX missile program and
rebuilding of communication and control systems. The
President also directed the Secretary to improve US civil
defenses. Such a plan would meet vital US security needs
and strengthen hopes for peace.
The President's announcement cleared the way for the
production of the LRCA version of the B-1 bomber. Though
this two-bomber approach was expensive, to many defense
experts it was less risky. Afterall the total reliance on
the stealth bomber was reduced in the near future. Thus a
bomber decision was put to a rest after some two decades
of debate on the issue. Experts praised the President's
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strategic modernization plan and said that it was overdue.
Though all was set for Rockwell International, the new
bomber plans were awaiting major public and Congressional
scrutinies which are discussed in the next chapter. I
shall also include the immediate repercussions of the
President's announcement, the details of the Rockwell's
winning strategy, the new bomber technology and its
production program.
As we saw in this chapter, the President's decision
to revive the bomber leg of the triad provided new life to
the B-1 bomber program. At this point, it is fair to say
that the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, while
attempting to interpret Congress' resolution for the Air
Force, gave birth to a new bomber. Hereafter, this bomber
shall be referred to as the B-lB bomber.
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Chapter 8
THE B-1B BOMBER PROGRAM (1981 - 1986)
During these years of the B-1B's history, its
technical progress was not vexed and trampled with the
winds of political forces as was clearly the case in its
past. The revival of the B-1B by President Reagan had full
blessings from both the House and the Senate. Because of
this support, the program acquisition proceeded without
interruption. This makes program historian's task a
little simpler because he could venture to jot down the
yearly progress. The multiyear acquisition program grew
out of the Administrations' sole concerns to save money.
The design of the B-1B was frozen in the earlier years and
the production program was ahead of schedule. In 1986,
however, it was beginning to look as though the defensive
avionics system development might delay the IOC for the
bomber. This delay was attributed to its technical
problems which simply got overlooked as a result of
running the developmental and production phases
concurrently within the imposed tight schedule.
During each year, the program steadily grew under the
backdrop of a few public scrutinies and micromanagement
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efforts by Congress. However, Congress wanted the
President to succeed in his goal of rebuilding the US'
strategic forces and it simply went along with almost
everything he asked for the B-lB. In the later years of
the program, the debate on B-lB's impact on the Arms
Control Treaty and on B-1B production extension (beyond
the appropriated number of 100) grew intense. More details
of the B-lB's competitor, the stealth bomber, also
emerged. With such background, the B-lB entered 1987.
This year brought perhaps the worst public scrutinies for
the program which are discussed in the next chapter. Here,
I shall provide an year by year account of the B-lB
program during President Reagan's term.
8.1 October 1981 - December 1981
Immediately after President Reagan's announcement to
go ahead with the B-lB bomber, the scholars of business
strategy provided the account of how Rockwell kept the B-1
alive. The details of the program plan and associated
costs were also made public. Different and contradicting
cost estimates on the B-1B, and doubts on its penetration
capability and IOC angered few congressman. Only on
assurances from the Pentagon and the President, did they
provide their consent to FY 1982 appropriation for the
B-1B.
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8.1.1 Rockwell's Winning Strategy
As a prime contractor, Rockwell was to get the
biggest share of the program. That amounted to $10 billion
in sales and the earning that went with it. The company's
stock soared from $24 a share in April 1981 to over $32 in
November 1981. Flawed logic in President Carter's policy
gave Rockwell its chance to revive the bomber. The
President canceled the bomber, but not America's
long-standing strategy of depending on a triad of nuclear
weapons system that included bombers, plus missiles that
were based on land and at sea. Without the B-I, the Air
Force would be left with a fleet of aging B-52s. It never
ceased demanding a replacement for them.
According to Sherman (1981), Rockwell International
pursued a four pronged strategy to win the contract. It
was:
(1) When it came to lobbying, Rockwell avoided the
appearance of manipulation and impropriety. Rockwell
restricted its activities mainly to providing data on B-1
to Congress and passing out reports to congressman on how
many of their constituents depended on the aircraft for
their livelihood. This low-key effort was a result of
lessons learned from its unsuccessful attempts in 1977
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which damaged its image for employing aggressive lobbying
tactics. These tactics included blasting employees with
loudspeaker announcements, writing to its shareholders and
phoning subcontractors and urging them to deluge Congress
with letters supporting the B-1. Eighty thousand letters
of support were produced and this created a backlash from
congressmen who felt unduly pressured. Another
embarrassment was Defense Contract Audit Agency's (DCAA's)
questioning of Rockwell's lobbying expense. During
1974-1975, Rockwell charged at least $653,400 in lobbying
expenses to government contract which DCAA questioned as
inappropriate expenses for the government to foot (Graves,
1981). Though this inquiry, done at the request of Sen.
George McGovern (D.-Wis), was preliminary, which of these
expenses were eventually paid by taxpayers was not clear.
But the revelation itself was embarrassing to the company.
During 1980-1981, none of these techniques were repeated
and indeed the low-key approach paid off.
(2) Since the cancellation of the B-1A in 1977,
Rockwell had gradually cut its employment in aircraft
group from 27,000 to 7,700. This was done gracefully
retaining the goodwill of the employees so they would
return to build the B-1, if it were to be given a
production go ahead. Rockwell found jobs for some 1,000
workers elsewhere within the company, and loaned a few
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more to other aerospace companies on the condition that
they would be allowed to return, if needed for the B-1
job. For these, monthly paychecks still came through
Rockwell. Job fairs were set up for the remainder, and
recruits from 24 companies and professional resume writers
were kept on hand to help the employees. Some stopgap
subcontracting jobs were brought in to keep the workers
practiced in skill needed for the B-1. The Boeing
Company, a companion contractor of Rockwell in the B-1
program, provided these contacts from its commercial line
of 747 and 757 passenger jets.
(3) Demonstrating the B-l's effectiveness was most
crucial to Rockwell's marketing of the bomber. The company
took every precaution it could to make each test flight a
success, and the people at the Air Force Test Center at
Edwards Air Force Base in California were happy with that.
Rockwell invited 28 Washington decision makers, including
two senators and six congressmen, for joyrides on the B-1.
Former Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater and Rep. Robert
Dornan (R.-Calif) and a few others piloted the bomber
themselves. All these made the B-1 a favored choice of
more and more congressional defense advocates.
(4) After President Reagan's victory in November
1980, Rockwell began pouring in some of its own money on
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the aircraft, making more detailed preparations for the
production. In March 1981, they leased a 300-acre site for
a new assembly building in Los Angeles and broke ground on
a $20 million installation to house B-1 engines. The
personal staff of the company president telephoned key
employees and it was beginning to look as though 60%of
these employees would return if the money were right. The
company's engineers were kept busy preparing the 5,000 new
drawings required to modify the aircraft and production
planning was started in full swing. Moreover, since
November 1980, Rockwell shook hands on fixed price
contracts with most of the 53 major subcontractors and all
3,000 vendors were ready to charge ahead. All this was in
a hope that Reagan's victory would indeed bring back the
B-1, and the company should be ready to serve the nation
with its sound production base, immediately after the
President's announcement.
Such efforts on the part of Rockwell were enough to
move the mountain and the architects of company's
strategy: Executive Officers Robert Anderson and Bastian
Hello; company lobbyiest Ralph Watson; and lawyer William
Clark were highly praised by the scholars of business
strategy.
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8.1.2 Details of the B-1B Program Plans
Section 7.3 provides the early details of the program
as they were known prior to the President's announcement.
After the $180.3 billion strategic force modernization
announcement by President Reagan, further details on the
procurement were made public (Robinson, 1981a). USAF
formally designated the new version of the B-1 as the B-1B
bomber. The procurement of 100 B-1B bombers with a force
of 90 operational aircraft was announced at a cost of $27
billion in then-year funds (or $19.7 billion in 1981
funds). The IOC was set in FY 1986 with full capability by
FY 1988. To provide all the B-1B bombers with cruise
missiles carriage capability, the Administration requested
additional funding of $172 million in FY 1983, $374
million in FY 1984, $289 million in FY 1985 and $80
million in FY 1986. In the second week of October 1981,
Rockwell and its associated contractors were awarded a
contract of $54.9 million in preparation for a full-scale
development program. Additional funding awaited further
negotiations between the USAF and the contractors over the
final aircraft configuration, cost and Congressional
approval. For the proposed 100 aircraft, Rockwell was
planning a steady buildup to a peak production rate of
four aircraft per month (Ropelewski, 1981). This
production rate was to begin with the 23rd aircraft. The
100th aircraft was to be delivered in mid 1988.
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The Pentagon officials were anticipating placing
orders for two B-lBs in FY 1982, seven in FY 1983, nine in
FY 1984, 36 in FY 1985 and 46 in FY 1986. The first
production aircraft delivery was due in December 1984 with
additional deliveries scheduled to be made at a rate of
four in FY 1985, 33 in FY 1986, 44 in FY 1987 and 14 in FY
1988.
Rockwell had submitted an estimate of $11.9 billion
for the 100 B-1B aircraft. The DOD added substantially to
the avionics of the aircraft which approximately doubled
its cost (Coleman, 1981). Several new items were included.
They were:
(1) New multifunction radar and terrain-following
radar.
(2) Satellite communication capability.
(3) Increase from four to eight frequency bands in
defensive electronics.
(4) Digital radio frequency memory.
(5) Terrain-bounce radar jamming capability.
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Offensive avionics system was adopted from the B-52
update program and no massive modifications were planned
(Ropelewski, 1981).
8.1.3 Cost and IOC Date Disputes
Immediately after the President's announcement, the
foes of the B-1B in Congress engaged themselves in
micromanagement efforts to curtail the scope of the
program. Based on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, they severely
criticized bomber's appropriation ("Senate Hearing
Criticizing B-1 Based on CIA, GAO Reports", 1981). In
addition, several other inquiries were made within the
DOD. Sen. Carl Levin (D.-Mich) was puzzled and upset over
the variety of estimates that poured in and he made a
special request to the presiding officer in the Senate to
make a permanent record of this information in the
Congressional Record (United States of America (1981)). He
was eager to know:
(1) Could the B-1 penetrate beyond 1990s?
(2) What was the cost of the B-i?
(3) When would it be ready?
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(4) When would the stealth alternative be ready?
The inconsistent data he received are provided in
Table 8-I on page 295. The program cost ranged from $19.7
billion to $28 billion in fiscal 1981 dollars. These
variations were a result of inclusion or omission of many
program-related items and their potential use in years to
come, their different cost estimates by various
governmental agencies and the use of different yearly
inflation factors ("GAO Report Questions USAF B-1B Cost
Estimate", 1981). The Pentagon Research Chief Richard
D. Delauer presented an additional cost estimate which
calmed down the worrying congressmen. He introduced the
concept of life cycle cost estimate to this debate. He
said that the continued operation of the force of B-52s
and smaller FB-111s through the end of the century would
cost $93 billion while it would cost about $92 billion to
buy and operate 200 B-ls to replace that bomber force. The
total cost for a combined fleet of B-52s and stealth
planes would be $114 billion over the same period, while
the President's proposal to phase-out the B-52s, buy 100
B-lBs and later 132 stealth planes would cost $112 billion
(Towell, 1981b). Similar doubts and uncertainty existed on
the matter of IOC definition (see Table 8-I on page 295),
IOC date and penetration capability of the B-1B.
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STATEMENTS
Following are a series of contradictory
statements from Pentagon officials on varl-
ous aspects of US. strategic forces:
L DZIDERNT AND CONTRADICTORY COST
STATMENNTS ON B--I
July 13, 1981-AF Legislative Liaison Doc-
ument, 819.7 Billion (FY 81 ).
Oct. 5 & 6. 1981-Dr. Richard DeLauer,
UnderSecDef Research & Engineering. and
Lt. Gen. Kelly Burke, AF R&D Chief, to House
Defense Approps. Subcommittee, $19.7 B
(FPY 81 ) or $21.4 B (FY 82 s).
Oct. 27, 1981-Milton Margolis, Head of
DoD Cost Analysis Improvement Group, at
direction of Dep Sec. Def. Carlucci at Sen.
Gov. Affairs Comm., $19.7 B (FT 81 ) from
AF Program Manager or 20.2-20.7 B (FY 81
$) n independent AP estimate not. inc. pos-
sible additional sub-systems.
Oct. 28. 1981--Jack Borsting. Asst. Sec.
Def. (Comptroller) to SASC Strategic Sub-
comm., $20.5 B (FY 81 $) or $22 B (FY 82 )
plus another $50 million for an unnamed
"nuclear feature" which will be added and
possibly another $600-4900 million more as a
3-4% estimate of further add-ons. Borsting
also confirmed that the independent AP esti-
mate was $800 million above the AF program
manager's estimate of $19.7 B in FY 81 .
Oct. 29, 1981-Lt. Gen. Kelly Burke (AF
R&D Chief) to SASC Strategic Subcommit-
tee, $20.8 B (FT 81 $) which Includes s300
million more for flight training simulators.
Burke refused to add another $624 million to
represent a 3% contingencies factor he him-
self said an AP audit showed added to the
program. Adding that would yield a $21.4 B in
FY 81$ program.
GAO Draft Statement of Facts (late Oc-
tober, 1981). 2.266 billion n FY 81 $ in
questionable reductions by AP to achieve
$19.7 B program cost. At least llst 8500
million more In possible program adds. ($1.1
B identified by in this area admitted above).
October 31/November 1, 1981, DoD Cost
Analysis (CAIG) Improvement Group briefs
SecSDef. Weinberger that B-1B program will
cost $27-28 B in PY 81 8.
EL rTEALTH SOC XTATmNTMS
Secretary Weinberger to full SASC, Oct. 5,
1981: "Our vigorous ATB program will lead
to that plane's deployment under current
plans beginning In 1989."
Principle Dep. Under Sec. Def. (Research
and Engineering) James Wade to SASC stra-
tegic Subcommttee on Oct. 28, 1981: "Our
vigorous ATB program will lead to that
plane's deployment in the early 1990's.'
Gen. Richard Ellis. then ClnC AC to
HASC Member last year: "Conversely, opting
for the B-1 at this time could preclude pro-
curing a more advanced aircraft available by
1990." 
Gen. Lew Allen, AF Chief of Staff, to SASC
Strategic Subcommittee on Oct. 29, 1981:
"At the same time we will be proceeding with
a vigorous program to develop an advanced
technology bomber, aiming toward deploy-
ment in the early 1990."
m. -- PNIRATION CAPABITrES CALLED INTO
QMSTON BY SECRTARY OF m PoRCz CHARTS
June 2, 1981 Charts in Memorandum from
Sec. AF to Sec. Def. show B-1B's ability tp
penetrate improving Soviet air defenses be-
gins to degrade well before AF testimony con-
tends it will ("well into 1990s").
Charts show B-52Hs will be able to pene-
trate for at least one year after B-1B's
penetration capability begins to degrade, and
that B-lB won't penetrate much longer than
B-52Hs.
Charts show our B-52Gs and Hs, ff armed
with cruise missiles, will be able to shoot
their missiles and then penetrate Soviet air
defenses to drop bombs well into 1990s. and.
that B-lBs will have to adopt this same
"shoot and penetrate" tactic only shortly
after the B-52Hs must in order to accom-
plish B-lB missions.
Charts show B-52Gs and Hs will be able
to shoot and penetrate Soviet air dfenses
well into 19908 and well after charts show
Stealth bomber will be available to assume
strict penetration mission role.
Iv. B-is BOMBER IOC (INTTIAL OPERATING CAPA-
sLmYr) IN DOUBT, DESPITE DOD/A TESTIMONY
Sec. Def. Weinberger. to full SASC on Oct.
5. 1981: "Specifically, we will develop a force
of 100 BO1 bombers with an initial operat-
ing capability in 1986."
AF Chief of Staff, Gen. Lew Allen, to SASC
Strat. Subcomm. on Oct. 29, 1981: "We pro-
pose to build and deploy a force of 100
modified B-i bombers with an initial op-
erating capability of 1986 . . ."
However, DOD's own "Dictionary of Mili-
tary and Associated Terms," published by
the JCS on June 1, 1979, and known as JCS
Pub. 1, provides the following definition of
"initial operational capablilty-the first at-
talnment of the capability to employ effec-
tively a weapon, item of equipment or sys-
tem of approved specific characteristics, and
which is manned or operated by an ade-
quately trained, equipped, and supported
military unit or force."
And. the B-IB IOC is being defined by the
A., according to GAO. as "delivery of the
15th aircraft to SAC."
Not only does this deviate from what is
supposed to be a system's IOC, but GAO has
been informed by A? that IOC for B-lB does
not represent or require operational capabil-
ity. GAO was told It would be at least mid-
1987 before even limited nuclear certification
of the B-lB Is complete.
Most importantly, the AF Strategic Sys-
tems Program Office offcials. according to
GAO to me ust today (yesterday) stated to
its nvestigators that: .. . it will be at
least a year after the 15th aircraft is dellv-
ered before the irst LRCA(B-1B) squadron
will have the capability necessary to stand
nuclear alert." (GAO quote.)
Table 8-I: Contradictory Statements from the Pentagon
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8.1.4 Appropriations for the B-1B Program
Congress decided to respect these uncertainties on
these estimates afterall and plotted its appropriation
strategy accordingly. The Reagan Administration requested
$2.37 billion for the B-1B program in FY 1982. Of this,
$1.674 billion was for the FY 1982 procurement and $227
million was for the long-term procurement leaving $471
million for the research and development. The House was
successful in maneuvering the final appropriation against
the wishes of the Senate ("Funding Increased for B-1B,
MX", 1981; Marsh, 1981). Yielding to pressure from the
House floor, the Conference Committee reduced research and
development funding to $292 million and a total of $1.8
billion was approved for both the short and long-term
procurement (Towell, 1981a).
The second thing Congress did was to require the
President by law to certify the cost and IOC for the B-lB
bomber. Such an action was meant to make him fully
responsible for his strategic modernization plan. The
details of the President's certification are provided in
the next section.
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8.2 January 1982 - December 1982
During this year, the B-1B design modification and
production program continued to develop steadily. Cost and
IOC assurances from the President were not enough to quiet
the critics of the program. In addition, the national
debate on the need of the bomber continued to persist.
Congress looked into allegations of improper lobbying by
DOD personnel for the B-1B aircraft. The steadfast refusal
of DOD to share its internal data on cost estimate of the
program angered Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D.-N.Y.) and Sen.
Carl Levin (D.-Mich). Their continued insistence compelled
GAO to acquire such data after threatening a court action
against DOD. The Air Force stood firmly in face of GAO's
disclosures and the Republican majority in Congress saw to
it that no harm was done to the B-1B bomber program
because of this uproar. In the end, a few technical
developments which took place during this period will be
discussed.
8.2.1 Presidential Certification
On January 18, 1982, the President sent a
communication to Congress certifying that a fleet of 100
of a new version of B-1 bomber could be bought for $20.5
billion (in fiscal 1981 dollars). The first squadron of
B-ls could be in service by 1986, the President said. The
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President further warned that the cost estimate and
schedule could be met only if Congress were to fund the
Administration's annual requests for the B-ls. "Failing
that", he said, "the program cannot be completed on time
and within cost" (United States Congress, 1982b).
The President's certification was required by a
provision of the fiscal 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill
(PL 97-114). The provision, offered as a Senate floor
amendment by Sen. Sam Nun (D.-Ga), arose out of some
members fears that the B-1 program would be far more
costly than the Administration's estimate of $20.5 billion
(Towell, 1982d). In that case, it was argued, development
of the more advanced stealth bomber might be slowed down
in order to fund the B-1. There had been estimates that
the B-1 program might cost upwards of $40 billion
(believed to be in then-year funds).
8.2.2 National Debate on the B-1B Bomber
The first item in this debate was the report released
by the U.S. Treasury Department (Bezdek, 1982). While
studying larger issues of cost effectiveness and economic
aspects of the U.S. defense spending (projected estimate
in range of $1.7 trillion over the next few years), the
report examined, in particular, the B-1 weapon system.
The program's history, rationale, cost and economic and
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manpower impacts, were studied in greater detail.
Peripheral environmental issues were also addressed in
this report. The details of economic and manpower impact
are discussed in Appendix B. The 30-year life cycle cost
of the B-1 program was estimated in the range of $100
billion (believed to be in then-year dollars) which
included the cost of procurement, weapons, maintenance and
operation. In addition, this included tanker support,
direct costs such as personnel, fuel spare parts, base
operations, and intelligence and communications, as well
as, indirect costs such as a depot, overhaul, base
support, tuning etc. Rationale for the B-1 was weighed
against its cost and economic and environmental impact.
Because of the controversial and sensitive nature of the
issues involved, the Treasury Department fell short of any
specific recommendations. They found that the case for
building the bomber was about as strong as the case for
canceling the program. They felt that it was not their
mission to tell the DOD what kinds of weapons to buy for
the national defense. But they thought that such studies
were necessary for them to provide data on the impact of
the national budgetary process.
Paine (1982b) criticized the combined clout of the
President, the Air Force, Congress and Rockwell with its
subcontractors which pushed the nation in buying the
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expensive B-1. He downplayed Pentagon Research Chief Dr.
Richard D. Delauer's views which praised the ability of
the B-1B to survive a Soviet surprise attack in order to
mop up residual weapons and which emphasized that such a
capability was essential for America's deterrence posture.
Paine further said that DeLauer and other officials had
revived what some called the "economic exhaustion"
scenario for the arms race. This was so, because their
estimate showed that the combination of B-1 followed by
the advanced technology bomber (ATB) would cause the
Soviets to spend in excess of $200 billion to upgrade
their air defenses, slowing the pace of their other
military build up.
Isaacs (1982), of the Council for a Livable World,
went one step farther. After summarizing the Congressional
action of the past which helped to resurrect the B-1B
bomber, he attacked the national psyche as it related to
defense issues.
Putting his views together with those of Fleisher's
(1985), it seems that there are three models of Congress'
voting on major defense related issues. They are:
(1) President-based model - which suggests that on
hard military budget and national security issues,
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Congress is used to following the Administration's lead.
As Rep. Les Aspin (D.-Wis) once pointed out (Isaac, 1982),
"When President Ford was for the B-1, Congress was for the
B-1. When President Carter was against the B-1, Congress
was against the B-1. And finally, President Reagan
supported the bomber and so did Congress."
(2) Constituency-based model - which argues that
reelection-oriented congressmen would always vote with
their constituency for mutual benefit.
(3) Ideology-based model - which proposes that
conservatives and Republican congressmen would always vote
for defense buildup while liberals and Democratic
congressmen would oppose it in favor of larger social
good.
These models could be applied to understand
Congressional voting on the B-1B funding throughout its
history.
In October 1982, Paine took another stab at the B-1
issue, and startled Congress with his version of
Rockwell's and the Pentagon's principles of procurement
(Paine, 1982a). In his picturesque article, he summarized
their strategy over the years which eventually got
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Rockwell and Pentagon what they really wanted. He fell
short of accusing them but implied that such a partnership
is not healthy for a democratic society. He delved into
the the subject of cost and IOC controversy and reminded
Congress that if the Pentagon intended to win over the
Soviet Union by the principle of "economic exhaustion",
surely that would be equally expensive for the U.S. to
indulge in.
Such remarks from Paine's article in Common Cause
magazine were believed to have provided impetus to the
on-going investigation of the allegations of improper
lobbying by DOD personnel, for the B-1B aircraft. The
details of the hearings, findings, conclusions and
recommendations are provided in United States Congress
(1982a). The findings included that Section 1913, Title
18, United States Code and appropriations acts make it
illegal for Executive Branch personnel to stimulate
indirect, or grass-roots lobbying of the members of
Congress, i.e., urging organizations or individuals to
generate broad-scale contact of members to influence them
to adopt a particular position on legislation pending in
Congress. The Subcommittee further found that during the
lobbying effort for procurement of the B-1B aircraft,
meetings of DOD personnel and the contractor's
representatives were held at the Air Force Legislative
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Liaison Office. These meetings took place after President
Reagan's decision to proceed with the procurement of the
B-1B in October 1981. The Investigation Subcommittee
concluded that the purpose of these meetings was to
coordinate activities and to exchange information.
Rockwell sometimes received inquiries regarding such
matters as mission requirements which could be answered
only by the Air Force. Since Rockwell was not in a
position to reply, because of the secrecy issue, such
inquiries were referred to the Air Force.
According to findings, the use of results of such
meetings in order to plan contact with Members of Congress
in order to gain support for the program, raised a
Constitutional issue. Personal contacts with Members of
Congress by executive officers are both sanctioned and
required by Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution,
which provides that the President, "shall from time to
time... recommend to their (Congress') consideration such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient". The
report further said that the President must entrust part
of this function to subordinate officers within the
Executive Branch, and the Federal Government could not
function efficiently if the President and his subordinates
could not do so. The Subcommittee found no violation of
existing law, and also found that the complaining members
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of Congress (Rep. Norman D. Dicks and Sen. William
Proxmire among several other sponsors of this inquiry)
presented insufficient evidence to support their charges.
The Subcommittee recommended that the procedures of such
contacts should be reviewed for further guidance of all
agencies. It also requested that existing lobbying laws
should be reviewed and the responsibilities of Executive
Branch Agencies, in lobbying Congress, should be clarified
to avoid any wrong doing.
This episode provides a classic example of how a
Constitutional issue was raised by the technology in a
process of it becoming a part of the national strategic
force. For bomber technology, this was the second time
that the Constitutional consultation was relied upon. The
first time was during the B-70 (B-l's fore-runner) bomber
debate in the early 60s (see Chapter 2 for further
detail).
8.2.3 Action in Congress
The Administration requested $4.78 billion for a new
version of the B-1 bomber for FY 1983. Of this, $4.03
billion was for the procurement of seven aircraft and
$753.5 million was for continued research and development
(Towell, 1982c). Both Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D.-N.Y.) and
Sen. Carl Levin (D.-Mich) continued their opposition to
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the program. They were determined to exploit the cost and
IOC controversy issue while attempting to block the
program. United States of America (1982c and 1982b),
provide details of their concerns. At the heart of the
issue was the controversy over the cost estimates provided
by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and by the Independent
Cost Assessment group formed by the Air Force. The CAIG
provided an estimate of $26.7 billion for the B-1B bombers
while ICA group's estimate was $22.5 billion. Both of
these estimates were in fiscal 1981 dollars. Both the Rep.
Addabbo and Sen. Levin were unable to obtain the details
of these estimates from DOD even upon repeated written
requests. They were unhappy about the steadfast refusal of
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, to share this
information and they said that such a lack of cooperation
from the Executive Branch might delay the B-1B's
appropriation. The GAO, an arm of Congress, was only able
to obtain information about the analysis by the CAIG and
the ICA group for Congress after threatening a court
action.
Both the CAIG and the ICA group disagreed with each
other and with the Air Force on following three issues.
They were:
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(1) The assumption on learning curves leading to
repeated production of airframes and avionics equipment
resulting into cost savings.
(2) The cost of air crew training simulators and
additional maintenance requirements.
(3) The nature and duration of flight test program
prior to IOC date for the B-1B bomber.
They said that the Air Force was too optimistic in
its assessment which provided a relatively high degree of
risk to the program. In addition, nuclear certification of
the bomber was questioned because the program did not
include any climate tests. Sen. Levin and Rep. Addabbo
urged that Congress should not approve any funds for the
B-1B program until the many issues raised by the CAIG, the
ICA group and GAO were satisfactorily resolved. In one of
the daily debates, Sen. Carl Levin (D.-Mich) (United
States of America, 1982a) repeated his opposition to a
high cost B-1B bomber and urged its cancellation in favor
of the much more capable stealth bomber. The Senator
quoted the editorial article from The New York Times of
June 22, 1982, which supported his argument and concluded
that," What economy, sense and security required was less
stealth in defending the costly B-lB and more speed in
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producing the stealth bomber". He feared that the stealth
bomber's production might be delayed just because funding
was shared with the B-1B.
Against all this criticism, the USAF reaffirmed the
B-1B's cost ("USAF Reaffirms B-lB Cost in Face of GAO
Disclosures", 1982). The USAF regretted that other groups
failed to see its extensive experience with the program.
But the general feeling among GAO officials was that the
high visibility of the B-1B program would put pressure on
Defense Department officials to remain within their
estimate. Except for the unsuccessful attempts of Sen.
Ernest F. Hollings (D.-S.C.), the B-1B program was not
challenged any further (Towell, 1982a). Finally, both the
Houses approved FY 1983 request of $3.9 billion to begin
procurement of the B-1B bomber, including the purchase of
the first seven production-line aircraft, and $753.5
million for B-1B research and development (Towell, 1982b).
8.2.4 The B-1B Technology Program
In spite of these developments, the $2.09 billion FY
1982 program proceeded without interruption. The necessary
contracts and subcontracts were initiated to augment
facilities and equipment to support the B-1B production
program. This amount totaled approximately $400 million to
be spread over the upcoming four years ("Rockwell Signs
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$2.1 Billion B-1 Contract", 1982). The company expected to
work with 3,000 contractors and 58,000 people at the peak
of the 100-aircraft production run.
As a show of its commitment to weapons buildup and
readiness, the DOD sent the aircraft No. 4 to participate
at the Farnborough air show in England September 5-12,
1982 ("B-1 Appearance Expected at Farnborough", 1982; "B-1
to be Displayed at Farnborough", 1982; and "B-1 Display
Tests Flight Performance", 1982). Earlier testing (four
quick flight tests prior to the trip) of the aircraft
after 15 months in storage ("B-1 Flight", 1982) did not
reveal any major problems. However, two minor problems
were encountered during the transatlantic flight including
the electronics multiplexing system and hydraulic fuel
pumps. These problems were solved and the mission
proceeded without any hitch. During the trip there were
two aerial refuelings using KC-135. The B-1 was on static
display at the air show and on its return, it did stop by
at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., near Washington in
response to Congressional interest. The entire expedition
was declared a success.
In August 1982, Vought Corporation, Rockwell's
contractor for building two sections of the B-lB aft
fuselage, proposed a highly automatic machining center
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designed to improve productivity by at least 3:1 over
conventional shop layouts ("Automatic Machining Center
Aids B-1B Productivity Effort", 1982). Vought's flexible
machining design grew out of its work with Wright
Aeronautical Laboratory's integrated computer-aided
manufacturing (ICAM) office to develop a detailed plan for
the "factory of the future". An investment of less than
$20 million was proposed and production use was expected
beginning December 1983. The cost savings were to be split
between the Vought Corporation and the Air Force. The
conventional shop layout of numerically controlled
machines might have needed $38 million to do the job. The
new concept was expected to result in 80-85% machine time
use, compared with an average 15-20% obtained from a
conventional machine setup. Figure 8-1 on page 310
illustrates the layout for the ICAM shop proposed by
Vought Corporation.
Along with this, Rockwell proposed about half a dozen
technology modernization plans to the USAF aimed at
reducing production cost ("Rockwell Proposes B-1B
Subcontract Changes", 1982). The overall proposal included
automated graphite epoxy composite material tape layout,
robotic spray systems for radar absorber material, optical
means of template location, computer aided process
planning, automated fluoroscope inspection, automated
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Figure 8-1: Vought's Flexible Machining Cell for
the B-lB Aft Fuselage Components
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cable production, automated material handling and
production control and numerically controlled water jet
cutting of composite materials. This proposal was well
received and the Air Force was looking forward to cost
savings.
Other technical details relating to the B-1B's design
modifications were slow in coming, and for the sake of
completeness, they are discussed in the next section under
the subsection of B-1B critical design review.
It is worth noting that the international community
did notice the B-l's appearance at the Farnborough air
show. In this connection, the comments of Lt. Gen. Kelly
H. Bruke, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and
Development and Acquisition, are also worth mentioning
(Robinson, 1980b). While advocating the new B-1 in mid
1980, Lt. Gen. Bruke had said that the new B-1 was the
answer to the Soviet Backfire bomber. He predicted that a
new and better Soviet bomber was likely to follow the
Backfire bomber. He turned out to be right. That new
aircraft was the Blackjack bomber which was first
publically discussed in the late 1982 by two European
aviation journalists, Sweetman and Warwick, who compared
it with the US B-1B (Sweetman and Warwick, 1982). In eyes
of many US military experts, the emergence of a bigger and
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better Blackjack bomber was sufficient to justify
development of a followon bomber to the B-1B.
8.3 January 1983 - December 1983
In early January 1983, the Air Force and Rockwell
completed the critical design review (CDR) for the B-1B
bomber. The design was frozen and its release to the
contractors began in February 1983. By this time,
additional technical details of the bomber defensive
electronics were made public. The USAF was eager to sign
multiyear procurement contracts that could save $800
million. In spite of the assurances from the President as
regards to the cost of the program, Congressional approval
of such multiyear contracting was seen as an uphill battle
by some within the Administration. At issue was the
interpretation of the definition of a multiyear contract,
and the concurrent request for research and development
funding as incorporated within the B-lB program. As the
number of Congressional admirers of the stealth bomber
were on a rise, securing approval of multiyear contracting
for the B-1B did require some doing on the part of DOD.
Against the backdrop of these events, the B-1B technology,
manufacturing and the flight testing programs proceeded
without significant difficulties.
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8.3.1 The CDR for the B-lB Bomber
After the design review, the Air Force announced that
the program was moving at a rate which placed contractors
two to six months ahead of schedule. According to the
review, the contractors were running 2-7% below the cost.
The CDR included a review of the new design of the B-lB
bomber, its support plan and early flight test program.
Details of this review are discussed below.
8.3.1.1 New Design
The major changes in the B-lB bomber compared with
the earlier B-1A design (Robinson, 1983; Perini, 1983; and
Geddes, 1982) included:
(1) Increased takeoff gross weight to 477,000 lb.
(2) Structural strengthening to accommodate increased
weight by strengthening the under carriage, by reworking
the rear wing spar, by fitting new tires and brakes, and
by replacing certain wing skin. Nose landing gear changes
included a revised drag brace strut design and minor
changes to miscellaneous retraction assemblies.
(3) Redesign of over-wing fairing using inflatable
seals.
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(4) Introduction of composite materials in the nose
ride control vanes (Hansen, L. et al, 1986).
(5) Fuel tank provisions in all three weapons bays
and adjustable bulk-heads in the bays to accommodate the
ALCMs.
(6) Increased external stores capability (weapons and
fuel).
(7) Elimination of supersonic dash capability leading
to fixed angled "snake" design of the inlets which by
means of vanes, bends and radar absorbing linings made fan
faces invisible to radar. This provided a significant
contribution to lowering the overall radar cross section
of the B-1B bomber.
(8) A new F101-GE-102 engine which was the direct
derivative of the previous F101-GE-100 version. It
included a simplified exhaust nozzle to reduce engine
cost. The new nozzle used 12 narrower overlapping flaps
without the use of seals. Only six actuators were needed
to adjust the nozzle versus eight on the original B-1A
design (Mordoff, 1983). This resulted into overall weight
savings. Neutral position bleed-air extraction ports were
provided to permit neutral build-up engine assemblies to
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be installed in any of the aircraft's four engine
positions. The exhaust had a lower infrared signature
which was the result of improved fuel mixing, and the
engine met stringent emissions and noise standards.
(9) Capability to start all four engines from a
single auxiliary power unit through an air turbine and
cross bleed system (Covey, 1984).
(10) Molecular sieve oxygen generating system (MSOGS)
providing an unlimited supply of oxygen to the crew. MSOGS
used pressure swing adsorption to separate oxygen from
nitrogen in the engine bleed air system (Tedor, 1985).
(11) Surface wave attenuation materials on the wings
and vertical stabilizers.
(12) Advanced centrally integrated test system.
(13) Advanced electrical multiplex system.
(14) New offensive avionics system.
(15) Tail warning system as a part of the defensive
avionics system.
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(16) The ALQ-161 with expanded capability, especially
against the Soviet monopulse air defense radar system.
(17) Synthetic aperture radar with electrically
steerable antenna inclined 30 degree from the horizontal
to reflect energy downward instead of back to an enemy
radar transmitter.
(18) Expanded electronic countermeasures frequency
coverage with a monopulse capability.
Additional information on the new design of the B-1B
bomber is provided by Lambart (1983) and by Wilmer (1982),
while the background information on the B-1A bomber
technology is presented in Chapter 4. On completion of
CDR, the Air Force recommended that the multiyear
procurement plans begin in the spring of 1983.
8.3.1.2 Support Plan and Flight testing
As a part of CDR, the support plan for the B-1B
bomber fleet was also examined. This plan provided
guidelines for bringing the support capability on line as
aircraft were being delivered to SAC.
The modified B-1A aircraft No. 2 was expected to
under go 275 hours of flight testing in categories that
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included stability and control, vibration and acoustics,
dynamics response, propulsion and weapons. The schedule
test date was April 15, 1983 but testing was expected to
begin in March 1983. The second flight test vehicle, the
B-1A aircraft No. 4, was to be used as an avionics test
bed with 420 hours of tests assigned to it. The testing
was scheduled to begin in July 1984. A separate 300 hours
of test activity was planned to integrate ALCM on the
aircraft. The modified B-1A aircraft No. 2 was to begin
this testing in November 1984. It was to be joined by the
B-lB aircraft No. 9 in June 1986 for continued testing on
the ALCM integration. In addition, a new simulator cab,
conforming to the revised B-1 flight deck, was scheduled
to be available for flight simulation tests. These tests
would explore the ride, and flight handling
characteristics of the B-lB with an updated mathematical
model of aircraft stability.
A full scale replica of the B-1B called the system
development tool (SDT) was kept ready for use by
subcontractors to determine the exact route of wires,
cables and tubes that would go onto the bomber. SDT was
also to be used as a training device for people who would
work on the actual B-1B and as orientation to Air Force
personnel and pilots.
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It is worth mentioning that a combination of light
gray and dark gray was contemplated for the B-lB paint
scheme. This pattern satisfied conflicting requirements of
protection against nuclear flash and world-wide visual
camouflage.
8.3.2 The B-lB Avionics Development
The B-1B avionics integrated significant modern
electronics technology over that which was incorporated in
the earlier B-1A version (Klass, 1978). Both the offensive
and defensive electronics were significantly upgraded
(Schultz, 1983b). Avionics system base line configuration
for the B-lB incorporated several new avionics boxes,
including a new IBM-1O1F dual architecture processor, as
well as system modifications, and upgrades from B-lA, B-52
and F-16 aircraft. The system baseline (see Figure 8-2 on
page 319) was configured in five interacting parts: a
computational subsystem, navigation system, defensive
subsystem, stores management system and control and
display system. These five avionics subsystems were tied
together by four redundant A and B channel MIL-STD-1555B
EMUX busses (see Section 4.3.6.1 for detail) that reduced
aircraft wiring and simplified the installation of LRUs.
Together, the avionics suite provided:
(1) Navigation and aircraft guidance including
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Figure 8-2: The Offensive and Defensive Avionics
System Baseline Configurations
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terrain following and avoidance, target acquisition,
aircraft steering, and precision positioning updates.
(2) Delivery of nuclear and conventional bombs and
missiles.
(3) Aircraft defense to include RFS/ECM expendable
measures (see Section 4.3.6.3) and tail warning system.
(4) Damage assessment and retargeting.
Schultz (1983b) provides a detailed description of
the computational subsystem, navigation and radar, stores
management, and control and displays. Flight station
positions of the B-1B avionics equipment are illustrated
in Figure 8-3 on page 321. They range from the low
observable radar antenna in the nose radome to the tail
warning system. Some 60 Boeing developed or integrated
avionics units and panels were installed in the aircraft.
Figure 8-3 also illustrates government furnished products
(GFP), new and modified equipment together with the ones
that were adopted from the B-1A, F-16 and B-52 aircraft.
The idea behind using proven systems was to reduce the
price of the avionics package. The Boeing Company's share
for producing avionics for 100 aircraft amounted to $2
billion. Eaton Corporation's AIL Division was to provide
-321-
Figure 8-3: Flight Station Positions of the B-lB
Avionics
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100 sets of defensive avionics packages at a price of $1.5
to 2 billion.
Schultz (1983b) also discusses details of electronic
warfare system architecture and operations. This system
was called AN/ALQ-161, and it consisted of 107 "black
boxes" or LRUs linked to the aircraft's new 1555B
electrical multiplex bus. The total weight was about 5,200
lb and it included a complex series of antenna, receivers,
a jamming transmitter (consuming a maximum of 123 Kw of
power) and IBM-1O1F, 16 bit digital computer that, when
used in concert, could locate, identify, prioritize, and
jam or spoof enemy radar. Three new radio frequency (RF)
bands, bands 1, 2 and 3, covered the lower end of the RF
spectrum (around 100-1,000 MHz and possibly as high as
2,000 MHz). They would detect enemy targets and would emit
at these frequencies to jam them. An 8-channel band
covering higher ranges (between 10-20 GHz) also acquired
receive and transmit capability. A monopulse threat-
dealing avionics was also incorporated. The ALQ-161 system
was housed in several B-1B flight stations. The system's
passive antenna and high power jamming transmitters were
positioned behind wing root panels and inside the
empennage antenna bay. An added ALQ-161 feature was a
built in system monitoring network called the Status
Evaluation and Test (SEAT) network. This network was tied
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into Rockwell's CITS. The SEAT system automatically
monitored and reported any electronic warfare system
degradation or failure to the CITS computer (also an
IBM-1O1F), which independently routed electronic signals -
using the 1553 bus - around failed or battle-damaged
components in order to maintain full jamming capability
against high priority threats. The IBM AP-101F processors
were to be initially driven by Jovial J3B software,
however, plans called for upgrading to Jovial J73 software
to confirm to MIL-STD-1750A 16 bits general register
architecture at a later date.
At the time of design review, it seemed that all the
major contractors and their subs were geared to produce
avionics systems at a rate of four per month. The avionics
budget, though relatively high in absolute terms (some $40
million per aircraft), was thought to be very low in terms
of cost/benefit ratio.
By mid 1983, the stealth effort team for the B-1B
bomber was estimating the radar cross section of the B-1B
to be less that 1 sq.mt when measured in headon position.
This amounted to approximately one tenth of that of the
B-1A's and one hundredth of that of the B-52's ("Stealth
Effort Set for B-1B Bomber", 1983; Schultz, 1983a). Both
the radar-absorbent stealth technology, and the use of an
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electronic counter measure system were expected to play an
important role in enhancing the penetration of heavily
defended Russian airspace.
8.3.3 Congressional Action on Multiyear Procurement
Contract
After the CDR, the Air Force recommended a multiyear
procurement plan for the B-1B acquisition. To stay within
the budget estimate of $20.5 billion for 100 aircraft, the
Air Force implemented streamlined management practices and
strict design-change-control procedure. At the time of
requesting a multiyear procurement program that could save
$800 million during the three years of the B-1B
procurement, the Air Force's figures showed that the
program was running under cost and on schedule.
The FY 1984 request for the B-lB procurement was $5.6
billion which consisted of $3.8 billion for procurement of
ten aircraft and $1.9 billion for advance procurement. In
addition, $750 million was requested for research,
development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E). These
requests totaled $6.4 billion. Initial spares and military
construction were excluded from this request. In
mid-February 1983, the House Subcommittee on Defense
Appropriation questioned Secretary of the Air Force Verne
Orr about the logic of proceeding with multiyear
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procurement for the B-1B (United States Congress, 1983c).
The Subcommittee raised the point that the key criterion
for the multiyear procurement should be that the program
be mature in order to qualify for multiyear contract
status. As a result, the Subcommittee could not reconcile
this FY 1984 budget request, which included $750 million
for RDT&E for the B-1B, and questioned an estimated $1.7
billion for the remaining research and development
activities during FY 1984-87.
Secretary Orr provided the DOD's interpretation of
mature technology as it related to the B-lB program. He
stated that the B-1As' 2,000 hours of flight test program
contributed to building the DOD's confidence in the B-1B,
and said that in addition to having aircraft (B-1A) and
engine commonality, the B-1B offensive avionics had a high
degree of commonality with that of B-lAs. Only 20% of the
B-1B's offensive electronics needed partial modification
and redesign. These were, in the experience of the Air
Force, enough to qualify the B-lB as a mature technology,
and Secretary Orr requested continued Congressional
support. He mentioned that disapproval of a multiyear
contract would increase the program's estimated cost by
$800 million. According to him, these savings were already
counted in an estimate for the total expenditure of $20.5
billion (fiscal 1981 dollars).
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The Subcommittee inquired about the nature of the FY
1984 RDT&E effort, and details were provided in relation
to the B-lB's: the air vehicle development program; the
system hardware and software program; the prime mission
requirement program; the engine program; the systems test
and evaluation program; the systems engineering/program
management; the technical data management program; the
prototype modification/refurbishment program; the
engineering change order program; and other governmental
costs.
In a continued inquiry on March 9, 1983, the
Subcommittee questioned Dr. David Chu, Director of the
DOD's Program Analysis and Evaluation Office, on cost
estimates for the B-1B weapon system. In the face of the
CAIG's estimate of $25.3 billion, he was asked to justify
the Air Force's estimate of $20.5 billion. Dr. Chu
elaborated upon different practices of counting monies for
a program within the DOD. Earmarking the related
equipment, such as simulators, in a separate account
provided a lower estimate, while including such items as
support costs and spares, etc over time provided a larger
figure, he said. He consented that the Administration had
taken some systematic decisive actions to deal with
differences in counting practices, and these actions were
a result of Deputy Defense Secretary Carlucci's
initiative.
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In Part 4 of the on-going Hearings, details of the
management of the B-1B program were revealed (United
States of America, 1983b). Lt. Gen. Lawrence A. Skantze,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development and
Acquisition at that time, said that the B-lB program was
reviewed on a month by month basis. In addition, he said,
there were quarterly meetings of the chief of executives,
that is, the Chairman of the Board of Boeing, Rockwell,
General Electric, and Eaton Corporation, concentrating on
the status of the B-1B program. The other senior
management action was that Secretary Weinberger received a
B-1B program review every two weeks, he said. This
concerted attention to the B-1B program from the top
management was reassuring to the Subcommittee members.
At the end of these Hearings it looked as though the
B-1B program was beginning to garner support for its
multiyear procurement. But still, some minor obstacles had
to be overcome. In mid-April 1983, at the request of the
House Appropriations Committee, the GAO published a report
which provided Congress with a review of the B-lB bomber
(United States Congress, 1983a). The report concluded that
the program excluded the acquisition cost of $1.4 billion
as identified by an independent cost analysis, which was
jointly performed by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and the Air Force. The GAO detailed cost
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category included simulators, continued engineering and
component development, development of depot capability,
interim contractor support, facilities, retrofit costs and
manufacturing technologies including miscellaneous costs.
The report reiterated the multiyear procurement criteria
as per Public Law 97-86, and OSD policy memorandum. It
raised doubts as to whether the B-lB program fit such
criteria. According to that report, logistics support
costs were underestimated and that support was to start at
a much later date in the program, which might hamper
smooth absorption of the aircraft in to SAC. In the end,
the report criticized the past flight-testing program of
the Air Force, and commented on the program's inadequacy
to produce the mature ECM system for operational
requirements. It further warned that if the program
objectives were not satisfied under the flight test plan
at the time of IOC, then the Air Force might incur
additional cost in subsequent testing. The House Rep.
Frank McCloskey (D.-Ind.) used this report's conclusions
to prevent multiyear procurement of the B-1B but he failed
to prevail in the Republican-controlled House (Towell,
1983f).
On June 28, 1983, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass)
objected vehemently to the inflation adjustment
announcements by Mr. David Stockman, Director of the
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Office of Management and Budget. Mr. Stockman's inflation
adjustments prompted the Senate Armed Services Committee
to shift $800 million into the B-1B account. Sen. Kennedy,
a B-1 foe, and a member of the Committee, blocked the
Committee's action for several hours and charged the
Administration with shameless budgetary manipulations
(United States of America, 1983b); Towell, 1983e). In the
end, the Administration's desire for multiyear funding of
the B-1B prevailed. One could only imagine the impact of
denying such a multiyear procurement. Such a denial might
have increased the program cost and stretched its
production schedule. While on the other hand, as it will
be indicated in the next chapter, the argument about the
maturity of the program was equally valid.
Congress had a hard time obtaining full information
on the B-1B cost because the Air Force denied the GAO
detailed information on the contractor's plan. The Air
Force's denial was based on the grounds that negotiations
were still going on and the proposal involved proprietary
information. The Grassely Amendment (United States of
America, 1983a) tried to provide the necessary information
on B-1B's cost by ordering that a report from the Defense
Secretary be submitted to Congress before February 1984
and by stipulating that the GAO should be given access to
financial data.
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The multiyear contract was also opposed by proponents
of the stealth bomber in Congress. Concerns of these
congressmen resulted in the Senate/House Conference
report, which included an ironclad prohibition against
diverting any funds earmarked for the ATB program to any
other purpose (Ulsamer, 1983). This action made it
impossible to siphon off funds from ATB to expand the B-1B
program. Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga) warned that if the B-1B
production rate were allowed to build up to 48 aircraft in
February 1986, with 60,000 employees engaged in the
project, it would be politically impossible to terminate
the program (Towell, 1983d). Kelly (1983) estimated an
average workforce of 140,000 people employed to make parts
for the B-1B through some 5,200 subcontractors - in every
state except Alaska and Hawaii. He echoed Sen. Nunn's
sentiments and so did Gordon (1983). Gordon quoted Sen.
Robert Byrd (D.-W.Va) saying that the highly classified
nature of the stealth bomber program did not permit it to
have any national constituency as did the B-lB, and there
was a very good chance that in late years of the
procurement of the B-lB, the stealth bomber program might
be cannibalized to stretch the B-lB production.
Thus, both Congress and the Administration had some
hard decisions to make while supporting the air-breathing
leg of the triad defense strategy. The B-52s were also
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dragged into this debate and a recommendation was made to
seek their early retirement effective in 1988. In the end,
the Conference Committee cleared the way for the entire
$6.2 billion bill granting a multiyear status to the
program (Towell, 1983c). The conferees also approved a
Senate provision ordering the Secretary of Defense to
update the Pentagon's estimate of the total cost of the
B-1B program. On November 5, 1983, both the House and the
Senate passed the final defense appropriations bill
(Towell, 1983b; Towell 1983a). This was the last floor
fight of Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D.-N.Y.) against the
multiyear procurement of the B-1B bomber because his
amendment to delete the B-lB funding in the House was
badly defeated in this session. Thus, the B-lB entered
1984 with Congressional blessings and with funding of $5.6
billion to produce 10 aircraft plus $750 million to
perform RDT&E.
8.3.4 The B-lB Program Achievements
This section will provide a brief discussion of the
B-1B flight test program. In the end, a summary of the
B-1B manufacturing technologies will also presented.
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8.3.4.1 The Flight Program
The flight test program got under way ahead of
schedule on March 23, 1983, with the modified B-1A
aircraft No. 2 ("B-1B Flight Test Begins at Edward", 1983;
"B-1B Flight Test Program Begins at Edward AFB", 1983).
Aircraft No. 2 was modified with several B-1B design
changes. Among the B-1B features incorporated were a
modified flight control system, spoilers near the
aircraft's new composite bomb bay doors, and fixed-
geometry engine air inlets. Interior acoustic oscillations
were measured during the high subsonic open-bay bomb
operation of the aircraft upto 970 pounds per sq.ft (psf)
dynamic pressure (at a flight Mach number of 0.88 and an
altitude of 5,000 ft). Only the open and empty forward-bay
testing was completed, and an additional series of flight
tests with forward, intermediate and aft weapons bays
empty or loaded with different store configuration were
planned for the future. Flight control modifications were
checked during "dry" refueling contacts with a USAF/Boeing
KC-135 aerial tanker. The future tests included
investigations of aircraft-handling qualities, weapons
carriage and separation tests and airframe flutter tests.
Weapons drop tests included both conventional and inert
nuclear bombs and SRAMs. The first live firing of an ALCM
was to be performed on B-lB No. 1, the first production
aircraft.
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The fourth B-1A aircraft was devoted to testing of
the B-1B offensive and defensive avionics. The testing was
planned to begin in July 1984, and was scheduled for
completion in mid-1986.
The first B-1B prototype produced was to join the
flight test program in the late 1984, and it was to pursue
similar tests to those performed by the modified B-lAs.
This aircraft would be the first test aircraft with
production engines and fixed geometry inlets.
The B-1B No. 9 production aircraft was to begin
flight testing in May 1986 for three months, performing
similar tests to those of the B-1B No. 1. Deliveries of
aircraft to SAC were planned beginning with the B-1B No.
2.
The flight test program was to evaluate the bomber
against specific operational mission criteria rather than
development-oriented objectives insuring that the
aircraft's ability to perform its intended role should be
determined and established as early as possible (Scott,
1983b).
In early July 1983, flight testing of the modified
B-1A aircraft No. 2 was halted as a result of flight
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control system damage that occurred during a ground test
("Air Force Halts B-1B Testing", 1983). The aircraft's
horizontal stabilizer control mechanism was damaged when a
bellcrank came in contact with a modified fuselage
bulkhead, bending the pushrod. The necessary steps were
taken to secure design modifications. However, extremes
gone to the troubleshooting a pitch control system
instrument, which caused this damage, were not likely to
occur during the flight. At the time of the accident,
about 40% of the planned weapons bay vibration and
acoustic tests and 30% of the flying qualities/flight
control evaluation had been completed. In mid July, the
flight testing of the aircraft No. 2 resumed ("B-1A Flight
Tests", 1983). By the end of July 1983, vibration and
acoustic measurement with multiple open bays had been
completed up to the dynamic pressure of 825 psf. A
complete summary of the B-1B flight testing is provided by
Benefield and Schroder (1983).
In mid August 1983, the Air Force announced the two
possible paint schemes for the B-lB bomber ("Paint
Schemes", 1983). A two tone gray and a single uniform
shade of gray were the prime candidates at that time. SAC
was to have the final say on the color of the low-level
penetrator aircraft. SAC was also considering implementing
special thickness control during painting as a means of
restricting aircraft weight.
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8.3.4.2 The B-1B Manufacturing and Technology
After the CDR for LRCA was completed in January 1983,
the B-1B designs were frozen. Rockwell and its principal
subcontractors prepared assembly operations.
The B-1B forward fuselage assembly operations at
Palmdale, California, were under way and scheduled to be
completed for the initial aircraft at the end of 1983. A
new 256,000 sq.ft tubing and electrical fabrication
building was in operation at Palmdale, while three other
major facilities were under construction. The final
assembly, checkout and support buildings were scheduled
for completion in October 1983 (Smith, 1983).
The 442,000 sq.ft final assembly building would be
used for mating main B-1B structures, while the aircraft
system would receive final testing prior to flight
operations and delivery to the Air Force in a 254,000
sq.ft checkout building. The new buildings were on a
307-acre site at Palmdale Airport and the site was leased
by Rockwell on a longterm basis from the Los Angeles
Department of Airports.
In addition, a 64,000 sq.ft support building, the
rerouting of a rail car unloading facility, a paint
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hanger, flight test and delivery ramp spaces, and engine
runup areas were made ready (Scott, 1983a). The Air Force
constructed additional taxiways and a perimeter road
around the Palmdale Airport runway complex to facilitate
transportation.
These new facilities were to supplement Rockwell's
existing facility at nearby Air Force Plant No. 42, where
the B-1B forward fuselage was being manufactured. The
Columbus, Ohio, facility, responsible for the forward
intermediate fuselage section, engine necelles and the
wing-carry-through structure at the mid-section of the
aircraft, was also under similar production related
activities. So was Rockwell's facility at Tulsa, Oklahoma,
which manufactured parts such as B-1B landing gear doors,
composite flaps, cables, parts of the forward intermediate
fuselage, weapons launchers and pylons. AVCO had begun the
fabrication of the wing base assembly while Vought
Corporation was gearing up to make intermediate and aft
fuselage sections. At the same time, Martin Merietta
initiated work on vertical and horizontal stabilizers.
In all, more then $400 million were spent in capital
investment to support the program, much of that went for
acquiring new facilities and equipment. A total of 22 five
axes milling machines - 15 for operations at Columbus and
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seven for El Segundo - were acquired. Program-wide hiring
also continued in support of these production activities.
The Air Force was keen on securing multiyear
contracting which would save $800 million during the three
years of the B-1B procurement. In Section 8.3.3 we saw the
complex political maneuvering which transpired to secure
that funding. At this point, it is worth mentioning that
the multiyear procurement decision did provide an
assurance to the B-1B contractors. They were convinced of
the serious intent of Congress to buy that aircraft. The
only thing the contractors had to do was solve the
technical problems as they arose, and meet the cost and
schedule goals of the program while doing so. Their
enthusiasm was so great that the decades or more of
political jostling and funding uncertainties, including
the Carter Administration cancellation of 1977, became a
dark history that nobody wanted to think about.
Maj. Gen. William E. Thurman, Deputy for the B-1B at
Aeronautical Systems Division at that time, was
encouraging the involvement of the B-1B program in the Air
Force's technology modernization (techmod) plan (Coleman,
1983). This plan was aimed at applying techmod to broaden
the industrial base. In addition to multiyear financing,
the techmod plan was also expected to bring in savings for
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the B-lB program. The B-1B techmod program was the largest
in the Air Force at that time, costing over $60 million.
The techmod program was set up on a four-phase basis:
first a study, then a business deal as the second phase,
development and validation as the third phase, and
implementation into the program as the fourth phase.
The techmod program at Rockwell involved an Air Force
investment of $47 million. Rockwell invested an additional
$80 million in that program, and this joint investment was
to create an estimated savings of $420-700 million.
General Electric's estimated savings were $15 million. In
August 1983, General Electric, with the consent of the Air
Force, decided to switch from diffusion bonding to
precision forging manufacturing techniques on selected
structural components ("USAF, Contractor Initiate Cost-
Savings Plan", 1983). Their estimate showed that because
of this switchover, the eventual cost of aircraft Nos.
9-100 could be brought down by $489 million. This was an
additional savings thruogh improved manufacturing methods.
Moreover, future Rockwell proposals involved 50-80
projects and savings of $300-500 million on the B-1B.
Citing these estimates, Maj. Gen. Thurman said that the
B-1B techmod program was aimed at saving in neighborhood
of $1 billion over the estimated 30 year life of the 100
aircraft fleet.
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Minicomputer-based test stations, used for off-
aircraft testing of avionics LRUs were also planned. These
facilities were designed to enable Air Force users to
program, edit and debug test station operating software
("B-1B Test Equipment", 1983). A cost saving was also at
the base of this effort. Added to these efforts, B-LB
simulator contracts were initiated. These simulators were
to train the pilots for various missions, weapons use and
other related software reducing in-flight hours ("Two
Design Teams Share $11 Million B-lB Simulator Contacts",
1983).
The B-1B techmod and cost savings program was given a
high visibility. The Air Force was eager to transfer its
experience from the B-1B to many other programs. The
landing gear manufacturing program and the EMUX program
were the prime candidates for across the board diffusion
in the Air Force. As the program grew, more and more
companies joined in this techmod program. Maj. Gen.
Thurman and his team emphasized the cost savings and they
repeatedly reminded all the associated contractors and
their subcontractors of it. The enormous impact of this
savings drive can be imagined by looking at the long list
of major subcontractors. Table 8-II on page 340 provides
that list.
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North American Aircraft Operations
Avco Aerostructures-Wings
Bendix Corp.-Vertical situation indicators
Sperry-Automatic flight control system
Kelsey-Hayes-Rotary launcher drive; flap/slat actuation system
Garrett AiResearch-Weepon bay door drive
Garrett AiResearch-Secondary power subsystem
Goodyear Aerospace-Windows
Goodyear Tire & Rubber-Wheels, brakes and nose wheel assembly
Swedlow-Windshields
Sierrocin-Windshields
Vought-Aft fuselage and aft intermediate fuselage sections
Brunswick--Defensive and forward radomes
Kamen-Engine access doors and rudders/fairings
Martin Marietta-Vertical and horizontal stabilizer and structural
mode control vanes
Aeronca. Inc.-Engine shrouds
Hamilton Standard-Air conditioning and pressurization/air recir-
culation loops
Sundstrand-Constant speed drive and rudder control, wing sweep
subsystem
Harris Corp.-Electrical multiplex
Stainless Steel Products-Engine bleed air duct system
General Electric-Engine instruments, engine thrust control
TRW-Fuel pumps
Westinghouse-Generator and control system
Hughes.Treitler-Heat exchangers
Menesco-Nose l nding gear shock strut
United Aircraft Products reooers
Starer En rinill-S teefr i lng and damping
Cleveland Pneumatic-Main landing gear shock strut
Simmonds Preision instruments-Fuel center of gravity manage-
ment system
Table 8-TI: Major Si
Product:
Sperry Vicker-Emrgency electric power subsystem and primary
hydraulic pump
ISC Telephonics-Central integrated test system
Singer-Kearfott-Multiplex interface module and flight instruments
signal converter
-Heath Tecn--Tail warning radome
Weber Aircraft-jeection seats
B. F. Goodrich-Tires
Collins Radio--Flight director computer
General Electric Aircraft Engine Business Group:
TRW-Turbine and compressor components
Ladish Co.-Forgings and rolled rings
Precision Casting Corp.-Large precision castings
Universal Cyclops--Superaloy powder forging billets
AlL Div. of Eaton Corp.:
Sedco Systems. Inc-Phased array antenna
Northrop Defense Systems Div.-Transmitters
General Electric Aerospace Electronics Systems Dept-RFS corn-
ponents
Flight Systems. Inc.-Thraat signal simulators
Whittaker Corp. Tasker Systems Div.-Digital radio frequency
memory
Litton Industries Electron Tube Div.-Traveling wave tubes
Keltac Florida Div. of Amstar Tech Products Co.. Inc.-High-voltage
power supply
Supports Systems Associates. Inc.-Test package software
Boeing Military Airplane Co-.
Singer-Kearfott-lnertlal navigation system
Teledyne Ryan-DOoppler velocity sensor antann-receiver-trans-
mitter
Honeywell-Radar altimeter and altimeter indicator
Westinghouse-Offensive radar system
IBM-Avionics control units and mass storage device
Sperry Flight Systems-Offensive display sets and video re-
corder
Sanders Associates-Elctronic countermeasures display units
Sundtrand Data Corp.-Oata transfer units
Lbcontractors for the B-lB
ion Work
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The money savings drive of the Air Force was backed
by a tight program control. This included primary program
review meetings every Thursday followed by an overall
program review meeting Friday. The Friday meeting was
attended by Executive Vice President, Samuel F. Iacobellis
of Rockwell's North American Aircraft operations and the
B-lB program managers. Both of these meetings were
regularly attended by Air Force program officials. A
weekly summary report detailing the outcome of the Friday
review meeting and the status of problems was forwarded
every Saturday morning to Maj. Gen. Thurman. Included in
that report was a 90-day summary of schedule trends,
associated contractor milestone status and the schedule
and status of aircraft No. 1. Detailed program costs and
personnel hiring and primary accomplishments were also
included in that report. Every two weeks, Maj. Gen.
Thurman reported to Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger, reviewing the progress and status of the
entire B-lB program, keeping the Administration and
military leadership informed. Every three months, Lt.
Gen. Thomas McMullen, Aeronautical Systems Division
commander, hosted a meeting of the chief executive
officers and program managers from Rockwell, Boeing,
General Electric and Eaton Corporation. The overall B-1B
progress was reviewed and policy questions or
disagreements were worked out at that time. This tight
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program control was executed in order to maintain the
production schedule which is illustrated in Figure 8-4 on
page 343, and it looked as though the entire B-1B
production team was prepared to achieve these goals.
In the rest of this section, I shall briefly
enumerate the manufacturing technologies of the various
components of the B-1B bomber. They include engines,
wings, fuselage, landing gear, rotary launcher and
avionics.
Engine: General Electric's engine manufacturing
technology's goal was to combine existing laser
technology, condition monitoring, and an automated
material transfer system to make production efforts more
efficient. This included: laser drilling of cooling holes
for high pressure turbine blades and vanes; the
elimination of diffusion bonding and unnecessary forgings
for various engine parts; better selection of alloys for
compressor and turbine disks; and instituting the Air
Force's techmod program at a number of plants involved in
the B-1B engine production (Mordoff, 1983).
Wings: The AVCO Aerostructures Division planned to
produce wings for the B-1B bomber at a rate of four ship
sets a month by 1985 (Lowndes, 1983). Manufacturing
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B-1B ACCELERATION CURVE/4 PER MO
Figure 8-4: Production Schedule for the B-1B Bomber
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process modifications introduced by AVCO on the B-1B wing
project included: wing skin milling; wing skin forming;
automated deburring of skins; metal treatment process;
paint shop; assembly shop; final assembly jigs; borescope
gap inspection; portable and perishable tool setups; wing
box fixture; fuel soak testing; attachment of leading and
trailing edges; computer aided forming of hydraulic
tubing; and modifications of existing rail cars for wing
transportation to a final assembly destination.
Aft Intermediate and Aft Fuselage: Vought Corporation
was the leader in installing a flexible manufacturing
center for the production of finished machine parts (see
Section 8.2.4 for details). Production tooling for
manufacturing structural elements and the installation of
plumbing, wiring and related subsystems was incorporated
in their techmod program (Bulban, 1983). The "just-in-
time" delivery of materials was instituted at various
machining subcenters. More than 100,000 fasteners were
needed to build each fuselage section.
Coordinating such a complex manufacturing was a giant
task by itself. The automated manufacturing experience of
Vought Corporation was transferred to other divisions of
Rockwell to improve productivity in manufacturing.
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A vertical stabilizer for the B-1B bomber was made
out of the titanium sine wave skeleton ("Martin Marietta
Delivers First B-1B Vertical Stabilizer", 1983). Matrin
Marietta also had a contract to manufacture structural
mode control vanes which were to be used to provide
stability during high-speed low-altitude flight of the
bomber. The delivery of these vanes was a month and half
ahead of the schedule. Cleveland Pneumatic also completed
B-1B's main landing gear ahead of schedule ("Cleveland
Pneumatic Completes B-1B Main Landing Gear", 1983) and
they too instituted the Air Force's techmod program. A
rotary weapons launcher was manufactured out of graphite
epoxy core by Thiakol. The conventional bomb launcher was
simpler than the one needed for SRAMs because the latter
needed additional cooling equipment ("B-lB Rotary Weapons
Launcher Tested", 1983).
By the end of 1983, the entire B-lB production team
was ready to charge ahead. The program scene of late 1983
provides a classic example of a technology-maturing phase
under favorable circumstances. All parties involved were
eager to see the B-lB fleet get delivered to SAC on time.
At this stage, it is fair to say that firm Presidential
leadership, continued support of the Republican majority
in both the Houses, and enduring efforts of the DOD,
played a decisive role in making the B-1B program enter
its production phase.
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8.4 January 1984 - December 1984
During this year, the program faced virtually no
opposition. On the Congressional side, there were two
developments worth noting. The first was a provision in
the fiscal 1985 Defense Authorization Act which prohibited
diverting funds appropriated for the stealth bomber and
advanced cruise missile to the B-1B bomber. And the second
development was the GAO study which claimed that the Air
Force could save hundreds of millions of dollars in
support costs for the B-lB if the basing and procurement
plans were to be altered. The friends of the B-lB in
Congress praised the bomber program calling it a success.
Except for the funding of the rotary weapon launcher, the
entire FY 1985 appropriation was approved.
On the technology side, both the flight testing of
the modified B-1A and the production of the first B-1B
proceeded at an accelerated pace. In late August, only a
week before the rollout of the first production B-lB
bomber, the fatal crash of the modified B-1A No. 2, took
the life of Rockwell's chief pilot Mr. Doug Benefeild. A
fuel transfer error, while preparing to conduct a
stability and control test, led to this unfortunate
accident. The B-lB production team recovered from this
shock and resumed its activities. Delivery of the first
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B-1B production aircraft was some five months ahead of
schedule. By the end of the year, there were indications
that the defensive avionics system delivery might be
delayed. The demand for numerous RF components pressed the
industry to its full capacity, and it was feared that some
of the early production B-lBs might not have a full
AN/ALQ-161 defensive avionics system.
8.4.1 Action in Congress
In February 1984, Rep. Robert E. Badham (R.-Calif),
Sen. Jake Garn (R.-Utah), and former Sen. Barry Goldwater
(R.-Ariz) praised the B-1B program and labeled it a
success story (United States of America 1984d, 1984c, and
1984b). They quoted an article from the Wall Street
Journal, February 6, 1984, and commended Gen. William
E. Thurman who was the manager of the B-1B program. These
congressmen were quick to point out the success of the
multiyear procurement contract which had, according to
them, already accumulated $550 million in cost savings.
They reported the program to be well ahead of schedule and
said that it was high time that Congress recognize some
well managed and cost effective programs such as the B-1B.
For FY 1985, the USAF sought $7.1 billion to procure
34 B-1B aircraft, $609.7 million for its initial spares
and $508.3 million for an RDT&E effort ("USAF Seeking to
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Continue Force Structure Updates", 1984). At this time
some Air Force officers started a campaign to slow down
the stealth bomber program ("Stealthy B-1", 1984). The
campaign was an effort to extend the production of the
B-lB bomber beyond the initial 100 to a second batch of
100. This new bomber would be called the B-1C. The B-1C
would have a much smaller radar cross section than the
B-lB. Robinson (1984) discusses this B-lB/stealth debate
in further detail. Services' fiscal 1986 program objective
memorandum proposed continued B-lB production at the
expense of the stealth bomber. The Northrop ATB was an
approximately $34 billion program of which approximately
$4 billion had already been invested in the development of
the aircraft. Some USAF officers told Congress that an
additional 100 B-1Cs could be procured for only $10
billion. They suggested that the stealth bomber in that
case should be kept in its developmental stage and
recommended that $325 million be cut from the stealth
bomber project (Towell, 1984c). Such a proposal would have
freed $20 billion to be applied to other programs that had
high USAF priority (see Appendix B for the concept of
opportunity cost). Though the original two-bomber
approach (100 B-lBs and 132 advanced technology stealth
technology bombers) was to foster competition, both within
the companies involved and within the Defense Department,
some opposed the stealth bomber from its very beginning.
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The stealth bomber's size, approximately that of the
Soviet Backfire bomber (see Section 8.3), was a major
objection. B-lB's unfueled range, 6,000 nautical miles,
was 20% higher than the ATB. Moreover, the B-1B could
carry 7.5 times more internal payload than the stealth
bomber. Though these features of the B-1B were attractive,
Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga) was angered by the proposal to keep
the stealth bomber in its developmental stage, and he
vowed to break the multiyear B-lB contract if the B-1C
campaign were to gain any momentum.
As a result, a bill was introduced that required the
Secretary of Defense to notify the two Armed Services
Committees before spending any funds on activities which
related to the procurement of more than 100 B-1B aircraft
(Towell, 1984b). In October 1984, this bill was accepted
by both the House and the Senate, and the fiscal 1985 DOD
Authorization Act limited funding for the B-1B bomber to
the planned 100 aircraft and prohibited diverting funds
appropriated for the stealth bomber (Mann, 1984b). In the
end, the conference committee's approval of the B-lB
program prevailed over the House's desire to trim its
budget. The entire $7.7 billion request was approved. The
conferees approved a small cut of $31.6 million from the
RDT&E budget request of $508.3 million. This money had
been earmarked for a new missile launcher for the B-lBs'
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bomb bay. According to the conferees, this cut was
appropriate because the test of the new launcher was not
scheduled to be completed by mid 1986 (Towell, 1984a).
In late September 1984, the U.S. GAO published a
report (United States Congress, 1984) saying that the USAF
could save hundreds of millions of dollars in support
costs for the B-lB bomber. GAO identified following major
savings opportunities. They were:
(1) Combining the purchase of investment spare parts
(components that can be repaired and reused) with purchase
of production components.
(2) Purchasing spares directly from the manufacturers
instead of through the four major B-lB contractors.
(3) Reducing the number of bases from four to three.
(4) Centralizing all avionics maintenance and repair
at the B-lB airframe and engine depot repair facility and
not establishing any repair shops at the planned B-1B
bases.
Of these, combined purchase of spares and production
component provided the largest estimated savings of
-351-
$400-880 million in FY 1985 and 1986. The DOD concurred
and gladly accepted this proposal for its procurement. DOD
disputed the other findings of the report though (Mann,
1984a). It decided to go ahead with its bomber basing plan
(Robinson, 1984) which called for basing 16 aircraft at
Grand Forks, N.D.; 32 aircraft at Ellsworth AFB, S.D.; 16
aircraft at McConnell AFB, Kan.; and 26 at Dyess AFB, Tex.
The GAO report had also criticized the concurrency
issue (concurrent development and production plans for the
B-1B bomber), saying that the Congressional mandate that
the B-1B should be operational by 1987, had forced the Air
Force to indulge in concurrent development and production
of the aircraft. This hampered the Air Force's logistics
planning effort, the report said. The report cited the
lack of a B-1A logistic database and cautioned that
inadequate logistics planning might force the Air Force to
make decisions resulting in:
(1) Contractor support beyond the two years planned.
(2) Deferral of the Air Force provision of avionics
maintenance support.
(3) Increased support equipment costs.
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(4) Significant changes in the design of test support
equipment.
As we shall see in the next chapter, some of these
fears of the GAO turned out to be well founded, and indeed
the shortage of spares and pilot crew did limit the number
of alert B-1B aircraft.
It is worth noting that as late as October 1984, the
general public was informed that the B-lB program
continued to stay two and a half months ahead of schedule
and under cost its estimate (Former Sen. Goldwater's
speech, United States of America, 1984a). Nobody paid any
attention to GAO's warnings, and as we shall see in the
later portion of the next section, more troubles awaited
the B-lB.
8.4.2 The Details of the B-lB Program
This section discusses the assembly operation of the
first production B-1B aircraft, the continued flight test
program, the crash of the B-1A prototype No. 2, the
rollout of the first production B-lB, emerging technical
details of the bomber, and the program status as of
December 1984.
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8.4.2.1 Assembly of the First Production B-1B
By late May 1984, Rockwell completed the assembly of
the first production B-lB ("Rockwell Completes Assembly of
First Production B-lB", 1984). The assembly started with
the mating of the fuselage. Fuselage mate began with the
attachment of the aft intermediate and forward
intermediate sections to the wing-carry-through structure,
to which the B-1B's swing wings were attached. The forward
fuselage and the aft fuselage were then mated to the
intermediate structures. Wings were attached during the
final mate and the four General Electric F101-GE-102
augmented turbofan engines were mounted during the final
installation. Figure 8-5 on page 354 illustrates the
assembly sequence. Smith (1984d) provides further details
of the final assembly procedures. The aircraft was then
transported from the assembly building to the nearby
checkout facility which could house four aircraft
simultaneously. Electrical power was applied to the
aircraft and primary aircraft system testing was
initiated. Tests of the aircraft's electrical hydraulic,
cooling, avionics, pneumatic and fuel systems were
conducted. About three-fourths of the tests were automated
and the facility could conduct 10 separate tests on an
aircraft at a time ("Initial B-1B in Automated Test
Facility", 1984). Both the offensive and defensive ship
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sets were fitted in the B-1B (Elson, 1984; Klass, 1984).
The B-1B's cockpit was fitted with nuclear flash shields
(see Chapter 4 for details) and preparations were made for
the first production rollout in September 1984. This
rollout date was about one month earlier than the one
previously scheduled.
Information on B-1B's cruise missile carrying
configuration was released at this time. Figure 8-6 on
page 356 illustrates the configuration for carrying 14
cruise missiles externally on fuselage pylons. Eight
additional ALCMs would be carried internally on a rotary
launcher.
8.4.2.2 Flight Testing
In mid-July 1984, the modified B-1A No.2 was painted
a variation of European One paint scheme which consisted
of a gray overall camouflage finish. The B-1A prototype
No. 4 with extensive modifications and B-1B offensive and
defensive avionics, and the first production B-1B unit
were to join the flight test program beginning October
1984. Long duration avionics testing was limited to these
two aircraft. The B-1A prototype No. 2 was schedule to
complete its flight testing in September 1984, and was to
enter a modification program which would enable the
aircraft to launch ALCMs. In August 1984, this aircraft
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Figure 8-6: Cruise Missiles Configuration on
the B-lB Bomber
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completed a successful low-level high-speed separation
test for B83 gravity nuclear weapon shape. The purpose of
the separation test was to evaluate the aerodynamic
effects of the aircraft on a weapon following its release
and hence any effect the aircraft might have on the
trajectory of the weapon. A brief discussion of the flight
tests is provided in "B-lB Test Pace Quickens; Second B-1A
Joints Effort" (1984), and in "B-1A Drops B83" (1984). The
production of the rest of the B-lBs continued on schedule
against the backdrop of these events.
8.4.2.3 The CRASH, The First B-1B Rollout and Continued
Flight Testing
August 29, 1984, was perhaps the gloomiest day in the
history of the B-1B program. On that day, at 10:30 A.M.
Pacific daylight time, the B-1B prototype No. 2 crashed
near Edwards AFB (Smith, 1984c), killing Doug Benefield,
the chief test pilot of Rockwell. When the crash occurred,
the aircraft was preparing for an asymmetric thrust test
which was a part of a series of low-altitude control and
stability tests. The asymmetric thrust test called for
reducing the power setting of an outboard engine to idle
and placing swing wings in full forward position with
flaps and slats extended. This test was preceded by a test
during which the wings were swept back to 55 degrees, the
aircraft CG control was set to manual, the CG of the
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aircraft was set to 45% mean aerodynamic chord and the
flaps, slats and the landing gear were fully retracted.
While the crew was preparing to conduct the asymmetric
thrust test, the CG had to be set at 21% of the mean
aerodynamic chord, but because of crew error, the manual
CG selector in the cockpit remained at 45% setting, the
position of the previous test. CG was 25% beyond its aft
limit and 31% of where it would be if the fuel system had
been in its automatic mode. This error made the aircraft
pitch up to a 70 degree angle and eventually the B-1 began
a slicing rotating motion. The crew tried to recover the
aircraft but all efforts were in vain and finally they
ejected the crew capsule. However, the explosive bolt on
the left, rear corner of the capsule failed to function
properly. This resulted in the capsule continuing its
descent in a nose-down attitude. The right front of the
module struck the ground first taking the life of Doug
Benefield and severely injuring other crew members (Smith,
1984b).
Speaking of Mr. Benefield's special contribution to
the B-1B program, USAF Gen. Lawrence A. Skantze, Commander
of Air Force Systems Command, had this to say during the
rollout ceremony of the first production B-1B on September
4, 1984: " We have been able to accomplish this because we
had a guy named Doug Benefield. Doug convinced himself we
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had a superb airplane, and then convinced the rest of.
us... Doug, wherever you are, we are going to finish the
program and do it damn well!" Canan (1984) covers this
ceremony at length.
The B-lB production aircraft made a successful flight
on October 18 at Palmdale, California ("Production B-1B
Makes First Flight", 1984). Two of the four engines
sustained foreign object damage during the initial flight.
The damage appeared to be minor and did not pose a safety
hazard to the mission ("B-1B Sustains Engine Damage on
First Flight", 1984). The first production B-1B joined the
No. 4 B-1A prototype aircraft at Edwards AFB for the B-1B
flight test program in early November 1984 ("First B-1B
Joins Flight Test Program", 1984). The flight testing of
the first B-1B was to be resumed in late January 1985.
8.4.2.4 B-1B Weapon System
By November 1984, additional information on the
effectiveness and flexibility of the B-1B was released.
Gulcher (1984) provides a detailed description. He applied
aircraft system design criteria called "Preplanned Product
Improvement", or P3I, to the B-1B weapons system. Using
this criteria, he showed that the built-in design and
operational flexibilities in the B-lB made it the most
versatile bomber ever designed over a long service life.
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He provided details of the various missions of the B-lB,
general characteristics of its airframe, range and payload
capability, and offensive and defensive avionics. Using
all these, he prepared a list of tasks which the B-1B
could perform if called upon to do so. He said that the
B-1B's onboard systems were designed to facilitate
modification without substantial hardware change and added
that a well-developed cost system was in place to evaluate
potential changes and perform cost and effectiveness
trades. In his opinion, the B-1B combined high
effectiveness in its immediate roles and missions with a
good P3I program, and substantial capacity for expansion
and improvement in response to evolving circumstances.
Keuren (1984) suggested another way to appreciate the
improvements the B-1B brought to the bomber leg of the
triad. He discussed a damage expectancy equation which
provided an estimate of a weapon system's chance of
success in inflicting damage on the enemy. The equation:
Damage expectancy equaled prelaunched survivability times
weapon system reliability times probability to penetrate
times probability of damage. Since all these are
probabilities, 1.0 is the perfect score. For example, a
rating of 0.9 in each area - normally considered excellent
- would result in a damage expectancy of 0.66. He
estimated each of these probabilities for the B-lB, B-52
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and FB-111 bomber and calculated the damage expectancy
equation for each of them. Actual numbers are secret, but
according to him, the B-1B exceeded the capabilities of
the B-52 and FB-111 it had replaced and gave an all-round
superior performance. He further concluded that the B-1B's
ability to play many roles guaranteed that it would be far
more than an interim bomber. The B-1B according to his
calculations, would remain a major part of the strategic
force well into the next century.
However, Bezdek (1984) in his article questioned the
effectiveness of the B-lB bomber. Its life cycle cost
consideration, likely to be in excess of $100 billion
(believed to be in then-year dollars), was his prime
objection. He did not compare the life cycle costs of the
other equivalent systems but feared that the B-1B might
postpone or crowd out other vitally needed U.S. defensive
weapon system.
8.4.2.5 Program status
In December 1984, Maj. Gen. Thurman, Air Force B-1B
program manager, announced that the AIL Division of Eaton
Corporation was facing some difficulties in securing
certain electronic subassemblies for defensive avionics.
This was partly a result of the shortage of companies
capable of supplying the components, and partly because of
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competition for the available capacity from other Defense
Department programs. Industrial capacity was stretched
because of these demands which resulted in AIL's falling
behind its schedule for the delivery of LRUs. At question
was the timely delivery of RF components used in these
LRUs. Maj. Gen. Thurman said that," because of this, some
early production B-lBs temporarily might not have full
AN/ALQ-161 defensive avionics system". The overall
defensive avionics system included more than 100 LRUs.
Fewer than 15 of the LRUs would be temporarily missing
from the first two to seven aircraft delivered to SAC,
depending upon the capability of industry to recover from
the shortfall. This development, he said, would not impact
SAC's training program (Smith, 1984a). But in the minds of
the critics, this shortfall raised serious doubts about
its probable impact on bomber's IOC and alertness.
However, neither of these questions were discussed during
this shortfall announcement, probably because it was too
early in the program to say anything about them.
Damage investigation of the engine focused on the use
of questionable titanium material in the manufacturing of
two compressor forward shafts. Proper steps were taken to
replace suspected shafts.
By the end of year, more multiyear contracts were
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signed (the engine contract in particular) which were
expected to save a large sum to the B-1B program.
Thus, by the end of 1984, the B-1B production line
started delivering the aircraft on schedule. The fatal
crash of the B-1A prototype No. 2 did not significantly
affect the program except for the flight testing. With
only some doubts on the availability of full AN/ALQ-161
defensive avionics system at the IOC date, the B-1B
entered 1985. The reelection of Mr. Ronald Reagan for a
second term assured continued support for the program, and
the critics of the B-1B abandoned hope of winning any
fight against it.
8.5 January 1985 - December 1985
This year was crucial because Congress had its last
opportunity to put money in FY 1986 budget for extending
the production of the B-1B bomber. Throughout the year,
the B-lB/stealth debate continued, and in the end, the
proponents of the stealth bomber were successful in
preventing any funds from getting transferred to the B-1B
account. Some congressmen were anxious to reduce the B-1B
funding allocation on the basis of the savings already
realized in the program, but they were not successful. As
we shall see, eventually, they turned out to be right.
Congress was also informed of the impact of the arms
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control agreement on the ALCM carrying capacity of the
B-1B. The limitations dictated by the Treaty might have
influenced the design, performance and the testing of the
B-1B and the cruise missile it was suppose to carry.
As for the technology part of the program, the second
B-1B rollout and the B-1B's delivery to SAC were the most
significant events. More information on the B-lB defensive
avionics, aircraft modifications, performance, basing and
crew selection was made public. This section will conclude
with some derogatory tales about the B-1B performance
which were circulating in Washington at that time.
8.5.1 Congressional Action
For FY 1986, the DOD requested $5.4 billion for
multiyear procurement of the final production lot of 48
aircraft, $162.2 million for initial spares, $367.4
million for RDT&E and $211 million for military
construction at the bases designated to host the B-1B
bomber ("USAF Stresses Forces Update, Gains in Airlift,
Readiness", 1985). By the end of February, the Senate
Armed Services Committee's chairman, Barry Goldwater
(R.-Ariz), completed a study of weapons budgeting options
(Mann, 1985b). He declared his intention to limit the
purchase of B-lB's to 100 aircraft. He was also anxious to
see the advance technology stealth bomber join SAC by
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1988. By saying this, he tried to stop the rumors about
extending the B-1B production. In spite of this, some Air
Force officials did launch a campaign in Congress to build
support for continued production of the B-1B and they
sought funds for long-lead items for these additional
aircraft. They claimed that additional production of the
B-1B at a rate of two a month, would keep the competition
for the ATB alive. This campaign, however, did not get any
support from the Secretary of Defense, or from the
President, or from the Secretary of Air force, or from
other senior Air Force commanders (Kozicharow, 1985), and
it slowly fizzled away.
Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga) expressed his vehement
opposition to continued B-1B production and he said that
the continuation of the B-1B would be," a tragedy over a
15-20 years period for our defenses because the stealth
will require the Soviets to revamp an awful lot of their
air defenses". He favored the stealth bomber and expressed
his full support for that program (Mann, 1985a). On April
15, in one of the daily debates in the House of
Representatives, former Rep. James R. Jones (Oklahoma),
cited an editorial essay from the March 25, 1985 issue of
the AWST magazine in his support for the continued
production of the B-1B (United States of America, 1985b).
Rep. Jones objected to committing $40 billion to an
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untested plane such as the stealth bomber. As quoted by
the editorial, the major arguments for preserving the B-1B
production included:
(1) Existence of an on-going B-1 program would
provide an incentive for the ATB to hold down its cost.
(2) Buying more than 100 B-lB (up to originally
recommended 240 of them) would provide cost advantages
obtained from economy of scale of production.
(3) The ATB's flying wing configuration could
encounter technical unknowns as did the earlier flying
wing project (Northrop's YB-49 program that ended in
1951). Stability and control problems were of major
concern (Rabb, 1986).
The editorial article also criticized the secrecy
surrounding the ATB which might not make it possible to
make an informed judgment about the program. In the end,
the Defense Secretary's opinion prevailed and the debate
on continued B-lB production was curtailed. Defense
Secretary Weinberger was adamant about capping the B-1B
program at 100 aircraft and was anxious to see the ATB
coming on as planned earlier in 1981.
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In November 1985, the Senate Appropriations Committee
approved a $200 million reduction of the funds requested
for the last 48 of 100 planned B-lB aircraft. The House
cut a total of $600 million from the prior year's funds,
which it said had proven superfluous. The Senate Panel
agreed that such savings might be realized once the last
plane was completed, but it argued that it was premature
to assume that so much could be cut from the program when
only the first three of 100 aircraft had been delivered
(Towell, 1985). Eventually, during the enactment of FY
1986 budget, the B-1B program suffered a reduction of over
$700 million. The FY 1986 cost performance report on the
B-1B ststed that $4.9 billion was actually spent on
procurement, while RDT&E effort used $265 million.
According to the Air Force, this led to a reduction in the
funding of the program of $1 billion below the certified
cost ceiling of $20.5 billion (FY 1981 dollars). These
reductions were considered premature and risky by the Air
Force, could result in a future request for supplemental
funds (United States Congress, 1986c).
In April 1985, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2576, as
amended, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency submitted
FY 1986 arms control impact statements (ACIS) to Congress
(United States Congress, 1985). The ACIS were intended to
serve Congress as a tool to evaluate weapons systems which
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might have a significant impact on arms control policy or
negotiations. The B-1B program was one of the major
programs analyzed for its arms control implications in the
FY 1986.
While discussing the impact of airborne strategic
offensive systems, the ACIS said that according to the
Second Agreed Statement to Article IV.14 of SALT II, no
bomber of the B-52 or B-1 type and no bomber of TV-95 or
Myasischev types would be equipped for more than 20 cruise
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
At that time, the B-1B was designed to carry a total of 22
ALCMs (Boeing AGM-86B ACLMs, 8 internally and 12-14
externally) capable of a range of approximately 2,500
kilometers. The ACIS implied that such a capability of the
B-1B might be in violation of the SALT II Treaty which was
signed in June 1979 by President Carter, but it had not
been ratified by Congress. The Reagan Administration
believed that the Treaty was flawed and that it was not a
sound foundation for strategic arms control. Hence, in
developing the ALCM capability of the B-1B bomber, they
decided to ignore the Treaty completely. However, there
was a small probability that the Treaty might get ratified
by a future Administration during the life of the B-1B
bomber (some 30 years). In that circumstance, to
discourage the criticism of the controversial cruise
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missile carrying capability of the B-1B while keeping the
bomber alive as a viable weapons system, emphasizing the
penetrating capability of the bomber was considered
crucial. At that time the ALCM carrying capability of the
B-lB could be dropped if it became a pivotal threat to the
passage of the Treaty, and its penetrating capability
could be relied upon for strategic defense.
It is this author's contention that this was one of
the rationales of the Reagan Administration during 1981
when they resurrected the bomber. They decided to
emphasize its penetrating capability by developing
defensive avionics technology. The multi-role capability
of the B-1B just suited this strategy (see Chapters 6 and
7). At this point, students of technology and policy can
easily identify the vital linkage between the Treaty
politics and the development of defensive avionics
technology for the B-lB bomber. Thus it looks as though,
over and above satisfying technical performance criteria,
the multi-role capability of the B-1B provided additional
flexibility to arms control strategists.
The Heritage Foundation, in its article titled "Build
More B-is" (1985), cited Soviet deployment of SS-25 ICBMs
as a violation of the SALT II Treaty. In their opinion, a
US decision to build 25-50 more B-lBs bombers could be a
-370-
direct and meaningful response. Closing down the assembly
line of one of America's best strategic bombers, in their
mind, was not the correct way to convey a strong sense of
US' commitment to maintain an effective deterrent. In the
wake of DOD's firm decision not to continue with B-lBs
beyond 100 of them, the Foundation's opinion did not
attract much national attention.
8.5.2 The B-1B Technology
As a result of the crash of the B-1A on August 29,
1985, the Air Force decided to relocate the CG warning
light. The Air Force was to change its color from yellow
to red and place it at two separate positions in front of
each of the pilot. It was to be so designed that the pilot
could not extinguish it while the CG was outside the
limits. A new system was to be instituted to restrict
swing wings. This system would not permit crew members to
sweep the aircraft's wings from full aft position without
pausing to check the aircraft system. The pause was to be
at 25 degree sweep - a position at which the aircraft was
least affected by CG ("USAF will Modify B-1B Warning
Indicators", 1985).
The B-1B's final checkout and flight test areas were
completed at Air Force plant 42 sites 1 and 3 to meet
requirements as the production of the multirole bomber
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continued. These facilities were ready by April 1985
("B-1B Checkout, Test Facility Near Completion", 1985).
Aircraft leaving the final assembly building would be
towed to an automated test facility at site 1. Functional
checks on the aircraft's avionics, electrical, fuel,
hydraulic and pneumatic system would be performed there.
Morley (1985) discusses complete ground testing and
procedures for the B-1B bomber in detail. This checkout
facility could accommodate four aircraft simultaneously.
Following the systems check, the aircraft would be towed
to site 3 for painting, fueling and engine runs. Full
production of four aircraft per month was scheduled for
September 1986 with the 27th B-1B. The AN/ALQ-161 hardware
shortage was expected to continue through the year.
In the first week of May 1985, the second production
B-1B was turned over to the Air Force Flight Test Center
("B-1B Delivery", 1985). The aircraft was painted with new
high visibility white pattern markings around the
in-flight fuel receptacle and around the structural mode
control system ("Special marking Facilitate In-Flight
Refueling of B-lB", 1985). These markings were painted to
facilitate the task of fuel boom operators and the pattern
was selected to help them judge depth when positioning the
refueling boom towards the B-1B.
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The B-1B No. 2 was delivered to SAC headquarters at
Offutt AFB, Neb., on June 27, 1985. Ingestion of loose
bolts from two flapper door assemblies mounted ahead of
the engines in the inlet, caused foreign object damage to
two of its engines just prior to landing at the Offutt
AFB. These doors allowed inlet air to be drawn off in
flight and passed through heat exchangers to precool
avionics and cockpit air. The cause of the damage was
discovered and repairs were made. This aircraft, however,
did not make the ceremonies to SAC at Dyess AFB, Tex., on
June 29, 1985, and the No. 1 B-1B was flown to take its
the place ("B-1B Engine Damage During Flight, Ground Run
at Offutt", 1985). In November 1985, the B-1B No. 1
completed structural tests and was scheduled to rejoin the
flight test program in early December 1985 ("No. 1 B-1B
Comrpletes Structural Tests", 1985). It is worth noting
that by this time, fiber filament wound weapons launch
tubes for the B-1B's rotary launcher were getting ready at
Thiakol Inc.'s Wasatch Division in Bringham City, Utah
("Filament Winding Produces Tubes for B-1B Rotary Weapon
Launcher", 1985). This tube weighed 400 lb less than its
steel tube equivalent, and was painted white to match the
color scheme of the bomb bay. The total production order
of 200 tubes was placed with Thiakol Inc.
In June 1985, the Air Force Systems Division
-373-
published a background paper the on B-1B (United States of
America, 1985a). This paper provided detailed information
on requirements, prime contractors, program status,
production data, general characteristics and description
of the B-1B, its comparison with other bombers, crew
selection criteria, aircraft delivery schedule and basing.
Of these, performance comparisons of the B-lB with the
B-52G/H, FB-111A and B-1A are presented in Table 8-III on
page 374. The paper reported the starting of the fuselage
mating task on the B-1B No. 9 by that time. Table 8-IV on
page 375 illustrates aircraft delivery schedule, basing
and description of aircraft by lot.
McClelland (1985) discusses details of the B-1B
avionics which were declassified at that time. In
particular, additional information on navigation, multi-
role radar, terrain-following and terrain-avoidance radar,
and defensive and offensive avionics was made public.
Figure 8-7 on page 376 illustrates the AN/ALQ-161
defensive avionics system configuration which was
declassified then. A brief update of the simulated
maintenance training system was also presented by
McClelland. Taint (1985) discusses the B-1B weapon system
trainer wherein visual simulation, motion, and a fully
operational crew station were successfully simulated. This
trainer also incorporated a simulated electronic warfare
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B-52G/H
Dimensions
Length
Width
Wing Swee.
159.0
185.0
35'
FB-lllA
75.54
34.0/70.0
72.5'/16'
B-1A
151
78/137
67.5'/15'
Takeoff wt 488,000 lbs 109,800 lbs 395,000 lbs
(Max)
Payload (Max) 35,400 lbs* 9,000 lbs 75,000 bs
* Approximately 60,000 bs, when configured with ALCLM
Crew 6 2 4
Fuel (Max) 312,000 lbs
** 196,000 lbs internal plus
carrying three weapon bay
Powerplant J-57/TF-33(8)
Thnrust (Lbs) 13,000/17,000
48,300 lbs 216,000 lbs** 216,000 lbs**
one 19,500 lb weapon bay tank - capable of
tanks for naximum ferry range (254,000 bs)
PW-TF30(2)
20,350
F101-GE-100(4)
29,850
F101-GE-102(4)
30,750
high subsonic
subsonic
supersonic
high subsonic
supersonic
high subsonic
supersonic
high subsonic
Table 8-III: Performance Comparison of Various Bombers
B-lB
147
78/137
67.5'/15'
477,000 lbs
125,000 lbs
4
Speeds
High Alt:
Low Alt:
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AIRCRAFT DELIVERY SCHEDULE
PDD* CDD**
84 DEC 31 85 MAR 15
85 JUN 29 85 AUG 31
86 fiB 28 86 APR 30
(2/month)
AljC
86 L 31 86 SEP 30
(3/month)
86 Sip 30
(4/month)
88 APR 30 88 APR 30
* PLANNED ELIVERY DATE
** CONTPACTUAL DELIVERY DATE
PAA
26.
32
16
16
90
SERIAL 
82-0001
83-0065
70
84-0057
85-0065
TAIL DESTINATION
20001 EDWARDS
30065 DYESS
70 DYESS
40057 DYESS
50065 DYESS
MCCONNELL
B-1 BASING
BAI 1ST AIRCRAFT
3 29 JU 85
3 35- R 86
1 /7 AUG 87
1 /7 n
8 = 98 PLUS 2 AT EDWARDS = 100
IOC
SEP 86
N/A
N/A
N/A
Dyess 96 Bomb Wing
Ellsworth 28 Bomb Wing
Grand Forks 319 Bomb Wing
McConnell 384 Bomb Wing
A/C BY LOT
A/C 1 LOT I
A/C 12-8 . LOT II
A/C 9-19 LOT III
A/C 20-54 LOT IV
A/C 55-100 LOT V
Table 8-IV: The B-lBs Delivery Schedule, Basing and
Aircraft Number by Lot
ACFT
1
2
7
17
23
100
DYESS
ELLSWORTH
GRAND FORKS
MCCONNELL
TOTAL
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Figure 8-7: The Defensive 
Avionics System Configuration
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environment. At the same time, Croft (1985) published his
work on a real time B-lB executive computer for the
control of a multicomputer simulation complex. Croft's
study included a simulation complex of four Harris 800
computers connected by a shared memory. These computers
communicated with six operational ACUs via multiple
MIL-STD-1555B buses. The simulation computers contained
software model of vehicle system simulation, weapon system
simulation, defensive system simulation, and radar data
simulation. The executive computer provided an interface
between these simulation computers. In the absence of a
commercially available or previously developed executive
computer, the success of such a simulation provided
valuable input to the B-1B avionics system.
I shall conclude this
of derogatory tales about
in Washington by mid 1985.
such rumors were adversely
opinion, they were bound to
As we shall see in the
thinking so.
section with a brief discussion
the B-1B which were circulating
Ulsamer (1985) feared that
affecting the B-lB, and in his
spill over into public debate.
next chapter, he was right in
According to Ulsamer, some allegations centered on a
misunderstanding of the performance requirements and
specifications of the B-1B. The critics alleged that the
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B-1B would not be able to operate in the 40,000-50,000 ft
range at top speed of about 2.2 Mach number. Ulsamer
reminded them of the history of performance changes which
were incorporated in to the B-lB, beginning in the early
70s (see earlier chapters and Appendix A for details). He
added that the aircraft performance as of 1981, was
optimized for low altitude, high subsonic speed
operations, and its cruise performance (at an altitude of
around 18,000 ft) was maximized for range and not for top
speed. However, with a lesser takeoff weight than the
maximum, he quoted the top speed of the B-lB to be around
1.2 Mach number.
The second item of adverse publicity concerning the
B-1B hinged on the critics' claim that the aircraft would
not meet critical gross takeoff weight and related takeoff
and climb-out specifications. There were fears that the
aircraft would not be tested adequately before the first
B-1B was turned over to SAC or even before IOC date in the
fall of 1986. Ulsamer explained that because of the Air
Force's near term concern to meet the cost and schedule
goals of the program, tests were likely to be delayed and
there was nothing unusual about that. He then attempted to
quiet the critics by providing the details of the
technologies under development which were to enhance the
flight envelop of the aircraft in terms of maximum
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altitude and gross weight. According to him, controlling
the schedule of the performance boost, was the validation
for the modification of the B-1B's Stability and Control
Augmentation System (SCAS). This was the first public
disclosure of such a system.
The baseline SCAS configuration incorporated a device
known as a stall warning stick shaker that would be
activated automatically when the aircraft was operated at
80% of the angle of attack (AOA) limit. The AOA limit is
the point at which the aircraft exhibited neutral
longitudinal stability. It is this 80% limit which imposed
operational constraints of altitude, gross weight and G
(acceleration due to earth's gravitional force) loading.
Ulsamer said that the AOA testing under the original B-1A
program was cut off when President Carter canceled the
program in mid 1977. When the flight test program of the
B-1B got under way in 1983, the Air Force added a Stall
Inhibitor System (SIS). This SIS was a modification of the
SCAS. The SIS permitted safe maneuvering up to the limit
AOA through a graduated increase in the stick force
required to command additional AOA as that limit was
approached. According to him, this system would provide
more usable AOA range and safer operation than the
previous system which curtailed operation at the 80%
limit. The B-1B No. 1 was to start testing this new SIS by
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the end of summer 1985. The validation of the SIS was
planned by March 1986, in time to meet delivery of the
ninth B-1B. Those aircraft which were delivered earlier
were to be retrofitted with the SIS.
Ulsamer also discussed another element in the B-lB's
envelop expansion effort which involved a system called
Stability Enhancement Function (SEF). SEF would further
modify the SCAS (and hence the SIS) to provide more usable
AOA with artificial stability beyond the point of neutral
stability. He said that once the SEF was installed and
validated, the B-lB's performance was sure to please the
critics. The flight-testing of the SEF was to begin on the
ninth aircraft in the summer of 1986 and validation was to
be completed by March 1987, in time to meet the delivery
of the 47th production aircraft. The SEF would be
installed on production aircraft numbers 19th through
46th, but would be kept deactivated until validation was
complete. Aircraft delivered earlier would be retrofitted
with the proven SEF. With this system in operation, he
said, the B-1B would be able to perform 2.4 G pullups
(climb performance parameter) at high gross weight while
in a terrain-following mode.
These assurances of envelop enhancement certainly
kept the critics quiet for a while; but their criticism
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surfaced again on the same subject in 1987, and it caused
embarrassment to the admirers of the B-1B. Details of
these developments will be discussed in the next chapter.
I shall conclude this chapter with the history of the B-1B
bomber in the year 1986.
8.6 January 1986 - December 1986
Though Rockwell International and a few members of
Congress proposed continuing production of the B-1B
bomber, no procurement funds were requested for the FY
1987 budget. During the year, Congressional inquiries
centered around the IOC date for the ATB, a retirement
plan for B-52s and the possibility of keeping the B-1B
production line hot. The results of these inquiries led
the House to propose an option that would have added $200
million to the budget to protect the possibility of buying
B-1B bombers beyond the 100 funded through FY 1986. The
Conferees dropped that initiative but they fully approved
the Administration's $118.7 million request for FY 1987
RDT&E.
The B-1B production and flight testing activities
continued throughout the year. The production rate of four
aircraft per month was achieved by April 1986. Additional
information on ATB/B-1B comparison, the B-lB Central
Integrated Test Expert Parameter System (CEPS), B-lBs'
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service readiness and crew training was made public. On
October 1, 1986, the B-1B reached IOC with 15 of the
bombers at Dyess AFB, Tex. One of the bombers was placed
on alert status with 16 qualified crews available. At the
same time, some major troubles were brewing for the B-1B.
These troubles were associated with :
(1) Fuel seepage from integral fuselage and wing
tanks.
(2) Defensive counter measures and terrain-following
system.
Publicity associated with the second problem brought
the B-1B once again in to the limelight. There were fears
that development problems associated with its defensive
avionics might delay the bomber's ability to fully carry
out its operational combat role for one or two more years.
The B-1B entered 1987 with this background, and throughout
the year, it was the focus of many public debate and
Congressional scrutinies. These developments are discussed
in the next chapter. Here, I shall present a brief
description of the history of the B-1B during 1986.
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8.6.1 Congressional Debates
Congress appropriated funds for FY 1986 for the last
48 of the planned fleet of 100 B-lBs, but no funds were
requested for the procurement of additional bombers in FY
1987. In spite of this, there was some Congressional
interest in buying additional B-lBs because they would be
cheap comparatively and could be produced quickly.
Moreover, the stealth bomber's first test flight was
planned in 1987, and the interest in the continued
production of the B-1B as a hedge against any technical
delays, price hikes, and schedule delays, was
understandable.
During the Hearings (United States Congress, 1986c),
appropriations committee members raised several questions
regarding the B-lB program. They inquired about the
B-lB's engineering change order (ECO) account, long lead
funding, production line closure, and B-1B retrofit
modifications. The committee was also curious about the
B-1B's use in the Navy, and its use as the Presidential
aircraft. Additional questions on the ATB's IOC date and
B-52s' retirement plan were raised. All these inquiries
seemed to have been motivated by the desire to find any
good reason to keep the B-1B production line hot.
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The Hearings revealed that the ECO account for the
B-lB as a percentage of the B-1B airframe steadily dropped
from 6.1% in 1984 to 1.7% in 1985. It was expected to be
around 2.4% in 1986. The Secretary of the Air Force,
Russell A. Rourke, informed the Committee that such
percentages were meaningful only when calculated using the
flyaway cost of the aircraft rather than the airframe
cost. The flyaway cost included all of the avionics costs.
He said that for the B-lB, the avionics cost was about 21%
of the total flyaway cost, and the ECO account as a
percentage of the flyaway cost was even lower. These low
percentage numbers for ECO accounts were common through
the Air Force's other projects, he said. He assured the
Committee that the Air Force was doing all it could to
keep these ECO costs under control.
During the Hearing, Rep. Bob Livingston (R.-Lou)
questioned Secretary Rourke about the IOC date for the ATB
and inquired about the average age and composition of the
USAF bomber force. The Secretary informed him that the ATB
IOC date was scheduled for the early 1990s. The
information on the composition of the bomber force
highlighted the average age of the B-52 of at almost 30
years. The Bomber Force Study, which might have answered
the committee members' question on the retirement plan for
the B-52s was delayed, and its release was expected in
early April 1986, the Secretary said.
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Rep. Clarence E. Miller (R.-Ohio) requested
information on the Air Force's estimate about the cost for
long lead funding to keep the production line from closing
down. After declaring a firm intent on the part of the
Administration for the procurement of 100 B-lBs, Secretary
Rourke reluctantly provided that information for the sake
of the record. He was reluctant because he did not want
to mislead people by indicating that the Administration
had a tendency to favor the 101st B-!B, and he thought
that public disclosure of the long lead cost estimate
would have that effect. According to the Air Force, lead
time for major B-1B subassemblies approached 3 years (e.g.
tail spindle forging for the aftfuselage assembly). An
intermediate decision to preserve the production option
could result in the delivery of the 101st B-1B in the
spring of 1989. This constituted a one year gap in
production. The delivery of the 100th B-1B was planned for
April 1988. Any delay in funding this appropriation would
adversely affect this schedule, he said. The Air Force
estimated that a $225 million investment in FY 1987 would
allow the B-1B contractors to cover the termination
liabilities of critical long lead material suppliers.
Moreover, this estimate assumed a normal follow-on buy of
24 B-1B aircraft. According to the Air Force, to further
protect that production option, an additional investment
of $1 billion would be needed in 1988. The Secretary
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informed the committee members that $225 million could be
considered an essential "insurance". He also hinted at the
additional associated expense of spares, etc., for these
24 aircraft, but did not elaborate on this.
In the Senate Armed Services Committee's Fy 1987
Defense Authorization Bill debate, Sen. John Glenn
(D.-Ohio), urged his colleagues to add to the bill $200
million to preserve the option of buying additional B-lBs
if the stealth bomber become too -expensive or experienced
technical problems. However, the Committee rejected Sen.
Glenn's proposal (Towell, 1986d). Sen. Glenn took his
fight to the Senate floor but his amendment, which would
have held open the possibility of building more B-1B
components, got tabled by a narrow vote (Towell, 1986b).
The House Armed Services Panel approved $200 million to
continue buying components of the B-1B bomber (Towell,
1986c). Of this $200 million, $100 million was approved to
keep the B-1B production line open, and the other $100
million was for a "strategic bomber contingency fund" for
the use of the Secretary of Defense (United States
Congress, 1986a; "Rockwell Raises B-1B Target Cost By $100
Million", 1986). In the end, though, the conferees dropped
$200 million that the House added to keep the production
line for components of the B-1B alive (Towell, 1986a). The
House Armed Services Committee approved $50 million for
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RDT&E, a reduction of $68.7 million from the
Administration's $118.7 million request. The Senate Armed
Services Committee fully approved the Administration's
request and so did the conferees, and so did both the
Houses in the end (United States Congress, 1986a).
Two B-1B related reports were published in October
1986. The first one was the GAO study titled Strategic
Bombers: Early Retirement of B-52G Bombers (United States
Congress, 1986b). The GAO made this study at the request
of Rep. John Kasich (R.-Ohio). In late February 1986, Rep.
Kaisch asked the GAO to identify the estimated savings in
budget authority which would occur if all B-52G bombers
were retired and all the SAC's FB-111 bombers were
transferred to the Tactical Air Command (TAC). He also
asked the GAO to determine the number of B-1B bombers that
could be acquired from cost savings obtained through such
early retirement. The GAO analyzed the following options
for retiring B-52s:
(1) All 167 B-52G bombers in 1987.
(2) All 167 B-52G bombers in 1989.
(3) 98 B-52G/ALCM bombers over the period 1989-1993.
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(4) 69 B-52G/Conventional bombers in 1989.
Option one was not feasible for logistical reasons
associated with nuclear war plans. However, options two,
three and four were estimated to provide a savings of $6.4
billion, $1.8 billion and $3.4 billion respectively. These
savings were to be realized through 1996. Because of these
retirements, the special dedicated strategic nuclear
weapons carriage capability of the US would also be
reduced, the report noted. Although substantial future
savings could be obtained from the early retirement of
B-52G bomber option two, these savings were not large
enough or available in time to acquire 32 B-1B bombers.
This was the updated minimum number the Air Force
considered necessary to continue production economically.
Thirty-two additional B-1B would cost about $8.6 billion,
according to the GAO report, and would require initial
funding in 1987 with full funding by FY 1990. The GAO
report also pointed out the additional cost of annual
maintenance, operation and support of these bombers and
added that bomber base modifications might cost as much as
$100 million to accommodate them. But the GAO information
was not enough to convince the conferees to allocate
funding for the continued production of the B-1B bombers
and eventually, the President's insistence on obtaining
100 B-1B prevailed over Congressional maneuvering.
-389-
The second report was the issue brief published by
the CRS (United States Congress, 1986a). This issue brief
updated the facts about the B-lB bomber program and
provided information on the bomber's background, cost
data, system description and legislation. The cost data
provided a breakdown for military construction activities
associated with the B-lB bomber program. For FY 1984 and
before, $5.9 million was spent on construction, while for
FY 1985, FY 1986 and FY 1987, that figure was $95.7
million, $211 million, and $50 million, respectively.
Details of the base-updating program associated with this
funding are given in the next section.
At the same time, yearly ACIS were released. Morroco
(1986) discusses the impact of the SALT II Treaty on the
strategic bomber force of the US President Reagan' s
decision to deploy the 131st Boeing B-52 bomber armed with
cruise missiles pushed the US over the limits of the SALT
II Treaty for the first time. This deployment took place
on November 28, 1986. As discussed earlier in Section
8.5.1, the SALT II Treaty was signed by President Carter
and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1979, but was never
ratified by the US Congress. President Reagan had signaled
his intent to break out of the SALT II Treaty's arms
ceiling in May 1985, but with his action, US'
noncomplaiance was official. Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga) said
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that such an action might lead to scraping of the Treaty,
and it would open the door for both sides to increase
their nuclear arsenals. He claimed that the Soviets were
in a better position to accomplish this buildup than the
US Thus, the deployment of the 131st B-52 bomber with
cruise missiles, opened the door for the official
deployment of the B-lBs with cruise missiles (see Section
8.5.1 for more details on the subject). The arms control
proponents were obviously displeased this such escalation.
8.6.2 The B-1B Program Achievements/Status
In this section, I shall discuss: the production and
IOC of the B-lB; its continued flight testing; the ATB and
the B-1B in comparative terms; the CEPS for the B-1B; and
service readiness for the bomber. In the end, I shall
discuss B-lBs' new problems with fuel leaks and defensive
electronics. As mentioned earlier, these problems brought
the B-lB in to the limelight during during early 1987.
8.6.2.1 Production and IOC of the B-1B
In April 1986, a production rate of four aircraft per
month was achieved ("Rockwell's B-1B Assembly Facility
Nears Capacity to Meet USAF Buy", 1986). By that time,
forward fuselages of the B-lBs Nos. 23 through 30 were
ready. Rockwell completed assembly of the first 18 B-lBs,
and aircraft Nos. 15 through 18 were occupying the
company's Palmdale flight line and final check areas.
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On October 1, 19.87, the B-1B reached IOC with 15 of
the bombers at Dyess AFB, Tex., ("News Digest", 1986). One
of these bombers was placed on alert status with 16
qualified crews available. The Air Force was scheduled to
receive the last of its 100 B-lBs in April 1988.
8.6.2.2 Flight Testing of the B-1B
Throughout this year, flight testing continued at an
accelerated pace with special emphasis on crew training. A
few developments are worth noting. During one of its local
training flight out of its home base at Dyess AFB, Tex.,
the B-1B No. 2 ran into a peculiar problem. Just after the
completion of the demonstration of high speed flying
qualities, pilots began to bring the wings forward from
their full aft position of 67.3 degrees. The wings got
stuck at 55 degrees and the backup system was unable to
change the wing position ("Stuck Wing Forces No. 2 B-lB to
Land at High Speed", 1986). The pilots reported no loss of
the primary or backup hydraulic system. Due to engine
warning, engine No. 3 was shut down as a precaution.
During the course of the next one and a half hours,
various landing options were discussed, and a decision was
made to land the aircraft at Edwards AFB, Runway No. 04.
This runway had a paved length of 15,000 ft with
additional overrun excess to lake beds at the end of the
runway if needed for the high speed landing. At this sweep
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back angle, the pilots could not use slats or flaps at
landing and that alone raised the aircraft's landing
speed.
The B-1B flew to Edwards AFB with three engines and
was refueled during the flight by an Air Force KC-135
tanker. The refueling operation marked the first time ever
that the B-1B had been fueled with wings swept as far as
55 degrees. The aircraft was brought down to Edwards
Runway No. 04 at approximately 238 kt indicated airspeed.
After landing, the aircraft used up 13,000 ft of runway
during rollout, and there was a small brake fire which was
extinguished without causing any damage to the bomber. The
normal B-1B approaches were flown at about 150 kt with a
lightly loaded aircraft, with touch down occurring around
144 kt. The standard landing configuration included the
wings swept fully forward to 15 degrees position, with
leading edge slats at 20-degree down and maximum flap
available to a 40-degree down position. The remarkable
capability of the B-1B to make this emergency landing with
high speed and a large sweep angle shows that the aircraft
had a large margin of safety in landing, and the design
engineers sure won great praise from the Air Force for the
safe landing.
By the end of March 1986, Rockwell finished upgrading
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its engineering flight simulators facility in preparation
for expansion of its role in simulation of B-1B missions
to explore ride, flight and handling characteristics
(Merrifield, 1986). The upgrades included:
(1) A new simulator cab, conforming to the B-1B
flight deck, which was installed in the existing motion
base.
(2) Installation of a daylight imagery visual system.
For several years prior to installation of this display
system, testing in simulators was performed solely by
reference to the flight instruments.
(3) Incorporation of more complex mathematical
algorithms describing the B-1B aircraft and its subsystem
such as SCAS, SIS and SEF (see Section 8.5.2 for details).
For performance match, the post flight evaluation
algorithms, which compared the observed performance of the
aircraft with the ideal, were also installed.
The simulator motion system simulated different
performance-maneuvering situations including turbulence,
and had a flat response up to 3 Hz. A Digital Equipment
Corporation VAX-11/780 programmed in the MPS-10 language
was employed as the host processor. The total cost of the
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company-owned portion of the simulator complex, including
the motion system, visual display system and computer
equipment, was in the range of $13-18 million. A staff of
20 engineers and technicians was needed to support the
entire simulator and computer equipment in the facility.
In late October 1986, the 10th production B-1B
underwent 18 weeks of intensive environmental testing at
the McKinley Climatic Laboratory at Eglin AFB, Fla.,
including:
(1) Three weeks of -65 degrees Fahrenheit (F)
(2) Two weeks of icing, blowing snow and 3 inches per
hour of rain.
(3) Three weeks of heat at 165 degrees F.
(4) Two weeks of humidity.
This climatic laboratory was constructed some 40
years ago and has been in use by Services to simulate a
wide spectrum of environmental extremes (Lee, 1987; "B-1B
Bombers Delivered to Operational Squadron", 1986). The
B-1B's future role in different geographical locations
worldwide, called for such performance testing, and the
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aircraft performed satisfactorily under this environmental
conditions.
8.6.2.3 Comparison of the ATB with the B-lB
Throughout the year, Congress and the Pentagon
continued battling over the ATB's "black" program status.
Both the supporters and detractors of the ATB program had
been frustrated by its restricted status which made it
difficult for them to obtain easy access to its cost and
technology status. Such information was considered vital
in determining the future of the B-1B production line (see
Section 8.6.1).
Most experts believed that stealth or low observable
characteristics were best created by using a combination
of radar absorbing or deflecting materials, radical
aerodynamic designs (e.g. flying wing type
configurations), engines with low infrared signatures, and
electronics countermeasures sets that spoof or jam enemy
radar and weapons. An artist's conception of the stealth
bomber that fulfilled all these requirements was published
by Rabb (1986), and is illustrated in Figure 8-8 on page
396. For comparison, the B-1B cutaway drawing is presented
in Figures 8-9 and 8-10 on page 397 and 398 respectively
("Palmdale and the Bomber Connection", 1986). These
figures provided, for the first time, the basic difference
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between the design philosophies of the ATB and the B-1B.
Note the flush ventral air inlets on the ATB which hide
the engines from enemy radar. Rabb (1986) also compared
weight, range, speed, payload, radar cross section and
cost of these aircraft. Table 8-V on page 400 provides
that information. Note that the radar cross section of the
B-lB as quoted by Rabb (1986) is ten times larger than the
one referred to earlier in Section 8.3.2. Actual number
being secret, the reader will be advised to make her or
his own judgment in this comparison.
By 1986, though no official figures had been
released, there were indications that $7 billion to $9
billion had already been spent on the ATB and related
stealth technology. The figure of $36.6 billion was quoted
for the entire ATB program which constituted acquisition
of some 132 aircraft. The price of ATB was $277 million
per aircraft in 1981 dollars and there were rumors that it
might go as high as $600 million. Donald A. Hicks, Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
defended the ATB program saying that the ATB was a must in
light of the Soviets' upgrading of their look-down/shot-
down radars and weapons. He called the B-lB a "gap-filler"
aircraft that would have a hard time surviving the Soviet
airspace without getting shot down. This technical
information was not sufficient for Congress to make any
decision on the future of the B-lB production line.
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Weight
Rasg
Spfed
Radar Cros Section
Cost
B-1B
477,000 lbs.
approx. 6,475 nm
Mach 1.25
max. 75,000 lbs.
10 sq. m
$265 million
ATB
376,000 lbs.
>5,000 nm
Mach 0.72 at 50,000 ft.
max. 40,000 lbs.
<5 sq. m
estimated $277 million
to $600 million
Table 8-V: B-1B vs. ATB: A Comparison
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8.6.2.4 The B-1B CEPS
By September 1986, more information was available on
the B-lB's CEPS. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, the
B-lB CITS provided a comprehensive on-aircraft diagnostics
capability and recorded approximately 19,600 parameters.
The CEPS was designed to improve the B-lB diagnostics
capability by applying expert system and data analysis
techniques. The CEPS was a ground-based system which would
process the parameter data along with maintenance,
configuration, and design data, to provide the following
capabilities:
(1) Interactive maintenance and systems engineering
aid.
(2) Increased fault isolation at the base levels of
maintenance.
(3) Resolution of false alarm, can not duplicate and
reset okays.
(4) Failure prediction and preventive maintenance
scheduling.
(5) Training aids.
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The details of CEPS are further discussed by
Montgomery (1986) and Papenhaus (1986). Here, I shall
present a brief discussion of the system.
Figure 8-11 on page 403 illustrates the CEPS concept.
The CEPS consisted of three major components: a data base,
an expert system, and a diagnostics tool kit. These
components were integrated with appropriate input/output
and control software to perform the maintenance aid.
The CEPS data base was a repository of maintenance
history. In addition to the recorded parameter data
obtained from the CITS, the data base would store:
selected data from the Air Force's maintenance-data
collection system; and information about observed avionics
malfunctions. The CEPS would store two years of data
on-line providing user access to all relevant information.
For the CEPS, the expert system used two distinct
categories of experts: the design engineers and
maintenance technicians. Each possessed different types of
knowledge about the failure modes and effects of the B-1B
avionics. Their knowledge was acquired and converted to a
form usable by computer. The expert system had a great
deal of system's power because it used artificial
intelligence discipline to emulate a human expert ' s
-4 03-
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reasoning capabilities. The expert system could represent
levels of certainty or uncertainty by applying weighing
factors to data that it handled. It also explained to the
user the logic and rationale underlying its conclusions.
Standard decision-tree formats were used for resulting
displays.
The diagnostics tool kit component of the CEPS
consisted of a series of aids that provided specific
enhancement to the system's overall diagnostic
capabilities. These tool kits were various computer
routines that would aid in analysis of the data base
through trending of malfunctions, matching of parameters,
tracking of apparent malfunctions and identifying false
alarms from the CITS. Tool kits also contained on-line
diagnostics documentation to aid the technicians' effort
which included signal flow diagrams and functional
diagrams of the avionics systems.
The entire CEPS would provide a diagnostics
consultation capability equivalent to many years of
maintenance experience, and with it, that experience could
be passed on to future generations of experts and
technicians during the 30 year life of the B-1B. The
maintenance scheduling system would also improve the
aircraft's operational capability. The entire CEPS was
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designed to reduce the life-cycle cost of the aircraft
through a preventive maintenance scheduling system, and
lots of hopes were pinned on maturing that system by
October 1987.
8.6.2.5 The B-lB Readiness for Service
With the coming of the B-lB, USAF initiated
development efforts to upgrade SAC's manned, penetrating
force bases. The air bases needed many changes to absorb
new technologies offered by the B-1B bomber. The bases
were to be equipped with new facilities. New maintenance
procedures, and computerized training methods were to be
designed and implemented in time for the IOC date of the
bomber. Crew selection and training were also to be
integrated in this plan. Dyess AFB, Tex., was the first
base to receive these updates and Ellsworth AFB, S.D.,
Grand Forks AFB, N.D., and McConnell AFB, Ken., were to
follow. The details of these developments are discussed in
"B-1B Readies for Service" (1986); Coyne (1986); and
Correll (1986). A brief description is provided here.
The base upgrades included:
(1) Construction and renovation of buildings for
personnel.
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(2) Construction of convoy roads to handle the
greater weight of the required trailer to be used for the
B-1B munitions.
(3) Consolidation of aircraft support system to
service the B-1B aircraft.
(4) Installation of additional electrical substations
to meet maintenance and training requirements for electric
power.
(5) Construction of the B-1B hangars, a corrosion
control facility, and new munitions storages.
(6) Preparing and certifying facilities for the
B-1B's nuclear weapons storage.
One of the biggest projects was the new under-ramp
fuel hydrant and centralized aircraft servicing system
(Hydrant/CASS). Hydrant/CASS would be used at each B-1B
parking space to provide rapid fueling, oil and other
lubricants, as well as cooling air, AC electrical power,
and ground communications. These would be provided through
ambilicals that would link each bomber with ten covered
pits beneath the ramp. The military construction
expenditures for these tasks were discussed earlier in
Section 8.6.1.
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A computer based training school first qualified the
B-1B instructor pilots, and instruction of the operational
crew began later. Every crew member was carefully chosen
and had hundred of hours of bomber-flying experience. The
B-1B instructors and student instructors had flown well
over 100 training sorties. More details of the length of
training, crew selection and lesson components are
provided in "B-lB Readies for Service" (1986). The B-1B
flight testing activities intensified while new aircraft
were accommodated as they got delivered to the bases.
Integration of the B-lB to the Air Force also caused
massive changes to normal maintenance procedures. The
CITS, the core automated maintenance system (CAMS), the
automated technical order system (ATOS), the Hydrant/CASS,
etc. were all instituted simultaneously. Some base
officials felt that there was a lot of catching-up to do.
Logistics was a tough part, and in the original B-1A
program, there was nothing done on logistics. No doubt
during this time, the additional help of contractors was
channeled through an interim contractor support program
(ICS) and a contractor-operated storage site (COSS).
Nevertheless, there were some fears that the bases were
probably one to two years behind the aircraft delivery
schedule and a need for continued contractors' support was
imminent for few more years to come. As we shall see in
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the next chapter, this hunch turned out to be correct.
Delays associated with absorbing the B-lBs on the bases
were one of the reasons for public scrutiny of the
aircraft in mid 1987.
8.6.2.6 The B-1B's New Problems
A few days before the IOC date of the first squadron
of the B-lBs at the Dyess AFB, Tex., it was revealed that
the bombers were developing fuel seepage problems in their
integral fuselage and wing tanks ("B-lBs Developing Leaks
in Fuselage, Wing Tanks", 1986). This prompted inspections
and repairs to aircraft already delivered to the Air
Force, and contractors corrected this seepage in the field
and paid the repair cost. The B-1B used a pair of wet
wings and several large fuselage sections to hold fuel
without the use of fuel bladders. The trick was to find
where the seepage was coming from, scrap off the old
cement, roughen up the surface, and apply new sealant.
The Air Force first became aware of fuel seepage
problem during the low level flight testing of the B-1A
bomber. As a result, fuel tank segment joints were
modified, and tighter tolerances were specified. Tank
integrity was checked by using vacuum and pressure testing
equipment. However, these leakage problems with the B-1A
were not publicized. New leaks with the B-lBs prompted
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another design review, and manufacturing and quality
assurance procedures were examined carefully. The B-lBs
were found to experience fuel seepage with greater
frequency as aircraft accumulated more low-level flight
hours. The low level flight testing caused more stress
and strain on the airframe, and fuel tank joints seemed to
be a major contributor to fuel seepage problems. Though
this problem was common, the Air Force was alarmed, for
bad publicity of the program was the last thing it needed.
By the end of October 1986, it was further revealed
that the Air Force was experiencing development problems
with the defensive avionics system of the B-1B (North,
1986). These problems, it was announced, might delay the
bomber's ability to fully carry out its operational combat
role for one to two years. The primary reasons for the
expected delay in full operational capability was the
AN/ALQ-161 defensive avionics system. Though Eaton
Corporation's AIL division was delivering the system at a
rate which surpassed the rate at which the aircraft were
delivered, the system had some functional problems
associated with its reliability. According to Lt. Gen.
William E. Thurman, Head of ASD, the second problem was
that in certain frequencies, the defensive jammer jammed
the transmitter. The error was traced to a shielding
defect. The critics also pointed to shortcomings in the
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low altitude terrain-following system. The Air Force
replied by saying that these shortcomings were addressed
through the installation of SIS and SEF to expand the
aircraft's angle of attack envelop (see earlier discussion
in Section 8.5.2).
Some Defense Department officials contributed to this
publicity by questioning the bomber's low level
performance. They said that the aircraft could not climb
above more than 20,000 ft while fully loaded with fuel and
weapons. They also said that this put the fully-loaded
B-1B among clouds during refueling which would be
inconvenient for the crew. To this date, this author was
unable to locate any reference which cites such complaints
from the B-lB/KC-135 crews. Some concerns were also
raised for the launch of a cruise missile from the inboard
wing station, but Lt. Gen. Thurman replied that the fix
had been found for that launch. He further added that he
might eliminate that station for SALT II Treaty reasons
anyway.
Thus, the Air Force found itself in a swamp of bad
publicity right after the IOC of its first squadron of
B-lBs. From the information available, it was not sure
that the problems faced by the bombers were greater than
that admitted by the Air Force. But this did set a stage
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for Congressional inquiries and public scrutiny of the
program in early 1987.
As we saw in this chapter, during six years of
continued support form both the President and Congress,
the B-1B technology matured to a production rate of four
aircraft per month, and IOC was achieved by late 1986. As
the bomber entered 1987, it carried with it a baggage of
looming problems which kept it in the public limelight for
the first few months, and caused embarrassment to its
proponents.
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Chapter 9
THE B-1B BOMBER IN 1987
During this year, the B-lB took the heaviest flak in
the news media and in Congress. In spite of the
continually upbeat reports from the Air Force and the DOD
about the progress of the program, the press reports of
aircraft's problems resurfaced in early January 1987. The
press called the B-1B a flying Edsel, and skeptics joined
in by saying that the B-1B was the most expensive plane in
aviation history as well as unnecessary and probably
unworkable. Though the Air Force attempted to quiet the
critics by providing them with in-depth reports on the
status of the program and an open discussion of the
problems faced by the maturing B-1B, Congress became
impatient. Congress was dismayed by the criticism and took
upon itself part of the blame. By authorizing the DOD to
go ahead with the multiyear procurement program, Congress
gave up its privilege of micromanagement, and in return it
was assured of the best and most cost effective management
of the program. Congress felt betrayed by the
Administration when the charges of mismanagement surfaced
in the press. The House Armed Services Committee's
chairman Rep. Les Aspin (D.-Wis) launched two major
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investigations of the B-1B bomber program: a program
review and a supportability, maintainability, and
readiness review. The outcome was grim. A few years of
delay seemed imminent and the revelations resulting from
this reviews caused embarrassment to the supporters of the
bomber. The appropriations for the bomber were affected as
a consequence. In the aftermath of the October Stock
Market crash and the following budget deficit reduction
talks, the future of the B-lB's funding became even
cloudier. At the time of this writing, no appropriations
figure is available for the B-1B.
In spite of adverse publicity, the B-lB program team
kept up its spirit and flight testing of the bomber
continued at the normal pace. The fuel seepage problems
of the bomber's wet wings were solved and earnest efforts
were made to correct avionics related problems. In June
1987, the bomber was displayed at the Paris Air Show, and
this exhibition in the minds of the supporters of the
aircraft, restored its image. By September 1987,
additional flight testing reports of the bomber were
released which praised its improved reliability and its
brisk, low-altitude handling capability with the improved
avionics. The details of the defensive avionics system
were also released.
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On September 28, 1987, during one of its low-altitude
training flights, the twelfth production B-1B suffered
multiple bird strikes and lost power in two engines. One
of the engines caught fire and the bomber plunged into a
bombing range in Colorado. The crash took life of three
crew members. It came at a time when the Air Force thought
the most of the problems that had plagued the aircraft had
been solved, and it looked as though the troubles of the
plane were not yet over. The details of these developments
are provided in this chapter.
9.1 Public Scrutiny of the B-lB
Evans (1987c), a former program analyst and a staff
member of the Secretary of Defense, startled Congress by
calling the B-1B bomber a disaster that occurred in the
light of day. In his Washington Post article, he called
the B-1B the most expensive aircraft ever built, and he
questioned the bomber's ability to perform its design
mission of low-altitude penetration. He accused the DOD
for understating the bomber's overall cost by at least $10
billion, and cited the high operating cost of the B-1B in
comparison with the B-52. Evans called the aircraft too
heavy (high wing loading), under powered, and short-legged
(unable to climb above 20,000 ft). He brought forth the
implications of these shortcomings for the long range
mission of the aircraft. In addition, he questioned the
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bomber's ground-hugging ability, and, according to him,
the flight envelope-enhancing systems of the bomber also
did not work as advertised. He added that there was simply
no way of redressing these shortcomings. He charged the
top management of the DOD and the Air Force for this
fiasco. He then turned his criticism to the stealth bomber
program, and said that the highly classified status of the
program barred taxpayers from knowing its shortcomings for
which they might have to pay even higher price.
Evans' criticism was the first of its kind from an
insider, and it took both the Pentagon and Congress by
surprise. Three days later, on January 7, 1987, Washington
Post's Pentagon correspondent, Molly Moore, reported in a
front page story (Moore, 1987b) that "the Air Force was
seeking more than $600 million to correct some of the
plane's defects and planned to extend the aircraft's
testing program by almost four years." She quoted Air
Force Maj. Gen. Peter W. Odgers, the B-1B program manager,
as estimating that the B-1B's avionics equipment, "would
not have the capability to meet their 1982 specifications
and a number of current threats for almost two years".
Moore's article fueled the on-going public criticism of
the program, and a few days later, Voorst (1987) of Time
magazine joined in with his criticism of the bomber.
Voorst pressed Evans' charges against the B-1B even
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farther, and said that in its rush to deploy the B-lB, the
Air Force went into production while the aircraft was
still undergoing major design modifications. According to
Voorst, by far the most critical deficiency of the B-lB
was the failure of the sophisticated ECM devices and he
also reported on the fuel leakage problems of the bomber.
The Washington Post's article titled "The B Bomber:
Flacks and Flak" (1987) fueled the B-1B controversy even
more, for it cleverly put together a sampling of the flak
fired at the bomber along with conflicting counterfire
from Defense Secretary Casper W. Weinberger and Air Force
officials. At the same time, technical problems associated
with the radar-jamming equipment of the bomber prompted
the Air Force to limit the terrain-following tests of the
aircraft ("B-1 Technical Troubles Prompt Limits in Tests",
1987). Following that, Evans (1987b) published another
critical article on the B-1B in the Chicago Tribune. He
attempted to qualify his criticism of the B-lB bomber in
the light of the Air Force's reply to his earlier charges,
and said that the Air Force, so far had not provided a
satisfactory explanation for limiting the gross takeoff
weight to 290,000 lb for the aircraft even it was designed
to carry 477,000 lb. Evans said that this limitation might
have been set because of peacetime flight safety
considerations but this means the crews were not training
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under simulated wartime conditions with wartime payloads.
Pointing to vast uncertainties that he claimed surrounded
the B-1B's actual combat capability, he said that, " More
money won't avoid a repetition of this costly fiasco; more
personal integrity in defense procurement program might."
All this criticism of the B-1B reinforced public
distrust of the DOD's capability to manage technically
complicated and big ticket defense procurement programs,
and those sentiments, as seen through the eyes of a
cartoonist, are best portrayed in Figure 9-1 on page 418.
This author believes that Evans had access to inside
information such as reports from the office of the
Director Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E, headed by
John Krings) on the on-going testing of the B-lB, and that
was probably the explanation for the strength of his
criticism. The interpretation of the extent of the
problems, however, could be better judged after listening
to the Air Force's reply to his criticism which is
presented in the next section.
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Figure 9-1: The B-1B, in the Eyes of Critics
I _
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9.2 The Air Force's Reply
The Air Force's first reply appeared in the
Washington Post ("The B1 is Fulfilling its Mission",
1987). Larry D. Welch, General and Chief of Staff, USAF,
and E.C. Aldridge, Jr., Secretary, USAF, cosigned a letter
to the Post saying that, "Despite Mr. Evans' tortured use
of an assortment of miscellaneous data to arrive at
unwarranted conclusions, the facts are straight-forward.
The central fact is that the B-lB, the most advanced
aircraft in the world, is today on alert at Dyess AFB,
Texas, fulfilling its intended mission of deterring
conflict by being able - this moment - of carrying out its
mission." They confessed the existence of the problems
with the B-lB and said that the B-1B was in its early
stages of life and there were some deficiencies in it that
required correction in order to realize its full long-term
potential. Most of them would be corrected soon though one
or two would take longer, they added.
Both Welch and Aldridge disqualified Evans'
comparison of the B-1B with the B-52, declaring the B-1B
was an superior aircraft overall. As to Evans' charges of
the high flying-hour cost of the B-1B as compared with the
B-52 (a factor of three higher), they said that the life
cycle cost of the B-1B would be only some 15 to 25% more
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than that of the B-52. Evans' charge of a $10 billion cost
overrun was also questioned, and the program underrun cost
of less than $20.5 billion ceiling (FY 1981 dollars) was
quoted. They added that because of Congressional cuts of
about $750 million below that ceiling, the Air Force would
ask that a substantial part of those cuts be restored to
complete needed work. For further details on the
Congressional cut, see Section 8.5.1.
On the very same day this letter was published,
Schemmer (1987) interviewed Lt. Gen. William E. Thurman,
the Head of USAF's ASD about the program. Lt. Gen. Thurman
told him that the problems faced by the 3-1B in order of
severity were those with the ECM system, the flight
control system, the terrain-following radar and fuel
leaks. He added that although those systems were not
working to their full potential this did not mean that the
aircraft couldn't perform its mission.
As for the ECM system, Lt. Gen. Thurman said that the
complicating factor in its design was in addressing the
threats understood in 1982 while incorporating some
additional ones which had emerged since then. He estimated
a delay of one year to achieve the original
specifications, and of two years, to counteract the new
threats with the ECM system. He also informed Schemmer
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that improvements that could enhance the performance
envelope of the bomber were behind the schedule by one
year. As for the terrain-following radar, remedies were at
hand and they were soon to be incorporated in the on-going
flight program. The problem of fuel leaks, was solved, he
added. As to the cost of the entire program, he reminded
Schemmer that the program was underfunded as a result of
the Congressional cuts in the FY 1986 appropriations, and
he justified the Air Force's $600 million request in order
to solve some of these problems.
In early February 1987, ("B-lB Contract Review
Discloses Deficiencies of AIL Management', 1987), the USAF
released a report criticizing Eaton Corp.'s AIL Division
which manufactured the AN/ALQ-161 electronic warfare
system for the bomber. Eaton was expected to run over its
$2.7 billion total contract on the ECM system by less than
2%, that is, somewhere in neighborhood of $37 million. The
report also criticized the company' s inspection and
acceptance testing practices while praising the
significant improvement in the hardware quality. In the
eyes of the critics, this was a public relation ploy on
the part of the Air Force to boost its image which was
tarred by early disclosures of the B-1B deficiencies.
One more high ranking Air Force official defended the
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B-lB bomber program against the rash of criticism directed
at problems ranging from the AN/ALQ-161 defensive avionics
system to the fuel leaks. He was Gen. Lawrence
A. Skantze, Commander, Air Force Systems Command. In his
address to the National Press Club on February 4, 1987, he
emphasized that the aircraft's problems were not
insurmountable and were to be expected, given the early
decision to go with a concurrent development and
production program in order to expedite the fielding of
the system and minimize acquisition costs (Skantze, 1987).
Gen. Skantze said the 1981 decision "Carried with it the
management of a significant degree of risk" and that
meeting the production schedule while meeting the cost
goal remained the major challenge in the program. He said
the ECM problems fell into two categories: integration,
in which boxes that checked out individually failed to
function well as a system; and second, the absence of hard
intelligence on the nature of the electronic threat that
the system is supposed to counter. He added that the
system was capable of responding to future challenges with
some delay in the program. He also said that due to a
number of corrective actions taken since July 1986, the
fuel leak problem was no longer a serious threat to the
B-1B operation. According to him, the leak rate came down
from 6 leaks per month to less than two leaks per aircraft
per month. He also gave information about delays in the
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flight control system. The terrain-following radar
software integration problems had been difficult but were
solved and the system was to be released to SAC for
training, he added. He also said that the Air Force's
request for additional funding was justified in light of
the earlier Congressional cuts and added that had the US
chosen to delay production by a year or two, a cost
increase of three to four billion dollars would have been
certain and the Air Force might not have averted all the
problems in any case. He concluded by saying that the B-1B
bomber was the finest available and was here to stay for
years to come.
Later, the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Larry
D. Welch met with members of the Pentagon press and
reiterated the Air Force's stand on the status of the B-1B
program. March 23, 1987, was declared "media day" at Dyess
AFB, Tex., to show off the B-1B, and special publications
were distributed to the press to ward off further
criticism. These publications were "B-1B Myths and Facts"
(United States of America, 1987a), and "White Paper on
B-1B" (United States of America, 1987b), both published by
the B-1B Systems Program Office (1987). The publication on
myths and facts on the B-1B, answered in detail every
charge made by Evans (1987c), while the White Paper
discussed the program background, the bomber's
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performance, flight controls, the defensive avionics
system, terrain-following radar status and avionics
integration. It also discussed the bomber's delivery
schedule, readiness and supportability, mission
effectiveness, and cost. The B-1B program was initially
structured with concurrent development and production. The
accelerated pace was necessary to meet the IOC date at an
affordable cost, the paper added. The certain cost
avoidance of a short acquisition cycle was judged to
outweigh any possible cost penalty associated with
retrofit, it claimed. The retrofit cost appeared to be
software intensive. In the end, the paper said that the
risks had been identified and appreciated, and the Air
Force was ready to manage these risks to make the B-1B a
vital strategic and tactical asset for its planned 30
years service life.
Late in July 1987, Gen. John T. Chain, Jr., Commander
in Chief of SAC, also defended the B-1B against its
critics ("Power on Alert", 1987). He expressed his
dissatisfaction with the press and media, which according
to him, paid very little attention to the Air Force's
replies to the bomber's critics. He vented his anger by
saying, "Can you imagine the frustration of the officers
and airman who fly and support the B-1B when they see so
much junk in the "news"?"
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9.3 Congressional Inquiry and Action
In the minds of the B-1B admirers, there was no
question that the bomber symbolized for its critics what
was wrong with President Reagan's defense buildup. Critics
were not interested in arguing at that time whether it was
wrong or right to build the aircraft, it just became a
Republican aircraft. In early January 1987, there was a
general feeling that sooner or later, the Democrats would
add their voices to the public criticism of the B-1B.
Congressional inquiries resulted in program reviews, both
about the status of the program at that time and future
readiness of the B-1B, and indeed, these inquiries had
repercussions on the FY 1988 appropriations for the
bomber.
9.3.1 The Program Status and Readiness Review of the B-1B
"Test Chief's B-1 Concerns Were Ignored, Krings
Sought to Kill B-1 Praise" (1987) revealed that John
Krings, DOT&E, knew about the problems of the B-1B bomber,
but in order to please his boss, Defense Secretary
Weinberger, he submitted a watered down version of them in
his January 1986 test report. Despite Krings' January 1986
B-1B test report, no panel member was informed about the
real extent of the problems, and Congress was unhappy
about this.
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Rep. Les Aspin (D.-Wis) had a hunch that the B-1B had
problems even greater than those that could be imagined
from the stories in the media. On February 10, 1987, he
called on the House Armed Services Panel to conduct a
major review of the B-1B bomber program and drew attention
to six problems with the B-lB. They were:
(1) The CITS diagnostics set.
(2) The stability enhancement system.
(3) Fuel leaks.
(4) Terrain-following radar which limited the B-1B's
ability to fly as low as 200 ft.
(5) Electronic interactions of the defensive avionics
system with the offensive avionics system.
(6) The ECM system outdatedness.
Mann (1987) discusses further political implications
of the bomber inquiry probe by Rep. Aspin. Mann said that
these inquiries were stiffened by the Committee's desire
to dispel its reputation for slack oversight. He foresaw a
wider application of the lessons learned from the B-1B
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probe because the talk of concurrency of developing,
producing, and rapid turnover of the weapons was
applicable to all Services. This was so, Mann said,
because Rep. Aspin assigned the investigation jointly to
procurement and to research and development subcommittees.
On March 30, 1987, the B-1B's program review report
was submitted to the House Panel (United States Congress,
1987b). The report focused on the following four basic
issues:
(1) The current capability of the B-lB, and the
system integrations that restricted the performance of the
aircraft at its IOC date.
(2) The Air Force's management of the program.
(3) The cost of achieving full operational
capability.
(4) Lessons learned from the acquisition of the B-1B
program.
The summary of major findings included:
(1) All the aircraft's performance and capabilities
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as of Fall 1986 had not yet been met at the time of the
inquiry and were not expected to be met any earlier than
1991. The cost and schedule to achieve operational
capabilities were uncertain.
(2) The limitations, particularly with regard to the
ECM/defensive avionics system, degraded the B-lB's
effectiveness as a manned penetrating bomber.
(3) The concurrency in the program provided
inadequate time for testing and evaluation which
undermined the program's integrity. The delivery schedule
was more important than the capability of the aircraft.
(4) The B-1B problems and required modifications were
known to the program office as early as 1982, but the
scale of the problem was not communicated to senior Air
Force or Defense Department officials until 1985, or to
Congress until 1987.
(5) The program reviews at the secretarial level did
not pose proper questions which might have led to the
detection of the problems developing in the program.
(6) For the Committee to support any request for
enhancement would be premature until the baseline
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performance of the aircraft was clearly established and
stabilized (The Air Force was considering request for
enhancement to the B-1B totalling $2.6 billion over the
next three years. These enhancements included: ALQ-161A
upgrade, forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) system,
1760 electronic data bus that would enable the B-1B to
carry new weapons such as SRAM II missiles, and monopulse
upgrade of the defensive avionics system).
(7) The B-lB acquisition experience raised
significant issue for the management and execution of
other Air Force Programs.
The report was also critical of the office of the
DOT&E, because of its failure to provide its clear
assessment of the B-lB's problems. In addition, this
report included a brief discussion of the B-lB's specific
problems with fuel leaks, the CITS, spare parts,
industrial base, avionics capability, refueling and the
ECS. More information was requested as a consequence of
this report and a declassified part of it is presented in
Appendix A.
The findings of this report embarrassed high ranking
DOD officials. In spite of this, they continued to support
the additional funding for the B-1B, and said that
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problems in any maturing system were a common occurrence,
and in the light of the constantly improving Soviet
defenses, one must seek answers to these problems.
In late June 1987, the GAO published a report on the
supportability, maintainability, and readiness of the B-lB
bomber (United States Congress, 1987a). This study was
performed for the House Armed Services Committee (Moore,
1987a). It discussed the shortage of spare parts, the
extension of contractor maintenance support and the number
of aircraft on alert. Unfortunately, it had some more bad
news for the proponents of the B-1B bomber. The report's
conclusions are summarized below:
(1) Spare parts shortages resulted in the temporary
grounding of the aircraft, some of them even had to be
cannibalized in order to use their parts in other
aircraft. Both the reliability of the parts and the system
detecting their failure (the CITS) were cited as reasons
for these shortages (an exhaustive survey on a sample of
20 parts that were responsible for the grounding of the
aircraft supported these finding).
(2) The Air Force's in-house maintenance had been
delayed primarily because of the limited availability of
repair instructions and the lack of support equipment.
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Contractor support cost which would be incurred until
in-house capability was to be achieved, came to
approximately double the original estimate. Some funding
would be required for this effort in FY 1990 through FY
1994, and this was not included in the previous estimate.
Engineering and instructor support were the major items
that would constitute this added expense.
(3) The Air Force's effort to reach its goal for
readiness and training was hampered by the unavailability
of aircraft because of fuel leaks, engine icing and other
problems. As of the end of April 1987, SAC had one B-1B on
alert and mission ready crews for 30 more B-lBs were
assigned a variety of bases. SAC's projections were to
meet the 30% readiness criterion (30 B-lBs to be kept on
alert at any given time out of a fleet of 100) in early
1990.
This report pointed to the deficiencies related to
the logistics support of the aircraft, and GAO's 1983
prediction of these deficiencies turned out to be true
(see Section 8.3.3 for more details).
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9.3.2 The B-1B Appropriations
In early January 1987, the USAF sought additional
funds for the B-1B program ("USAF Requests $600 million To
Solve B-lB Problems", 1987). This request, the Air Force
said was within the cap of $20.5 billion (FY 1981 dollars)
for the entire program. Of the $600 million requested,
$376 million was to finance flight testing of the bomber
over the next three and a half years, $93 million was to
be spent bringing the AN/ALQ-161 defensive avionics system
up to the original specifications, and $131 million was to
be used in FY 1988/89 to upgrade the aircraft's defensive
avionics to meet Soviet capabilities which had emerged
since the original baseline was set in 1982. The House
debated this request (Towell, 1987d), and the $376 million
needed to complete the aircraft's original flight test
program seemed likely to be approved.
The House Panel approved $376 million for the
continued testing of the B-1B bomber (Towell, 1987c). Both
Panels refused to fund development of any new electronic
equipment to cope with improvements in Soviet air defenses
since 1982. It looked as if both the Panels were confident
that the stealth bomber would replace the B-1B in the near
future and hence, they were unwilling to pay for upgrades
in the B-1B avionics. The House also turned down the Boxer
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amendment (offered by Rep. Barbara Boxer (D.-Calif)) that
would have deleted from the bill the $376 million approved
by the Committee for additional tests (Towell, 1987b). The
amendment would have allowed the work to proceed provided
the Air Force paid for it with funds appropriated for
other projects.
In the aftermath of the October crash of the Stock
Market and the following deficit reduction summit between
the Administration and Congress, the future of the FY 1988
B-lB appropriations became more uncertain. To this date
(Towell, 1987a), I was unable to obtain the exact amount
appropriated for the B-1B in FY 1988. These events
exemplify the kind of repercussions suffered by
technological development (the maturing of the B-1B
through continued flight testing). However, there are
indications that $376 million will be appropriated to
continue development of the B-1B bomber (Towell, 1987a).
In addition, Towell informs us that the conferees have
agreed to a House provision authorizing a panel of outside
experts to study the B-1B's capability to penetrate Soviet
targets. It is worth reminding the reader that the
promised ability of the B-lB to penetrate Soviet air
defenses has been at the heart of its public scrutinies
for the past two years.
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9.4 Continued Flight Testing of the B-lB, the CRASH, and
the Latest Developments
In January 1987, the flight testing of the B-lB
continued with the successful live launch of SRAM-A from
500 ft above the ground at Mach number 0.9. The wings were
swept fully aft to 67.5 degrees when the SRAM-A was
dropped from the fuselage mid bay, and the inertially-
guided missile successfully hit the target. The USAF was
expecting full operational capability of the bomber by
October 1988 ("USAF Expect Fully Operational B-lB by 1988
within Spending Limits", 1987).
In the last week of March 1987, air crews and
officials at the Dyess AFB, Tex., the first operational
unit of the strategic bomber B-1B, defended the aircraft
against Congressional criticism. They cited improvement in
the B-1B sortie production rate (Shifrin, 1987) from 55%
of those contracted in October 1986, to 98% of those
contracted in March 1987. The cannibalization rate of
2-2.2 parts per sortie was quoted. In comparison, mature
aircraft like B-52s, still had a 0.4 part per sortie rate
even after some 30 years of service. In February 1987,
there were 41 leaks in 26 B-lBs as compared with the July
1986 level of 53 leaks in 11 B-lBs. According to the
officials at the Dyess AFB, Tex., despite deficiencies in
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the CITS, the B-lB required about 35-40 hours of
maintenance manhours per flight hour, a level which was
equivalent to a mature KC-135 fuel tanker. The CITS fault
alarms dropped from 110-120 per flight in December 1987,
to about 74 per flight in March 1987, they said. The crews
were satisfied with the terrain-following radar flights at
400 ft altitude. Both officials and crews were confident
that the B-1B would mature quickly with continued flight
testing, and they were anxious to work with the improved
aircraft systems.
In mid June 1987, the Air Force exhibited the B-1B
production aircraft No. 21 in the Paris Air Show. This a
display was intended to restore its public image. The
bomber however had some problems with its APU which
prevented engine start on its trip back home ("Lack of
Power Unit Delays USAF B-1B at Le Bourget", 1987). This
was the first appearance of the B-1B in Paris and the
second in Europe (a B-1A prototype was exhibited several
years ago at Farnborough Air Show in England).
In July 1987, additional information on the B-1B
flight testing was released. The aircraft successfully
flew a 21 hour mission with a takeoff weight of 413,000
lb. At an average speed of 440 kt, it covered 9,411 miles
over the north-west coast of the US. The plane was
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refueled five times to keep it heavy for data collection
and performance evaluation (Rhodes, 1987b). Rhodes also
provides details on the sealing of the wet wings of the
aircraft and said that only three leaks were detected
since the wings were sealed using a newly developed
"triple-redundant" method. In August 1987, Rockwell
detected some production line damage to the aircraft
cabling and this was addressed ("Rockwell Probe Determines
Causes of B-1B Production Line Damage", 1987).
In September 1987, detailed information on the status
of the flight test program was made public (North, 1987b).
Table 9-I on page 437 provides the latest B-1B
specifications included in that release. It was revealed
that the reliability of the B-lB had improved as the line
crew gained experience. The fuel leaks problem was
reported to be under control. The progress on the
defensive avionics system was announced to be satisfactory
and the Mod-1 configuration of the system was being
prepared to undergo flight testing beginning March 1988.
Additional information on the functioning of the
AN/ALQ-161 system was released. The new block diagram of
the system was released in September 1987, and is
illustrated in Figure 9-2 on page 438. The system
consisted of 108 separate LRUs and weighed approximately
4,800 lb. The entire flight testing program was geared to
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USAF/Rockwell International B-1B Specifications
Powerplant
Four afterburning General Electric F101-GE-102 turbofan engines with 30,780
lb. of thrust each.
Weights
Maximum takeoff weight 477,000 lb. (216.630 kg.)
Maximum payload 125,000 lb. (56.700 kg.)
Maximum fuel load 195,000 lb. (88,450 kg.)
(Additional fuel can be carried in the bomb bays)
Dimensions
Length 145.8 ft. (44.4 meters)
Height 34 ft. (10.4 meters)
Wing span, 15 deg. sweep 137 ft. (41.8 meters)
Wing span, 67.5 deg. sweep 78 ft. (23.8 meters)
Performance
Maximum speed Mach 1.2 to 1.3
Penetration speed Mach 0.85 to 0.9
Range at low level Intercontinental can be refueled by KC-135 and
KC-10 tankers
Takeoff roll at 348,000 lb. 4,500 ft.
The B-1B has a crew of four-the pilot, copilot, offensive system operator and the
defensive system operator. The aircraft is capable of carrying short-range attack
missiles (SRAMs), nuclear and conventional gravity bombs, and air launched cruise
missiles.
Table 9-I: The Latest Specifications of the B-lB Bomber
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Figure 9-2: The AN/ALQ-161 Defensive Avionics System
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expand the bomber's operational envelope, with emphasis on
weapons clearance and the development of a stall
inhibitor, stability enhancement and terrain-following
systems. The B-1B test force included:
(1) The B-1B No.1, devoted to SIS, the terrain-
following system and some stability and control testing.
The SRAM-2 testing was also scheduled for March 1988. This
aircraft was limited to 80% of maximum gross weight.
(2) The B-lB Nos. 9 and 28, configured for cruise
missiles and heavy weight testing up to the aircraft's
maximum gross weight of 477,000 lb. They would remain
with the flight test program till February 1989.
(3) The B-1B No. 40, to be equipped with full
defensive avionics gear and reserved for avionics related
tests only.
Progress was also reported on the SIS-1 and SIS-2
systems development, and SEF tests were due to begin by
the end of September 1987. The terrain-following system
was cleared for the aircraft flights down to 200 ft above
the ground level and the early success of on-going tests
was reported. Additional wind tunnel testing was to be
performed on the release of SRAM in order to understand
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and reduce the pitch down moment on the released missiles.
This effect was observed in earlier tests and needed some
fixing. It looked as though the B-1B program was back on
track again.
On September 28, 1987, the B-1B No. 12, on a routine
training mission from Dyess AFB, Tex., crashed about 60
miles south-west of Pueblo, Colorado. The aircraft had
suffered multiple bird strikes and had lost engines three
and four, with one of them on fire (Scott, 1987). Three
crew members parachuted to safety but the other three were
killed in the crash. The aircraft was making a simulated
radar bombing run when the accident happened. After the
reported bird strike, the aircraft climbed up to
approximately 3,000-4,000 ft and crew ejection was
initiated at a speed of about 500 kt. Manual bail out of
two crew members through the entry hatch was presumed to
be time consuming and made it difficult for them to
escape. At this point, it is worth reminding the reader
that ejection seats were selected over the capsule
ejection (ejecting the entire crew simultaneously) during
the B-1A program in 1974 (see Section 4.3.2 for details).
The ejection seats were capable of ejecting a crewman at
speed of 600 kt.
In spite of this setback, the flight testing
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continued, and in November 1987, it was reported that the
B-1B had a successful long range (3,100 miles) flight with
takeoff gross weight of 440,000 lb (Rhodes, 1987a).
In the first week of December 1987, it was disclosed
that the Air Force had suspended low-level testing of the
B-1B bomber ("Bird-Watching Bombers", 1987). It was
further revealed that the SAC had restricted the 72
operational bombers to an altitude of several thousand
feet until the September crash investigation is complete
and safety changes are made on the aircraft. In the later
part of December 1987, additional information was made
available on this subject (North, 1987a). Rockwell was
asked to develop a modification kit to strengthen areas of
the engine necelle and wing that proved to be susceptible
to bird damage in September crash. This modification was
ordered after the accident investigation team concluded
that bird strike occurred at the upper lip of the
dual-engine necelle and punctured the skin of the lower
wing above the necelle and the wing-necelle attachment
area. The team also found that hydraulic and fuel lines in
a small gap between the forward necelle and the B-1B's
stationary wing were damaged by the bird impact and it
recommended that such modifications be carried out. The
Air Force and Rockwell will also be changing the ejection
sequence system which failed to operate. These structural
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and electrical modifications are scheduled to be completed
in early 1988, and following that, SAC is expected to
resume low-level flights of the B-lBs.
By the end of December 1987, it was also announced
that the USAF plans to build the largest anechoic chamber
(264x250x70 ft) at Edwards AFB for the B-1B ("Filter
Center", 1987). The new chamber is to be completed in the
first quarter of 1989.
Thus ends more than three decades of the history of
the B-1B bomber which in the words of Evans (1987c),
"stood as pre-eminent totem of the Air Force's ..
commitment to a manned bomber." The B-1B indeed had a
troubled past, and the thought of its turbulent history
brings forth a vivid panorama of the numerous complexities
associated with conceiving, fostering, planning, managing,
manufacturing and making operational a highly technical
weapons system in the modern times.
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Chapter 10
CONCLUSION
Designed to have a service life of 30 years, the B-1B
bridges the gap between the B-52 and the stealth bomber.
It joined SAC almost 25 years after the Air Force began
its first formal studies. The B-52 will cede its place to
the new multi-role long-range strategic bomber after 32
years of service.
The present study encompasses a period of some 32
years which stretches over seven presidencies. During this
period, the B-1A program was killed in 1977 by President
Carter. The cancellation was partly a political decision
to foster arms reduction negotiation with the USSR, partly
a cost-saving measure, and partly due to the advent of new
weapons technology such as ACLMs. The B-1 bomber was
resurrected as the B-1B, by President Reagan in 1981 as a
part of his Strategic Force Modernization Plan, with a new
mission statement including cruise missile launch, but
without a high altitude supersonic element.
The rest of this chapter provides a program summary,
my opinions on the B-lB acquisition process, and my
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recommendations on ways of improving the efficiency of
overall acquisition system.
10.1 Program Summary
Tables 10-I through 10-III on page 445 through 447
respectively, present a summary of the B-1B program
history. The program to acquire 100 B-lBs was structured
to meet a strict budget of $20.5 billion (constant 1981
dollars), nevertheless, it is still one of the most
expensive defense systems ever produced. Table 10-IV on
page 448 provides details of the money appropriated for
the B-1 program to date (Evans, 1987a). The total of $6.73
billion (then-year-dollar sum) was spent on RDT&E, while
$23.60 billion (then-year-dollar sum) was provided for the
procurement of the aircraft. The additional amount of
money was, and is, being spent by the Air Force for the
management of the program and for the support of the B-1B
fleet on various bases.
The B-1B bomber program exhibits salient
characteristics of technically complex large-scale
programs or a macroprojects. These projects usually
involve multiple and diverse actors (Horwich, 1984).
Figure 10-1 on page 449 illustrates a set of actors
involved in the procurement of the B-1B bomber. The arrows
in Figure 10-1 indicate directions of interactions among
-4 45-
1961
Air Force undertook first formal exploratory studies on new
aneration of aircraft, called SLAB (Subsonic Low Altitude
Bomber).
1963
Air Force expanded effort ith two new studies, ERSA
(Extended Range Strategic Aircraft) and LAMP (Low Altitude
Manned Penetrator). A number of aerospace companies
undertook other studies under government contract including
AMP (Advanced Manned Penetrator) and AMPSS (Advanced
Manned Penetrating Strategic System).
1965
Four-year AMSA (Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft)
studies. funded by Air Force. undertaken by a number of
aerospace companies as a follow-on to industry/Air Force
drorts.
1967
Beginning of B-I contract definition Defense System Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC I). (1 July)
1969
Formal industry competition began as Air Force issued Request
For Proposal (RFP) for B-I. (December)
1970
DSARC 11 completed authorising Full-Scale Development
(FSD). (4 June)
Rockwell International selected as B-I svstem contractor,
General Electric selected to build engines. (June)
1971
Fulale B-I enginering mock-up completed and approved.
(Octokbr/November)
1972
Air Force selected Boeing to integrate B-I offensive avionics.
(April)
1973
Construction starts on first B-I (flying and handling qualities
aircraft).
1974
Air Force selects AIL (Division of Cutler-Hammer) to develop
B-I defensive avionics. (January)
Roll-out of first B-I at Palmdale, Calif. (26 October)
First flight from Palmdale, Calif. to Edwards AFB. Calif, lasting
I hour 18 minutes. (23 Deember 1974)
1975S
First supersonic fight (Mach 1-05) and first aerial refuelling.
Full-scale static/strength and proof loads test completed on B-I
Aircraft No 2 at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation facility at
Palmdale, Calif. (July)
Development on B-I aircraft No 4 begun with contract award to
Rockwell International. Aircraft to have ejection seats, new
engine nacelles and a redesigned forward fuselage and aft
avionics bay to accommodate the defensive avionics equipment.
(15 August)
First low-level flight over the Pacific Ocean, at 500 ft (152 m) at
M-075. (19 September)
First low-.level flight at 200 ft (61 m) over the Edwards AFB,
Calif. runway, at 190 mph (306 km/h) to M-0S83. (11
November)
1976
B-I No 3, the offensive avionics test aircraf rolls out (16
January) and makes first flight (I April).
Table 10-I: The B-1 Program History Summary
-446-
B-1 No 2 (structural test aircraft) rolls out (11 May) and makes
first flight (14 June).
Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) missions,
simulating Strategic Air Command (SAC) combat missions.
successfully completed. (September)
Completion of DSARC III: B-l Production Decision. (I
December)
1977
President Carter announces his decision not to deploy B- I but to
continue testing and development. and Air Force directs stop-
work on B-I production programme. (30 June)
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Brown directs termination of all
B-I production contracts. (6 July)
Air Force provides restructured B-I programme to SECDEF. (7
October)
1979
B-I No 4 first flight; defensive avionics testing begins. (14
February)
Congress appropriates S549 million for continuation of
defensive avionics testing and operauonal penetrativity eval-
uation. (October)
1980
Congressional notification sent by office of the Secretary of
Defense extending the Bomber Penetration Evaluation (BPE)
programme to 31 January 1981 to provide an orderly
termination of the evaluation. (29 January)
Joint/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) - Air Force
Bomber Study (JBS) formed under Dr Zeiberg (OSD) to evaluate
the bomber alternatives. The study was divided into five panels:
missions and requirements, threat, aircraft system design, plan
and programme, and systems evaluation. (19 August)
SECDEF Brown announces "Stealth" technology. (22 August)
BPE General Officers Steering Group meet to resolve orderly
completion of the BPE effort to reflect Research Deveiopment
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) delays in the Operational Test
and Evaluation (OT&E) testing. Decision made to concentrate
on Airborne Controlled Intercepts (ACI) only. (27 October)
General Mathis, Air Force Vice-Chief of Staff. letter stating the
new strategic-bomber would be called the Long Range Combat
Aircraft (LRCA). (2 December)
Decision made to extend BPE flight test through April 1981.
Efforts still concentrate on ACI. Letters of notiicauon sent to
Congress. (8 December)
1981
Interim Joint OSD/Air Force Bomber Alternatives Study signed
by Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci and sent to Congress. (7
April)
B-I Aircraft No 4 completes last flight in the BPE (29 April),
concluding all B-I flight testing.
The Air Force Test and Evaluation Center "Manned Bomber
Penetrativity Evaluation Flight Test Results Final Report"
completed. (30 June)
First meeting of LRCA Configuration Steering Group. (17
September)
President Ronald Reagan announces strategic programme to
include construction of 100 Rockwell B-lBs (2 October). DoD
places interim contract for S54.8m to launch initial full-scale
development
19S2
USAF contracts valued at S2200m placed with Rockwell for
B-lB production. (January)
The B-1 Program History SummaryTable 10-II:
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1982
President Reagan sent a communication to Congress certifying that a
fleet of 100 of a new version of B-1 bombers would be purchased for
$20.5 billion (FY 1981 constant dollars) and the first squadron of B-1
would be in service by 1986 (January)
1983
Critical design review for the B-1B bomber (January)
The B-1B program was granted a multiyear status (August)
1984
The fatal crash of the modified B-1A No. 2 (August)
Rollout of the first production B-lB (September)
The defensive avionics system delay announced (December)
1985
The first delivery of the B-1B to SAC (June)
Adverse publicity of the B-lB (June)
1986
Problems with fuel leaks and defensive avionics (September-October)
IOC with 15 of the B-lB bombers at Dyess AFB, Tex. (October)
Congressional decision to close the B-lB production line beyond the
planned 100 aircraft (October)
1987
Scrutiny and reviews of the program (January-June)
The fatal crash of the twelfth production B-lB bomber (September)
Continued flight testing and fine tuning of the aircraft systems
(January-December)
Table 10-III: The B-1 Program History Summary
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Fiscal Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1976T
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
RDT&E
$ Million
Then-year funds
28.0
46.0
18.8
26.0
25.0
100.2
75.0
370.3
444.5
448.5
445.0
596.5
129.0
482.7
442.5
50.3
54.9
301.1
291.9
753.5
749.9
465.0
265.1
118.7
?
Procurement
$ Million
Then-year funds
64.0
22.6
284.3
1,801.0
3,868.1
5,571.7
7,071.0
4,913.6
Table 10-IV: The B-1 Money Appropriated to Date
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Figure 10-1: Actors who Played a Major Role in
Development of the B-1B Bomber
I
The B-1BC--,
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these actors. This description of the acquisition process
is stark, but it by no means exaggerates the environment
of many defense programs. The result of the management
environment shaped by all pressures, both internal and
external to DOD, was a long acquisition cycle of
approximately 25 years. It was the primary objective of
this study to acquire and present knowledge about the
technological and political processes which shaped this
extended acquisition.
The major technologies which shaped the bomber's
development include:
(1) Swing wings.
(2) Long "snake" type engine inlets lined with
microwave absorbing material which resulted into reduced
radar cross section of the aircraft.
(3) Augmented turbofan engines.
(4) Advanced composite materials.
(5) Techmod productivity enhancements.
(6) Government furnished avionics.
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(7) Defensive avionics.
(8) Offensive avionics.
(9) Aircraft training/maintenance related avionics.
(10) Cruise missiles technology.
(11) Stealth technology.
The first nine technologies made the B-1B technically
the most complex bomber ever produced. The tenth
technology was used by President Carter as a reason to
kill the B-1A bomber program in 1977, while the search for
a cruise missile carrier resurrected the B-1 as the B-lB.
Stealth technology was used to improve the stealthiness of
the B-1B. In 1986, Congress curtailed the B-1B production
line to 100 while pointing to progress in the stealth
bomber technology. The ATB are to be the next generation
of bombers.
The managers of the program within the DOD, the Air
Force and the contractors, were largely successful in
dealing with uncertain technologies of extreme complexity.
Through program evaluation and technical input, both the
Bisplinghoff Committee (in 1973) and the Air Force
-452-
Scientific Advisory Board (in 1980), played a crucial role
in the design and justification of the bomber. The Air
Force played a key role as systems manager for the DOD,
and it managed four major contractors: Rockwell, General
Electric, Boeing and Eaton, on a multiyear contract to
procure the B-lBs. The Air Force fell short in its
preparations and management of the bomber logistics for
SAC, and this delayed the IOC date for the bomber.
Rockwell was careful to avoid manipulation and impropriety
or the appearance of such. The four key elements to its
successful strategy were: its graceful treatment of its
employees during the B-1A/B-1B transition period in
1977-1981; its successful flight testing of the B-1A
aircraft; its development of alternative designs of
multi-role long-range bombers; and its willingness to put
its own money in the program ahead of time to demonstrate
its commitment. On the other hand, Eaton's inability to
manage its defensive avionics system program properly
delayed the aircraft's IOC and indeed this invited
numerous scrutinies of the program which continue even
today.
The political environment surrounding the B-1B
program included the press, Congress and the Executive
branch. The over-arching Constitution was also consulted
and relied upon to foster the program and justify its
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development. The major events and processes which
influenced the B-lB's development were:
(1) Defense Secretary McNamara's steadfast refusal to
fund the B-70 and AMSA programs (fore-runners to the B-l)
and his insistence upon development of a Tri-Service
aeroplane and a new missile technology. This resulted in
a Constitutional debate in the early and mid 60s, and the
F-111B.
(2) Initiation of the B-1A design changes through
"Project Focus" and "Project Innovation" in 1970 to meet
budget constraints.
(3) Down-playing of the role of manned bomber forces
in the US triad strategy by President Carter which led to
the cancellation of the B-1A program in 1977. He favored
instead the new technology of cruise missiles, which can
be launched into enemy territory from a launch platform
without penetrating enemy air defenses.
(4) A 1987 IOC deadline for the new bomber was
legislated by Congress in 1980. This Congressional mandate
legitimized the Air Force's long-standing need for a
replacement bomber for the aging B-52s.
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(5) President Reagan's plan for rapid buildup of
strategic forces (1981) which compelled the Air Force to
commit to a concurrent program of development, production
and basing of the aircraft. In particular, the defensive
avionics system fell prey to the tight program schedule.
Its limited success with prototyping and testing, brought
public scrutinies in 1987. The propose retrofitting has
delayed full operational status for the bomber.
(6) Micromanagement of the program by Congress,
except during the multiyear procurement period from 1983
to 1986. The micromanagement by Congress kept the Air
Force on its toes and made it run the program on schedule
and abide by the cost limit set by President Reagan.
(7) The role of the Office of the DOT&E during
1985-1986. This office presented a watered-down version of
the B-1B's problems to Congress. Congress was unhappy
about this and in 1987, it initiated two major
investigations of the program.
(8) Numerous public scrutinies which included
Congressional investigations. These scrutinies reinforced
prevailing public concerns about the inefficient defense
acquisition system of the US.
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10.2 My Views on the B-1B Acquisition
In this section, I will present my views on the B-1B
bomber acquisition process. I present them for
consideration by the demanding reader who seeks the utmost
efficiency in defense acquisition, but might have failed
to appreciate the complexity of the issues associated with
the acquisition of the B-1B bomber. The need for an
effective weapons system togetherwith concerns about their
cost effectiveness, and the difficulty in gaining public
support for it, often create an atmosphere of conflict.
This leads to an unreasonably long acquisition cycle. As a
result, the user tends to err on the side of overstating
the threat, and technology may become obsolete by the time
it is deployed. The difference of opinions on weapons
technology, and its cost and schedule estimates among the
contractors, Service leaders, and staff in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, makes the process fragile at
times. The President's preference for a particular
technology adds further complexity. While congressmen have
an interest in program effectiveness, they also have an
intense pragmatic interest in retaining the support of
their own constituencies. These interests are frequently
in conflict as they exert pressure on specific programs
through legislative oversight. Widely publicized
investigations and prosecutions of large defense
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contractors have fostered an impression of widespread cost
overruns, fueling popular mistrust of the defense industry
(United States of America, 1986). In its effort to meet
news deadlines, the popular press often neglects to
research the important facts and ignores historical
perspective on the weapons system development. It has
frequently demanded scrupulous standards of integrity from
the management, and miracles from technology, totally
ignoring political processes which play a major role.
Figure 10-1 on page 449 illustrates the complexity of the
acquisition of the B-1B bomber. Given these underlying
problems and the evolving dynamics that entangle them over
the decades, it is a tribute to the dedication of many
professionals in the system, both in and outside of DOD,
that most programs do not end up in serious trouble
(United States of America, 1986).
With this prologue, I urge the reader to ponder and
debate the following issues on which I offer my views.
Issue: Was the B-1B weapon system a "user pull" type
of acquisition or a "technology push" type of acquisition?
Opinion: In my opinion, it was both a "user pull"
and a "technology push". "User pull" defines the
process by which the users, in this case the Services,
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assess the adequacy of existing weapons systems to meet
military needs and state the characteristics of the next
generation of equipment desired in order to meet
identified mission requirements. The user knows that the
acquisition cycle is usually long, and knowing that the
equipment to meet his requirements is fifteen or twenty
years away, he makes extremely conservative threat
estimates. Long term forecasts are uncertain and may tend
to increase the cost of the system. B-lB's defensive
avionics development was strongly influenced by "user
pull". It was designed in the early 80s to maintain the
B-1B's penetrativity through the mid 90s.
Under a "technology push" process, a government or
industry team conceives of a new advanced technology. It
then tries to persuade users to state requirements that
will exploit the new technology. The advent small gas
turbine engines and guidance system for cruise missiles in
the mid 70s did exactly this, and the birth of the B-lB,
the LRCA version of B-1, was the result of this
"technology push".
Issue: Is the B-1B heavy?
Opinion: Yes. Inclusion of cruise missile standoff
mission capability, resulted in an aircraft which is heavy
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relative to its initial design. As stated in Section 7.3,
the B-lB was designed to carry out six missions including
the cruise missile standoff mission. This multi-role
capability was a great departure from its original two
major flight missions of low-level subsonic penetration
and a high-altitude supersonic cruise, as discussed in
Section 4.3.1. The ALCM mission increased the load factor
of the aircraft (increase in gross takeoff weight from
360,000 lb to 477,000 lb). In addition, fixed geometry
inlet limited the B-1B's capability to a flight Mach
number of 1.3. A new engine development and variable
geometry inlet were not pursued because of the additional
cost and schedule delays. It would have taken 6 to 8
years for this development and would have cost
approximately $700 million. Moreover, the Air Force never
stopped asking for replacements of the aging B-52s. The
B-1A was available on hand, and was a proven technology.
Defense planners were fully aware of these tradeoffs and
the decision was made to go ahead with the B-1B's reduced
performance capability. Unfortunately, the popular press
took no notice of these tradeoffs but later, it came down
too hard on the Air Force in 1987 (Evans, 1987c).
Issue: Did the concurrent development, production,
and basing approach for the B-lB bomber procurement lead
to an under-tested weapons system, delaying its
operational date?
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Opinion: Yes. The concurrency approach delayed the
bomber's operational date. Figure 10-2 on page 460
illustrates the acquisition process in its idealized
conception, in reality and with concurrency (Long and
Reppy, 1980). The B-1A acquisition was based on Packard's
milestone and DSARC approval approach, which was
sequential, and produced a fine aircraft which met all its
requirements except those of avionics; the full
development of this latter system was planned later (see
Chapters 3 and 4 for details).
The B-1B's defensive avionics system development can
be classified as concurrent. This approach is often
characterized by a high rate of production in the early
stages of the program to avoid schedule slippage. The
emergence of technical problems is common in the later
phases of testing and operation, and hence, redesigning,
modifications and retrofitting are common features of the
concurrency approach. The problems of the B-lB defensive
avionics system are proof of this generalization. In part,
the B-1B's facing of such difficulties could be blamed on
Congress' and President Reagan's mandating of its IOC date
which made the DOD emphasize program schedule over weapons
performance.
Issue: What is the real cost of the B-lB bomber?
-4 60-
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Opinion: The answer to this question has been
controversial throughout the development of the bomber
(see Table 8-I on page 295). Though to date, $30.33
billion (then-year dollar sum) has been spent for
acquiring 100 B-lBs, their life cycle cost may run as high
as $100 billion (in then-year sum, see Section 8.2.2). The
estimate of bomber readiness fraction is approximately 30%
for such an assertion. The bomber is comprised of a large
number of complex subsystems. The actual cost involves the
expense to be incurred during various phases of
development of these subsystems. These phases include
basic research, exploratory development, advanced
development, engineering development, management support,
operational systems development, full scale production,
basing, logistics, and operational support throughout the
life of the system. The projected life of the B-lB is 30
years. The life cycle cost, which includes all these costs
as expressed in constant dollars, is the most useful tool
for planning purposes. The life cycle cost estimate takes
into account accepted inflation factors, while then-year
sum cost is more easily understood and most commonly
quoted by the popular press. The estimation of cost often
relies upon historical data, and many times, estimators
tend to err when technical complexity enters into the
process. Various actors in the B-1B acquisition had used
in the past the cost estimate which promoted their views
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on the program, and I see a total lack of uniformity in
such approaches. According to Bezdek (1982 and 1984), in
constant dollar terms, the B-1 cost might have more than
doubled over the past 15 years; this comes to less than 5%
annual cost growth. It is worth reminding the reader that
the B-1B of today is not the same as the B-1 of the early
70s.
Issue: What is the IOC date for the B-1B bomber?
Opinion: For the B-lB, the IOC date was defined by
the Air Force as delivery of the 15th aircraft to SAC. I
caution the reader on the interpretation of the definition
of the IOC date and its use to serve political purposes.
The true meaning varies from weapons system to weapons
system and could only be found in the contract signed by
the Service with the contractor. The term "IOC date" is
loosely defined by the DOD (see Table 8-I on page 295) as
"the first attainment of the capability to employ
effectively a weapon, item of equipment or system of
approved specific characteristics and which is manned or
operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and supported
military unit or force."
Issue: Will the public ever know the actual
performance capability of the aircraft and of its
avionics?
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Opinion: I do not think so. The actual performance
capabilities of the aircraft and its avionics have to be
kept secret for national security reasons. Any reverse
engineering approach on the part of the technically
capable reader will be incomplete because of a lack of
data (see Appendix A for details). One has to learn to
rely upon technical information available in trade
journals, in trade magazines, in Congressional testimony
and reports.
Issue: Was communication on the status of the B-1B
program between the DOD and Congress strained?
Opinion: Yes, on three occasions. The first time the
relations were strained was in 1982, when the GAO was only
able to obtain information for Congress from the CAIG and
the ICA Group about the cost analysis after threatening a
court action (see Section 8.2.3). The second time was in
1987 when the DOT&E's action on assessing the on-going
status of the B-1B was criticized by Congress (United
States Congress, 1987b). The Director, John Krings, was
criticized because he submitted a watered-down version of
the B-1B's problems in his January 1986 test report (see
Section 9.3.1). No panel member was informed about the
real extent of the problems, and Congress was unhappy
about this. The third time was again in 1987, when the GAO
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scrutinized the Air Force for its inadequate logistics
support of the B-1B bomber (United States Congress,
1987a). The GAO cautioned Congress about this inadequacy
as early as 1983 (United States Congress, 1983a). In my
opinion, Congress failed to convey this possibility to the
DOD and as a result, no subsequent action was taken until
the problems surfaced again in 1987, causing new tensions.
Similar problems were reported during the fielding of the
B-52s in the mid 50s but little attention was paid then by
either the DOD or Congress.
Issue: Was Congress able to intervene constructively
in the acquisition program for a complex system such as
the B-1B?
Opinion: No, not really. As discussed earlier,
a congressman's interests are frequently in conflict as he
exerts pressure on programs through legislative oversight.
On one side large sums of public money are at stake and
program effectiveness is most desired, while on the other
hand he sees a need for such a program to benefit his
constituents. Congressional oversight of military programs
is not a simple task. The budget is large and is presented
in considerable detail; it includes hundreds of line
items. The technical complexities of the programs are
daunting to a group whose members are for the most part
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graduates of law schools and there is a tendency to go
along with DOD's opinion. Through their limited
professional staff, and through the GAO, frequent
scrutinies of the B-1B bomber program kept the Air Force
on its toes, forcing it to manage the program with a tight
budget and on schedule. But in my opinion, the true
control resides mainly in the hands of the Services. No
one else in the system has the information and the
financial and the staff resources to wield the day-to-day
influence over the program. Moreover, no one can match the
military man's unique claim to understanding of military
requirements. For this reason, the battle for civilian
control of the acquisition process will always be uphill.
Issue: Has the popular press behaved responsibly
when it came to reporting the issues and problems related
to the B-1B?
Opinion: Not always. Through its reporting on
the B-1B, the popular press has reinforced the following
public opinions (United States of America, 1986):
(1) There was considerable waste and fraud in the
B-1B acquisition.
(2) The B-1B's major contractors are guilty of fraud.
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(3) The Air Force has been a willing accomplice in
helping to develop an aircraft which does not work.
(4) The goal of reducing fraud and waste could be
served through the development and enforcement of a strict
code of conduct and by imposing severe penalties on
contractors for illegal actions.
However, throughout the program, not a single case of
illegal action or fraud was proved in court. These actions
are discussed in Section 8.1.1. for Rockwell's
investigation for charging lobbying expenses to government
contracts, and in Section 8.2.2 for allegations of
improper lobbying by DOD personnel of B-lB aircraft. The
press failed to report these developments in any detail.
The popular press, in my opinion, also failed to
inform the public on the role of political forces, and of
the implications of its cruise missile carrying role which
led to deletion of the B-lB's high-altitude supersonic
capability. The press, with its limited knowledge of
complex technologies and economics, failed to separate
fact from myth, and used discrepant information to make
the sensational news. These trade tactics were most
obvious when it came to reporting facts, whether they
concerned GAO's straightforward findings or the B-1B's
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second tragic crash in 1987. I found a great discrepancy
even in the reporting of the altitude of the aircraft
climb after the bird strike. The national newspapers
seemed incapable of reporting even the verifiable fact
such as the altitude of aircraft climb after the bird
strike. Evans' (1987c) action of reporting his views on
the program was brave and commendable, but he too, in my
opinion, found himself dealing with well accepted cost
controversy and the isolated use of technical numbers. In
particular, I found his allegations on the integrity of
DOD's personnel harsh. Through him, the popular press was
successful in providing venue to a "whistle blower", and
to that extent, it does deserve credit. Evans' action led
to two major investigations of the B-1B program but, those
investigations were of marginal influence in solving the
problems faced by the defensive avionics system of the
aircraft.
In addition, the popular press took no interest in
generating public debate on the subject of opportunity
costs of the B-lB program (see Appendix B for details),
and Bezdek's (1982) work, though of fundamental importance
and of high quality, went completely unnoticed. A debate
on the violation of SALT II Treaty in the light of the
B-lB's cruise missiles carrying capability also never
surfaced in the popular press. On the other hand,
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technical magazines and trade journals did an excellent
job of reporting the B-1B issues. The popular press should
study techniques practiced by their technical colleagues
in trade journals and magazines when it comes to reporting
such complex issues.
Issue: What is the real extent of the cost savings in
the B-1B program?
Opinion: The answer to this question has been a
matter of controversy. For the B-1B program, the cost
saving efforts included low cost alternatives (government
furnished equipment, see Table 4-III on page 159),
productivity enhancement through techmod program (see
Section 8.3.3) and multiyear procurement program (see
Section 8.2.4). Crocker (1986) and Fox (1984) discuss the
general theory behind the relation of these efforts to
saving on cost. In my opinion, providing government
furnished avionics equipment indeed saves the
developmental cost of new equipment, but the furnished
equipment's integration into the B-1B was a nightmare for
software engineers, and I found no cost-benefit analysis
of this approach. Productivity enhancement was introduced
to the B-1B program with the hope of large savings, but
its' true extent has never been disclosed. Cost savings
was the popular argument in justifying the B-1B as a
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matured program and hence granting it a multiyear
procurement status. The projected savings ($1 billion in
1981 dollars, see Section 8.5.1) were taken away from the
program in FY 1986, but were not returned when the Air
Force requested them in early 1987 upon the disclosure
that the ECM avionics system development was facing
technical difficulties. The Air Force's request was $600
million but, its estimate of funds needed to solve
aircraft's avionics problems was $2.6 billion (see Chapter
9 for details). In my research, I found no long term
cost-benefit analysis of the multiyear concurrent
procurement program, and the real extent of such savings
probably will never be known. In my opinion, such savings
estimates are used as political rhetoric and do not
reflect an effort to seek real cost savings while
procuring an effective weapons system.
The issue of economic production, which might have
saved money, was never raised for the B-lB's production.
In the early 70s, the plan was to produce 244 aircraft and
in the early 80s, that number was reduced to 100. Economy
of scale certainly saves money, but this rationale, to my
knowledge, was never applied. Budgetary constraint was the
sole driving force in picking these numbers. According to
Crocker (1986), the budgetary battles between actual
procurement funding, five year defense plan funding, full
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procurement funding, and economic production rate based
procurement funding, have in general, sought a sensible
compromise. Table 10-V on page 471 presents Crocker's
estimate of such savings through acquisition improvement
programs for 1981 through 1989. Indeed everybody is for
cost savings, but the question is how much. Sensible cost
saving efforts should always be encouraged rather than
merely used for political purposes.
10.3 Recommendations
Problems facing defense acquisition are not new nor
are they unique to DOD. They are, I believe, typical of
the way in which large democratic bureaucracies manage
large multiyear, multibillion dollar programs which
incorporate complex state of the art technologies. Many
comparable civil programs like highway projects, water
projects, large processing plants and public buildings
experience similar cost growth to that of many defense
programs (United States of America, 1986). However, the
questions are, what level of excellence can be achieved in
defense programs, and, what are the ways of improving the
efficiency of the overall defense acquisition system. The
recommendations provided here are not for the B-1B program
in particular but rather they are general. They are
adapted from United States of America (1986), wherein the
President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management
-471-
Acquisition Improvement Program:
Total Estimated Savings, 1981-1989 (in billions)
Acquisition Total Savings
Lower cost alternatives 1.4
Productivity enhancements .5
Multiyear contracting 4.7
Economic production rates 2.8
Cancel!Reduce marginal programs 18.7
Other 6.2
Total 34.3
Table 10-V: Estimated Savings from Acquisition
Improvement Programs
I
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discussed the formula for action based on an acquisition
model they found worth emulating. The Commission relied
upon the Defense Science Board Study which compared DOD's
development programs with successful programs from private
industries. In particular, case studies for the
development of the IBM 360 computer, the Boeing 767
airtransport, the Hughes' communication satellite and the
AT&T telephone switch were relied upon. Based on that
study, I recommend that the following features, which were
typical of successful commercial programs, should be
adapted by Congress, DOD, the defense industry and the
popular press:
(1) There should be a short, unambiguous chain of
command between the program management and the top
management of the relevant Service.
(2) There must exist a stability in support through
out the life of the program. A multiyear procurement
program approach should be used for providing such
stability. A two year limit is desirable as indicated by
the Constitution of the United States of America,
Preamble, Article I, Section 8 (Tribe, 1978). Such a limit
maintains the principles of separation of powers in
various branches of the government, providing ample
opportunities for Congress to intervene.
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(3) Program reporting requirements should be limited
to a focus on deviations from the original plans once the
commitment is undertaken.
(4) New strict standards should be developed and
adhered to when it comes to government-defense industry
accountability. The contractors' standard of conduct and
their internal auditing should be of highest quality. The
government's auditing and oversight activities should be
consistent and limited in number. They should be used to
foster program development by helping to solve the
problems faced by the program once the commitment is made.
To reduce biases, reviews by independent experts should be
preferred by Congress as a micromanagement tool, over any
other internal investigation. Scheduling and cost should
be compared with available weapons effectiveness, and due
changes should be initiated according to need. Appropriate
actions should be taken to break the DOD's prevailing
public image of "willing accomplice" (see Section 8.2.2),
and due law enforcement should be instituted for any
illegal conduct of contractors.
(5) The entire program staff should be very high in
quality. A greater attempt should be made to draw upon
industry's experience in defense program management. The
"revolving door" policy's implications should be examined
-474-
from time to time to prevent any misuse by contractors for
their personal gain.
(6) Right from the conception of the program,
dialogue should be established with the operational
command, and this dialogue should play an important part
in any performance tradeoffs because of developmental
problems. The goal should be to acquire an effective
weapons system rather than to save money and to maintain
time schedule in a spirit of blind principle.
(7) Before the final design is authorized for
production, any unproven or state-of-the-art technology
used in prototype hardware should be completely tested in
simulated operational conditions with the full confidence
of the operational command. The Office of the DOT&E should
play a more active role in establishing guidelines for
such testing.
(8) When it comes to reporting defense acquisition,
the popular press should study reporting techniques
practiced by their technical colleagues in trade journals
and magazines.
With this, I would like to conclude my thesis. I
sincerely hope that the facets of the policy analysis and
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processes illuminated by my work may some day help a
decision maker to craft a strategy for rejecting or
acquiring a large scale and complex technology in general,
and new bombers in particular. However, I wonder whether
sophisticated policy analysis would have led to an
efficient policy choice for a grand-macroproject such as
the B-1B.
I conclude by quoting Rep. Les Aspin (D.- Wis)
(Isaacs, 1982), who once said: "When President Ford was
for the B-1, Congress was for the B-1. When President
Carter was against the B-1, Congress was against the B-1.
And finally, President Reagan supported the bomber and so
did Congress."
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Appendix A
PREDICTED PERFORMANCE OF THE B-1B BOMBER
This section presents part of the information which
was requested by Representative Mrs. Barbara Boxer of
California, a member of the Research and Development
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee of the
one hundredth Congress of the United States of America.
Rep. Boxer requested the GAO in May 1987, to provide
information on the performance characteristics of the B-1B
bomber (Evans, 1987a). The following information was
submitted by the Air Force to the GAO:
(1) The best cruise altitude of the B-1B bomber
(2) The B-1B aircraft engine performance (obtained
using simulated ground testings) at various throttle
settings, flight Mach numbers and altitudes, and
(3) The predicted lift/drag ratio for the bomber for
different weights, flight Mach numbers, and altitudes, at
different sweep angles of the wings.
Figures A-1 through A-6 on page 477 through 482
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Figure A-5: Lift/Drag Ratio vs. Flight Mach Number
for the B-lB Bomber
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respectively, present typical data. These data were
thought useful to predict the aircraft performance at
take-off, cruise and the high subsonic low altitude
penetration portion of the major designed mission.
Using the fundamentals of flight mechanics (Miele,
1962; Shevelle, 1983), the author attempted to calculate
the take-off distance, endurance, range, and service and
ceiling heights for the B-lB bomber. Because of the
unavailability of the following additional technical
information, such a reverse engineering approach was not
found to be successful. The missing information was on:
(1) Lift coefficient vs. angle of attack data (with
and without slats and flaps fully extended) for the
airfoil used on the bomber and the fixed angle of attack
on the wing (believed to be between 8.5 to 10 degrees).
(2) Installed engine in-flight performance (believed
to be 7 to 22% above that provided in Figures A-2 and A-3
on page 478 and 479 respectively) including specific fuel
consumption at various altitudes, flight Mach numbers at
various different engine settings.
(3) Lift/drag characteristics of the fully loaded
bomber (take-off weight of 477,000 pounds) at the wing
sweep angle
configuration.
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of 15 degrees during the take-off
(4) Total wing area with both the slats and flaps
fully extended.
This information is believed to be classified for
national security reasons.
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Appendix B
OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF THE B-lB BOMBER PROGRAM
Calculating the dollar cost of the B-1B Bomber
program does not reveal its true price. To determine that,
the opportunity cost involved in creating the system must
be considered (Sapolsky, 1977). The $30.33 billion in
then-year funds allocated to the B-1B bomber program had
many alternative uses, all of which had to be sacrificed
with the decision to produce the B-lBs. The value of the
B-lBs lies in the difference between the benefits obtained
by building the system and those that could have been
obtained by doing something else with the same resources.
There are two ways of measuring the opportunity costs
of the B-1B bomber. They are :
(1) Employment and energy impacts of the B-1
procurement (Bezdek, 1982)
(2) Another equivalent defense projects.
A brief discussion of these are included in following
sections.
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B.1 Employment and Energy Impacts of the B-1 Procurement
Bezdek (1982) studied the job-creating potential of
the B-1 program as opposed to other uses of the same
funds. His results are summarized in Table B-I on page
487. The table shows the total employment (number of jobs)
and the total energy requirements (in British Thermal
Units, BTUs) likely to be generated per billion dollar
(1975 constant dollars) expenditures on B-1 procurement
and on 11 other federal programs: US Army Corps of
Engineers Projects, Education, Sanitation, National Health
Programs, Social Security, Law Enforcement, Highway
Construction, Mass Transit Construction, Public Housing,
Welfare Payments and Conservation and Recreation. His
study shows that dollar for dollar, development of the B-1
bomber is likely to generate fewer jobs and require more
energy than most of the other Federal programs.
Bezdek (1982) further says that neither employment
nor energy is a heterogeneous commodity: total employment
is composed of manpower in different occupations with
different levels of skills and educations while a BTU of
energy can be generated from several different types of
energy resources. Different government programs tend to
generate requirements for unique occupations and energy
sources. The results of his studies are summarized in
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Program Manpower Energy
(Total Number (Billion of
of Jobs) BTUs)
B-1 Procurement 58,591 4,582
1. Army Corps of Engineers Project 69,384 5,614
2. Education 118,191 2,970
3. Sanitation 78,954 3,728
4. National Health Program 133,717 3,225
5. Social Security Program 108,196 4,402
6. Law Enforcement 75,601 3,401
7. Highway Construction 84,933 6,103
8. Mass Transit Construction 83,536 1,928
9. Public Housing 84,524 5,973
10. Welfare Payments 99,406 5,502
11. Conservation and Recreation 88,415 4,138
Table B-I: Comparison of Manpower and Energy Use
for Various Programs
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Table B-II on page 489. It lists impacts on requirements
for selected occupations and selected energy sources per
billion dollars (1975 constant dollars) on B-1
procurement, Educational Programs, Highway Construction,
Health Programs and Mass Transit Construction. The major
point to note from these data is that each program listed
generates a set of unique requirements for different types
of energy and for different occupations. Bezdek contends
that because the labor force availability varies from
state to state, policy makers should be sensitive to the
regions and workers who are adversely affected as a result
of resource allocation.
B.2 Equivalent Defense Projects
Under the political conditions prevailing in the
years 1970-1987, the money would have been allocated to
another equivalent defense project if it had not been
allocated to the B-1B bomber program. What, then, were the
defense alternatives which were sacrificed for the B-1B
Bombers?
Over the past 32 years, at three different times, the
Administration and the Congress debated the issue of
canceling the alternative equivalent defense system in
favor of B-1 program. The first such debate took place in
1969 (Brownlow, 1969). Air Force plans for the FB-111, a
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B-1 Educn. Highway Health Mass
Prcmt. Const. Programs Transit
Const.
Energy (Billions of BTUs)
Coal 1,748 950 1,764 477 184
Crude Oil 2,573 1,870 4,125 1,259 693
Refined Oil 1,287 948 2,154 700 325
Electricity 48 252 358 190 86
Natural Gas 1,379 975 1,957 628 378
Selected Occupations (Total Number of Jobs)
Aeronautical Engineers 703 34 39 31 7
Chemical Engineers 103 74 85 107 47
Civil Engineers 244 410 801 183 1,526
Mechanical Engineers 1,077 300 266 245 249
Chemists 487 188 49 317 246
Biological Scientists 47 64 160 120 9
Physicists 99 32 43 32 17
Physicians and Dentists 22 1,227 22 1,963 27
School Teachers (Pr.& Sec.) 21 14,504 51 1,814 15
College Teachers 16 2,835 9 289 3
Economists 40 25 29 31 8
Statisticians 44 37 33 49 15
Psychologists 7 179 9 206 2
Architects 30 64 67 41 29
Carpenters 208 255 3,491 218 7,466
Concrete Finishers 21 164 365 28 809
Electricians 598 678 1,276 277 2,351
Structural Metalworkers 308 171 351 32 709
Machinists 1,693 410 499 171 290
lariers [sic] 24 40 73 17 137
Opticians 30 29 13 49 6
Semiskilled Textile Workers 126 94 49 477 74
Drivers & Deliveryment 1,483 2,924 4,613 2,237 3,806
Welders 1,118 574 922 190 1,026
Table B-II: Comparison of Requirements Generated for
Occupations and Energy Sources by Selected Programs
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bomber, variant of fighter design originally imposed on
that service by former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
in lieu of a formal AMSA approval (see Chapter 2 for
details) called for the procurement of 253 of the
aircraft. With the budget squeeze imposed by mounting
Vietnam war costs, this figure subsequently was trimmed to
126. Then, as a result of the Liard-Packard reprogramming
package for fiscal year (FY) 1970, the proposed FB-111 buy
was reduced to 76. The price equivalent of 50 FB-llls was
allocated to help begin full scale development of the Air
Force's long-sought-for AMSA. Thus 50 FB-llls were lost in
favor of AMSA which eventually became the B-1B bomber.
In June 1976, action on a Senate amendment to defer
procurement funds for two months of the Rockwell
International B-1 bomber in a House-Senate Conference
Committee was thought to be linked to difference in
funding for a Navy shipbuilding program and reduction in
cost for military power (B-l, Shipbuilding Fund Trade-off
Possible", 1976). Funds proposed for the Defense
Department's military procurement for the FY 1977 vary
from $33.4 billion in the House version to $31.8 billion
in the Senate. A major factor involved in resolving the
House and Senate difference in funding was associated with
an almost $1.5 billion variation between $7.4 billion
total procurement for shipbuilding and conversion in the
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House bill and $5.97 billion in the Senate version. At the
time, the amount sought for the B-1A production for the
same FY was $1.5 billion; since there were no funds linked
to the Culver amendment (see Chapter 5 for details), which
sought postponing of the B-1 procurement from November 30,
1976, until February 1, 1977, after the presidential
inauguration, the key issue was either the B-1 or the
shipbuilding program.
The third time debate was about continuing B-1B
production at the expense of the stealth bomber.
Tri-Services' FY 1986 program objective memorandum
(Robinson, 1984) caused this debate. Defense Secretary
Casper W. Weinberger cautioned Air Force leaders then that
the Reagan Administration's strategic modernization plan
called for production of 100 B-lBs and 132 advanced
technology stealth bombers. Weinberger's action was based
on a report from members of Congress to the White House
that some Air Force officers were seeking to foster
continued production of the B-1B with improvements to
obtain a second increment of 100 aircraft. The second
batch would be called B-lCs and would apply technology to
reduce the radar cross section.
The services memorandum suggested that if more than
100 B-lBs were to be produced on the line, approximately
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$500 million would be required in FY 1986 long-lead
production funding. The Northrup stealth bomber was
estimated at $34 billion with some $4 billion already
invested in development of the program then. Some USAF
officials told Congress that an additional 100 B-1Cs could
be procured for approximately $10 billion . Keeping the
stealth bomber in its development stage could free
approximately $20 billion that could be applied to other
programs that were high priorities. Thus, any attempt to
extend the production of B-lBs beyond the 100 called for
would cut into the funding for a line item in Air Force FY
1986 Defense budget under the name "Aurora", the name for
the advanced technology stealth bomber (Kozicharow, 1985).
This line item requested $80 million in FY 1986 for
long-lead items and $2.27 billion in FY 1987. This issue
of the B-1/stealth bomber alternative is further discussed
in Chapters 8 and 9.
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